MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, District Judge.

Petitioner Damion Cox brings this petition (the "Petition") for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Pet. (Dkt. 1)1.) Petitioner, who, at the time of his sentencing, was a Permanent Resident Alien of the United States, argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him that he would likely be deported ifconvicted. (Id. at ECF pp. 4, 14-17.) For the following reasons, the Petition is DENIED as untimely.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 19, 2015, Petitioner entered a guilty plea before this court to a single-count information, which charged him with use of a passport procured by false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1542. (See Aug. 19, 2015, Min. Entry (Crim. Dkt. 14)2; see also Information (Crim. Dkt. 12).) The court sentenced Petitioner to twelve months' imprisonment, followed by a one-year term ofsupervised release. (J.(Crim. Dkt. 20).) No appeal was filed.3 Petitioner is now in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement("ICE"). (See Pet.)

On March 24, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Pet.) Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because counsel informed him that "there would be no negative immigration consequences" if Petitioner entered a guilty plea. (See Pefr Aff. in Supp. of Pet.("Aff")(Dkt. 1 at ECF p. 14) ¶ 4.) Specifically, Petitioner claims that counsel told him that if he entered a guilty plea,"[rjemoval from the USA would not occur." (Id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner further avers that had he been properly advised that his guilty plea"would have profound negative consequences on [his] status as a Lawful Permanent Resident," he would not have entered a guilty plea. (Id. ¶ 5.)

The Government responds that Petitioner's § 2255 petition should be denied because (1)the Petition is time barred; (2) Petitioner waived his right to appeal; and (3) Petitioner's claims fail on the merits because trial counsel "advised [Petitioner] of the immigration consequences of a plea, as did th[e] Court." (Gov't Opp'n to Pet. ("Gov't Opp'n")(Dkt. 3) at 3-4.)

II. DISCUSSION

The threshold question for this court is whether the Petition is timely. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 2255 petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The one-year limitations period runs from the latest of:

Id.

As Petitioner's judgment of conviction was entered on January 6, 2016 (J.), his conviction became final for purposes of § 2255 on January 20, 2016. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(providing that a criminal defendant's notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 14 days after the entry ofjudgment); Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005)(per curiam)("[F]or purposes of § 2255 motions, an unappealed federal criminal judgment becomes final when the time for filing a direct appeal expires."). Petitioner filed the instant Petition on March 24, 2017. (Pet.) Accordingly, Petitioner did not file the Petition within a year of the judgement becoming final, so the Petition is untimely under § 2225(f) unless Petitioner can demonstrate that he satisfied one of the conditions listed in § 2225(f)(2)-(4).4

Petitioner avers that his Petition is timely under § 2225(f)(4), as he did not discover counsel's "erroneous advice" until he was placed in ICE custody and his immigration attorney explained to him that trial counsel's advice "was not correct."5 (Pet. ¶ 18.) Under § 2255(f)(4), the one-year time period begins to run "when a duly diligent person in petitioner's circumstances would have discovered" the facts supporting a particular claim. Wims v. United States. 225 F.3d 186, 190(2d Cir. 2000). For Petitioner, that fact is his likely deportation.

Petitioner's claim of ignorance is belied by the record. Petitioner should have known, for purposes of § 2255, that he likely faced deportation as a result of his conviction well before that conviction was final.

First, Petitioner's trial counsel maintains that after consulting with an immigration attorney, he advised Petitioner that Petitioner would be likely to be deported if he entered a guilty plea.6 (Aff. of Harlan Protass ("Protass Aff.")(Dkt. 3-3) ¶¶ 8, 9.)

Second, the court advised Petitioner of the immigration consequences of his conviction before Petitioner entered his guilty plea. On August 19, 2015, Petitioner waived his right to indictment by grand jury and entered a guilty plea to a single-count information. (Guilty Plea Hr'g Tr,("Plea Tr.")(Dkt. 3-2)7:20-8:25, 17:4-24:16.) Prior to entering his guilty plea, the court advised Petitioner that he would be subject to certain penalties associated with pleading guilty to the charge of passport fraud. (Plea Tr. 18:15-19:18.) The court specifically advised Petitioner that he would be "subject to removal or deportation of the United States in a separate proceeding brought by the Department ofHomeland Security at the end of [his] prison sentence." (Id. 19:4-8.) After Petitioner confirmed that he understood the penalties associated with pleading guilty, the court reiterated its prior warning about immigration consequences: "And, in particular, do you understand that by pleading guilty, you are subject to a proceeding for deportation and removal from the United States at the conclusion of your sentence?" (Id. 19:9-14.) Petitioner once again stated that he understood. (Id. 19:15.)

Third, Petitioner's own sentencing submission demonstrates that prior to his sentencing. Petitioner was aware of the immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea to the information. On December 30, 2015, Petitioner submitted a sentencing memorandum, seeking a non-custodial sentence. (Pet'r Sentencing Mem. (Crim. Dkt. 17).) On three separate occasions in the memorandum, Petitioner acknowledges that an incarceratory sentence will likely result in his removal from the United States. He states that(1)a prison sentence "likely also would result in his deportation from the United States;"(2)he is "acutely aware of the impact it may have on his family and loved ones if this Court imposes a term of imprisonment(and/or if he is deported)"; and(3)"potential deportation" would impact his children and their mothers. (Pet'r Sentencing Mem. at 5, 6, 15.)

Finally, during Petitioner's sentencing hearing on January 6, 2016, Petitioner, Petitioner's counsel, and the court all made explicit mentions of the high probability of deportation following the entering of a guilty plea. (Sentencing Hr'g (Dkt. Num. Pend.) at 20, 21, 27, 29, 30.) Specifically, Petitioner's counsel stated that "if he is in prison, it is almost certain that he will be deported at the time that his terms of imprisonment ends." (Id. 20:13-20:17.) Petitioner, in his own statement before the court, stated that he was fearful of the emotional and financial impact on his children "if I [were] deported back to Jamaica." (Id. 27:14-27:15.) And, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court informed Petitioner that "at the end of your sentence, you will be subject to a separate proceeding by the Department of Homeland Security for your removal." (Id. 30:20-30:22.)

Under these circumstances, a duly diligent person in Petitioner's position would have discovered that he was subject to deportation well before sentencing, and certainly by the time his conviction became final in 2016. Therefore, the Petition is untimely, and it is denied on this basis.

III. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the Petition (Dkt. 1) is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.