OPINION

FREDA L. WOLFSON, District Judge.

Defendant Mark Anderson, M.D. ("Defendant" or "Dr. Anderson") moves to dismiss the Complaint of Ronald Dapuzzo ("Mr. Dapuzzo") and Paula Dapuzzo ("Mrs. Dapuzzo") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Plaintiffs allege a medical malpractice action that resulted in injuries to Plaintiffs, both New Jersey residents, while Mr. Dapuzzo was under the medical care of Defendant, a Pennsylvania resident, at a Pennsylvania hospital. Before the court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to the another venue, specifically the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404.

Defendant argues that the District of New Jersey is an improper venue because the Defendant does not reside in the state and because no conduct giving rise to the Complaint occurred in New Jersey. The Court disagrees and finds that the District of New Jersey is a proper venue for this case. Further, the court finds that there are no grounds warranting transfer of the case to another venue. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint and are accepted as true for the purposes of this motion to dismiss. The Court need not recount all facts and instead recounts only those relevant to a discussion of venue. In 2011, Mr. Dapuzzo began consulting with Dr. Anderson at Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital in New Brunswick, New Jersey. Compl. ¶ 1:2. Mr. Dapuzzo and Dr. Anderson met throughout 2011 and 2012 to discuss cardiac surgery. Id. at ¶ 1:5. Thereafter, Dr. Anderson relocated to Pennsylvania to take a position at Albert Einstein Medical Center ("AEMC"), in Philadelphia. Civil Motion Statement of Reasons, Dapuzzo v. Anderson, No. OCN-L-1461-14 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. Sept. 19, 2014). Dr. Anderson performed an aortic valve replacement surgery at AEMC on June 21, 2012. Id. at ¶ 1:7. Plaintiffs allege that during this surgery and subsequent hospital stay in Philadelphia, the negligent conduct of Dr. Anderson, individually and as an agent of the hospital, resulted in injuries to Mr. Dapuzzo. Id. at ¶¶ 1:6-8. Additionally, Mrs. Dapuzzo alleges derivative loss of consortium stemming from her husband's injuries. Id. at ¶ 3:4.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Ocean County, on May 21, 2014. On August 11, 2014, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case based on, inter alia, improper venue. The Honorable Mark A. Troncone, J.S.C. denied the motion on September 14, 2014. Defendant then removed the case to the District Court of New Jersey on September 30, 2014. Defendant again moves for dismissal on the basis of improper venue. In the alternative, Defendant moves to transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3), a district court may dismiss an action for improper venue. The burden to show improper venue is on the moving party. Myers v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 695 F.2d 716, 724-25 (3d Cir. 1982). "[A] plaintiff's choice of venue is accorded deference, especially when that choice is plaintiff's home forum." MacKay v. Donovan, 747 F.Supp.2d 496, 502 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970)). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, courts "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint, unless those allegations are contradicted by the defendants' affidavits." Bookman v. First Am. Marketing Corp., 459 F. App'x 157, 158 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pierce v. Shorty Small's of Branson Inc., 137 F.3d 1190, 1192 (10th Cir. 1998)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain any specific venue provisions or requirements. The Court must determine whether venue is proper in accordance with the nature of the action when deciding a motion to dismiss for improper venue. See Albright v. W.L. Gord & Associates, Inc., No. 02-304, 2002 WL 1765340, at *3 (D. Del. July 31, 2002) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

a. Venue

Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the case because the District of New Jersey is an improper venue. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3). Defendant points to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the federal statute generally governing venue. § 1391 provides that venue shall be proper in:

Id. § 1391(b). Defendant claims that venue cannot be proper under § 1391(b)(1) because Defendant resides in Pennsylvania, not New Jersey. Defendant further argues that venue is not proper under § 1391(b)(2) because the Complaint avers that Defendant was negligent in Pennsylvania only, and so New Jersey is not a district "in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." Id. § 1391(b)(2). It appears that Defendant argues that venue is improper under § 1391 and thus, dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).1

However, contrary to Defendant's argument, § 1391 does not apply to actions removed to federal court.2 28 U.S.C. § 1390(c) explains that the federal venue statute "shall not determine the district court to which a civil action pending in a state court may be removed." Id.; Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663, 665 (1953) ("§ 1391 has no application to [a] . . . removed action."); see also Fantis Imps., Inc. v. Hellas Imp., Ltd., No. 07-0544 (JAG), 2008 WL 1790425, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2008) (citing Polizzi, 345 U.S. at 665). Instead, under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a properly removable case3 must be removed "to the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." Id. § 1441(a). This is true even when that federal district would not have been a proper venue under § 1391 had the case been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §1390(c). Here, because the case was removed from Ocean County to the United States District Court of the District of New Jersey, the proper "district and division" under § 1441(a), venue is proper.4

b. Transfer

In the alternative, Defendant moves to transfer this case to the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania due to improper venue. Transfer under § 1406(a) for improper venue is unavailable to Defendant because, again, venue is proper under § 1441. The appropriate transfer statute, then, would be 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See, e.g., Nat'l Asset Mgmt. v. Coleman, Civ. No. 10-16, 2010 WL 3338343, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2010) ("In removed cases, the transfer of a case to another district is controlled by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) which permits a district court to transfer a case to another district for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice."); Thorlabs, Inc. v. Townsend Commc'ns, LLC., No. CIV.A. 03-4550 (JCL), 2004 WL 1630488, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. June 30, 2004) (citing Chicosky v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 979 F.Supp. 316, 319 (D.N.J. 1997)).

A court may elect to transfer the action to another venue, even when venue is currently proper, "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877, n.3 (3d Cir. 1995). § 1404(a) has been interpreted to encompass factors beyond the three named in the statute to include all relevant private and public interests affected by the transfer. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879; see also Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946). Courts then balance "all relevant factors to determine whether . . . the litigation would more conveniently proceed and the interest of justice be better served by transfer to a different forum." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.

Here, Defendants do not move to transfer under §1404(a), and even if the Court were to construe Defendant's alternative motion to transfer as one made pursuant to § 1404(a), Defendant makes no substantive arguments to further such a motion. Instead, Defendant simply reiterates his claim that the events giving rise to this action occurred in another forum. The only other support proffered by Defendant is a Pennsylvania state law that requires professional medical liability actions to be brought "in the county in which the cause of action arose." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101.1(b). However, this law is irrelevant to this Court's determination of whether a transfer is appropriate. "Because questions of venue . . . are essentially procedural, rather than substantive, in nature, federal law applies in diversity cases irrespective of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, (1938)." Jumara, 55 F.3d at 877 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Thus, this Court finds Defendant has not met his burden in proving that transfer is appropriate. This action will remain in the District of New Jersey.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss, or alternatively, motion to transfer is DENIED. An appropriate Order shall follow.