MEMORANDUM ORDER

MICHAEL A. SHIPP, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion for default judgment of Trustees of the B.A.C. Local 4 Pension and Annuity Funds, Trustees of the New Jersey B.A.C. Health Fund, Trustees of the New Jersey BM&P Apprentice and Education Fund, Trustees of the Bricklayers & Trowel Trades International Fund (collectively "Funds"), and Richard Tolson, as Administrator of B.A.C. Administrative District Council of New Jersey (the "Union") (collectively "Plaintiffs"). (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiffs brought suit against C & C Ripoll Masonry, Inc. ("C & C Ripoll" or "Defendant") under the Employee Retirement Security Income Act of 1974 ("ERISA") and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"), seeking to collect delinquent employer contributions to employee benefit plans that Defendant was required to withhold from its employees' pay and forward to the union. (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)

Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a court "to enter a default judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive pleading." Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F.Supp.2d 532, 535 (D.N.J. 2008). Default judgment is left "primarily to the discretion of the district court." Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, it is preferable that "cases be disposed of on the merits whenever practicable." Id. at 1181. "[P]rior to entering default judgment, the Court must ensure that it has proper jurisdiction over the action," and that a legitimate cause of action has been asserted. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Nat'l Metals & Minerals Imp. & Exp. Corp., 596 F.Supp.2d 842, 849 (D.N.J. 2008). By virtue of the default, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, except those factual allegations related to the amount of damages. DIRECTV Inc. v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 165 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990)).

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiffs' default judgment motion.1 In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiffs asserted a legitimate cause of action. The Complaint asserts that: (1) C & C Ripoll and the Union are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"); (2) pursuant to the CBA, C & C Ripoll must make specified contributions to the Funds and forward dues check-offs and other contributions to the Union; and (3) from January 9 through October 6, 2014, C & C Ripoll's employees performed covered work on the G Wing of Ramapo College in Mahwah, New Jersey, but failed to make $28,999.55 in required contributions to the Funds and failed to remit $2,001.57 in required dues check-offs to the Union. (Compl. ifif 11-14.)

Plaintiffs' motion papers indicate that after this action was commenced, Defendant paid all required contributions and dues check-offs owed, excluding interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. (Declaration of Gary Mercadante ("Mercadante Decl.") ¶ 6, ECF No. 7.) Plaintiffs, therefore, request judgment in the amount of $8,749.86, which represents interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. (Id. ¶ 13.)

The Court must deny Plaintiffs' motion. Local Civil Rule 7.l(d)(1) provides that:

L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). Plaintiffs did not file a legal brief pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1) or a statement that no brief was necessary. In addition, the Court is not clear regarding Plaintiffs' calculation of interest damages. Plaintiffs' motion provides that: (1) employees of Defendant performed covered work on the project from January 9 through October 6, 2014; (2) Defendant failed to make $28,999.55 in required contributions to the Funds; and (3) "Employers [were] liable for the payment of delinquent Contributions with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum (calculated from the Due Date) for local funds." (Mercante Decl. ¶¶ 5, 10 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs then set forth how they calculated interest in this case:

(Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs, however, do not explain how calculating interest from the midpoint of the delinquencies results in the accurate amount of interest owed. Absent a more thorough explanation, the Court would be required to accept Plaintiffs' assertion that calculating the delinquency from July 1, 2014, yields the accurate amount of interest. While the Court accepted the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint as to Defendant's liability, it cannot accept the interest calculation provided in Plaintiffs' default judgment motion as to interest damages.

Accordingly,

IT IS on this 29th day of January 2016, hereby ORDERED that: