MATTHEW W. BRANN, District Judge.
Defendants moved to dismiss Counts IV and V of Plaintiffs' Complaint. For the reasons that follow, that motion will be granted.
Plaintiffs are joint owners of an office building in Arkansas.
On July 24, 2014, JS Partners ("JSP") made an offer to purchase the office building.
At that time, one of the building's largest tenants was Blue Cross Blue Shield ("BCBS"), whose lease was set to expire on June 30, 2016.
Plaintiffs' Complaint contains claims for breach of contract (Count I), breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), breach of fiduciary duty (Count III), negligence (Count IV), and constructive fraud (Count V). As relevant here, Plaintiffs' negligence claim is based on allegations that Defendants failed to exercise "due care, skill, and diligence" when considering JSP's offer, which negligence led Plaintiffs, mistakenly, to decline the offer.
On February 22, 2018, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' negligence claim should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it is untimely.
Both parties agree that the relevant statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' negligence claim is two years.
Plaintiffs, however, argue that the relevant starting date for limitations purposes should be June 30, 2016, when BCBS's lease expired, since (1) the expiration of BCBS's lease damaged Plaintiffs (through a decline in the value of the building), and (2) a claim for negligence does not accrue until "it is complete with all of its elements," including the damages element.
Plaintiffs next argue that they should be able to utilize the "discovery rule," which "postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action."
It appears, therefore, that Plaintiffs' negligence claim is untimely; it will consequently be dismissed. The dismissal, however, will be without prejudice, and Plaintiffs may amend their Complaint in order to rectify the above-identified deficiencies, if desired and if possible.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' constructive fraud claim should be dismissed pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6).
Rule 9(b) states that, when alleging fraud, a plaintiff "must state with particularity the circumstances constituting" that fraud. The Third Circuit has indicated that this heightened pleading standard is met by factual allegations that tell the "who, what, when, where, and how of the events at issue."
Plaintiffs' constructive fraud claim occupies six numbered paragraphs in their complaint.
Plaintiffs correctly note that their constructive fraud claim also "reasserts, restates, and incorporates by reference" the rest of their complaint, and their brief opposing Defendants' Motion to Dismiss attempts to explain how conduct alleged in other paragraphs constitutes constructive fraud. Rule 9(b), however, imposes a pleading standard, not a briefing standard. Because this explanation is absent from the complaint, Count V of the complaint will be dismissed. The dismissal, however, will be without prejudice, and Plaintiffs may amend their Complaint in order to rectify the above-identified deficiencies, if desired and if possible.
For the reasons discussed above, Counts IV and V of Plaintiffs' Complaint will be dismissed. An appropriate Order follows.