SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Gloria Dancause ("Dancause") appeals from the decision and order of the district court dismissing her complaint against her former employer, Mount Morris Central School District ("Mount Morris"), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dancause alleged that Mount Morris forced her to resign her position as an English as a Second Language ("ESL") teacher when she requested time off to obtain treatment for periodontal disease, a condition she alleged was disabling. Dancause argued that her forced resignation violated the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"). The district court dismissed her complaint, holding that Dancause had failed to establish that she was otherwise qualified for her position as an ESL teacher because she lacked the necessary state certification. The district court also held that, as pled, Dancause's complaint failed to plausibly allege that her periodontal disease was sufficiently severe to qualify as a disability under the ADA.

As an initial matter, Mount Morris urges us to dismiss Dancause's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court dismissed her complaint without prejudice. However, we have held that dismissal of a complaint without prejudice is a final order. Elfenbein v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 590 F.2d 445, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1978). Therefore, the district court's dismissal is appealable, and we have jurisdiction.1

Turning to the merits, the district court properly held that Dancause failed to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), because she did not sufficiently allege facts showing that she was disabled under the ADA. The ADA defines disability as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), and provides a non-exhaustive list of major life activities, including "eating, sleeping, . . . concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working." Id. § 12102(2)(A). Dancause's complaint alleged that the flare-up of her periodontal disease caused "anxiety and infection" and prevented her from "adequately communicating, sleeping, eating, reading, thinking, concentrating and interacting with others." But short of reciting activities found in the statute that she could not "adequately" perform, Dancause did not allege any facts from which a court could plausibly infer that her periodontal disease substantially limited these major life activities. See Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice [to state a claim].").2 On appeal, Dancause presents a letter from a doctor stating that she suffered from disabling depression caused by her periodontal disease. We cannot consider this new evidence, however, because "[o]ur consideration, like the district court's, is limited to facts stated on the face of the complaint and in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, as well as to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59, 67 (2d Cir. 1998). Accordingly, based on the facts pled in the complaint, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Dancause's ADA claim.3

We have considered Dancause's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.