ORDER

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, Chief District Judge.

AND NOW, this 26th day of July, 2018, upon consideration of the report (Doc. 21) of Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson, recommending the court deny the appeal of plaintiff Lena Maria Camacho Baez ("Camacho Baez") from the decision of the administrative law judge ("ALJ") denying Camacho Baez's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, wherein Judge Carlson opines, inter alia, that the ALJ's explanation for rejecting the opinion of Camacho Baez's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Bhatt, while "brief" and "succinct," is adequate to support the ALJ's decision, (Doc. 21 at 22-24), and the court noting Camacho Baez filed objections (Doc. 22) to this portion of Judge Carlson's report, and that the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") filed a responsive brief which incorporates by reference Judge Carlson's analysis as well as arguments previously presented to the magistrate judge on the subject, (Doc. 23), and following de novo review of the contested portion of the report, see Behar v. Pa. Dep't of Transp., 791 F.Supp.2d 383, 389 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1106 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989)),2 the court observing that, in disability eligibility determinations, a "cardinal principle . . . is that the ALJ accord treating [sources'] reports great weight, especially `when their opinions reflect expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient's condition over a prolonged period of time," Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted), and that a treating source's opinion must be afforded "controlling weight" if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence" of record, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), and further observing that an ALJ must carefully examine medical findings supporting a treating source opinion of disability, see Morales, 225 F.3d at 317, (citation omitted), and that, in rejecting the opinion of a treating source, "an ALJ may not make `speculative inferences from medical reports' and may reject `a treating [source's] opinion outright only on the basis of contradictory medical evidence' and not due to his or her own credibility judgments, speculation or lay opinion," id. at 317-18 (citations omitted), and, after an independent review of the record and the ALJ's decision, the court determining that the ALJ offered cursory and legally insufficient justification for rejecting Dr. Bhatt's treating source opinion (among others) in favor of the opinion of a non-treating, non-examining state agency psychological consultant, to which the ALJ assigned "significant weight," in what the court can only characterize as spare analysis, to wit:

(Tr. at 22),3 and the court further determining that, other than vague and generic statements that the treating source opinion is "not supported by the evidence" and is "inconsistent" with Camacho Baez's activities, the ALJ fails to meaningfully engage with the treating source opinion,4 to identify discrepancies between the treating source opinion and the source's underlying medical records,5 to identify contradictory medical evidence,6 or to otherwise justify assigning little weight to all treating sources of record,7 such that the ALJ's decision violates even the most deferential construction of the treating source rule and leaves this court unable to adequately exercise its reviewing function, and the court thus concluding that the ALJ's decision is not supported by "substantial evidence," see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), it is hereby ORDERED that: