SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Steven Otte ("Otte") appeals from the July 22, 2010 judgment of the United Stated District Court for the Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellants Frank Brusinksi ("Brusinski") and Donna DeLusso ("DeLusso") and dismissing Otte's claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that he was retaliated against for exercising his First Amendment right of free speech. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. See F.D.I.C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010).

"To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) his speech addressed a matter of public concern; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the speech and the adverse employment action." Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 2008). Otte complained to his supervisor, Brusinski, that certain patients at the Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center ("Mid-Hudson") should not have the use of a microwave oven. Otte's speech was "pursuant to his official duties because it was part-and-parcel of his concerns about his ability to properly execute his duties" as a security hospital treatment assistant—namely, to maintain a safe environment for other patients and employees. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). His speech therefore was not protected by the First Amendment, see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006), and he thus failed to satisfy the first requirement necessary to allege a First Amendment retaliation claim.

Even assuming Otte's speech was protected, he suffered no adverse employment action as a result. The term "adverse employment action" has a different meaning in the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim than it does in cases brought under Title VII. See Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217, 225-26 (2d Cir. 2006). A plaintiff need not demonstrate a material change in employment terms or conditions in order to establish that he was subjected to an adverse employment action; rather, a plaintiff need only show that the retaliatory conduct in question "would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights." Id. at 225 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The detriment Otte relies on is his transfer from one floor to another, at which he performed the same job. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, Mid-Hudson management has the right, at its sole discretion, to deploy employees between floors within a building. Moreover, Otte's transfer was made as a result of Brusinski's claim that Otte's comments were threatening. It is undisputed that the facility's normal operating procedure was to separate an employee from a supervisor when a threat was alleged to have been made. In short, Otte's transfer was not the type of action that "would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights" and was therefore not an adverse employment action. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have considered all of Otte's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.