Filed: Jan. 03, 2012
Latest Update: Jan. 03, 2012
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED. John Salabarria appeals from his conviction in federal court following a jury trial on the ground that the government intentionally excluded black women from serving on his jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts of the case and the issues on appeal. "On ap
Summary: SUMMARY ORDER ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED. John Salabarria appeals from his conviction in federal court following a jury trial on the ground that the government intentionally excluded black women from serving on his jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts of the case and the issues on appeal. "On app..
More
SUMMARY ORDER
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.
John Salabarria appeals from his conviction in federal court following a jury trial on the ground that the government intentionally excluded black women from serving on his jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts of the case and the issues on appeal.
"On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous." Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008).
We do not think that the district court clearly erred in concluding that the government's race- and gender-neutral explanations for exercising its peremptory challenges were credible. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) ("Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference.").
The fact that one potential juror stated during voir dire that her brother had been incarcerated for murdering a woman at least raised a question of whether she might harbor some bias against the government. In addition, we have previously found that "it was plausible for the prosecutor to think that a juror who regularly watched television shows in which forensic science conclusively solved crimes might be more inclined to demand such evidence in order to convict." United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2011).
Furthermore, even if we assume, arguendo, that the government's waiver of its final peremptory strike could be interpreted as an act of intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, defense counsel did not object to the government's waiver of its last strike. Because "it is not apparent from the record that [Salabarria] intentionally relinquished a `known right,'" and given that "the government agrees that plain error review is proper here,. . . . we review defendant's . . . Batson objection for plain error." United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 663 (2d Cir. 2003).
We see no such error here. Indeed, "[t]he trial court did not have the opportunity, at the time of jury selection, to conduct an inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons for" waiving its final strike. Id. at 670. Therefore, "the basis for the challenge is ambiguous enough so that any error the judge might have committed in permitting the strike was not `obvious' or `egregious.'" Id.
Accordingly, the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.
