GEORGE B. DANIELS, District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Beatrice Shirley Williams-Steele brought this action against Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian") and two other credit reporting agencies, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the "FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $3 million for injuries caused by the allegedly incorrect reporting of information on her credit report. (See Compl. § V, ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff claims that her phone number, address, work history, and Social Security number were inaccurate; a tax lien against her was wrongly reported; and a credit account
In a prior action, Plaintiff resolved substantially similar FCRA claims concerning her credit report by entering into a settlement agreement with Experian dated April 5, 2011, in which she received $7,500.00. (Settlement Agreement and Release (the "Agreement"), Ex. B. to Countercl. (filed under seal), ¶¶ 1-7, ECF No. 81.) Plaintiff acknowledged under the terms of this Agreement that "any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature, known or unknown" relating to the claims then brought against Experian would be released. (Id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff further certified in the Agreement that all information contained in an April 4, 2011 Experian disclosure (the "2011 Disclosure") was accurate. (Id. 5.) On January 12, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant action.
This Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings set forth in the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When there are objections to the Report, the Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which objections are made. Id.; see also Rivera v. Barnhart, 423 F.Supp.2d 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The district judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court need not conduct a de novo hearing on the matter. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1980). Rather, it is sufficient that the Court "arrive at its own, independent conclusion" regarding those portions of the Report to which objections were made. Nelson v. Smith, 618 F.Supp. 1186, 1189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Hernandez v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1983)). When no party files objections to a Report, the Court may adopt the Report if "there is no clear error on the face of the record." Adee Motor Cars, LLC v. Amato, 388 F.Supp.2d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Magistrate Judge Francis advised the parties that failure to file timely objections to the Report would preclude appellate review. (Report at 12); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Neither party objected to the Report. As there is no clear error, this Court adopts the Report in its entirety.
Magistrate Judge Francis recommended that this Court dismiss the claims relating to allegedly incorrect information on Plaintiffs credit report, including: (1) her telephone number, (2) an alternate address, (3) an additional employer, and (4) her Social Security number. (Report at 6-9.)
Under the FCRA, a "consumer report" consists of "any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living" which is used or expected to be used to determine the consumer's eligibility for credit, insurance, or employment, among other purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
The Report also properly found that the Plaintiff could not assert an FCRA claim as to the inclusion of four, allegedly incorrect, digits of her Social Security number. (See Report at 8-9.) This claim is barred by Plaintiff's prior settlement Agreement, in which Plaintiff confirmed that the information contained in the 2011 Disclosure—which included these same four digits—was accurate. (See Agreement ¶ 5; compare Aff., Ex. 1 at 2 (reflecting the allegedly incorrect numbers in the credit report at issue), with Agreement, Ex. A at 9 (reflecting the same last four digits in the 2011 Disclosure).)
As correctly explained in the Report, the terms of the Agreement additionally bar Plaintiff's claim that Experian's failure to include the Saks Fifth Avenue account on her credit report adversely affected her credit score. (See Report at 10.) Under the Agreement, Plaintiff released Experian from "any and all claims ... which were or could have been asserted" in the prior action. (Agreement ¶¶ 1-2 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff does not dispute that the Saks Fifth Avenue account predated the April 5, 2011 Agreement, and she consequently was able to bring a claim concerning this account in her prior lawsuit. (See Compl. ¶ V (noting the "1995-2009" dates of the Saks Fifth Avenue account).) In accordance with the Agreement's express language, the instant claim is precluded. (See Report at 10.)
In her opposing affidavit, Plaintiff confirms that Experian did not erroneously report a tax lien on her credit report. (Aff. at 4 ("As to the lien[, it] wasn't reported by Experian [but] by Trans Union.").) Because this claim is neither relevant to nor asserted against Experian, Magistrate Judge Francis properly concluded that Plaintiff's tax lien claim should be dismissed. (See Report at 10.)
Finally, this Court sees no error in Magistrate Judge Francis's recommendation to dismiss, without prejudice, Experian's counterclaim for breach of the Agreement. (See Report at 11.) Federal courts may exercise original jurisdiction over federal question or diversity cases, neither category of which encompasses Experian's state law counterclaim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a); (see also Report at 11). This Court is statutorily empowered to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Experian's contract claim, but it is not obligated to do so, particularly where this Court has dismissed the claims over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[A] district court's exercise of pendent jurisdiction is purely discretionary. [Plaintiffs] certainly have no right to insist that the District Court retain jurisdiction of pendent state law claims after federal claims have been dismissed."). Because all federal claims against Experian have been dismissed, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over its remaining state law counterclaim.
Magistrate Judge Francis's Report and Recommendation is adopted in full. Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the motion at ECF No. 84, and this case.