HUGH B. SCOTT, Magistrate Judge.
The parties have consented to this Court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The Court has reviewed the Certified Administrative Record in this case (Dkt. No. 5, pages hereafter cited in brackets), and familiarity is presumed. This case comes before the Court on cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8.) In short, plaintiff is challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") that he was not entitled to Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has deemed the motions submitted on papers under Rule 78(b).
"The scope of review of a disability determination. . . involves two levels of inquiry. We must first decide whether HHS applied the correct legal principles in making the determination. We must then decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence." Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When a district court reviews a denial of benefits, the Commissioner's findings as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is defined as "`more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); see also Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773-74 (2d Cir. 1999).
The substantial evidence standard applies to both findings on basic evidentiary facts, and to inferences and conclusions drawn from the facts. Stupakevich v. Chater, 907 F.Supp. 632, 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Smith v. Shalala, 856 F.Supp. 118, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). When reviewing a Commissioner's decision, the court must determine whether "the record, read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the conclusions reached" by the Commissioner. Winkelsas v. Apfel, No. 99-CV-0098H, 2000 WL 575513, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2000). In assessing the substantiality of evidence, the Court must consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision, as well as evidence that supports it. Briggs v. Callahan, 139 F.3d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1998). The Court may not reverse the Commissioner merely because substantial evidence would have supported the opposite conclusion. Id. "The substantial evidence standard means once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Brault v. Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
For purposes of Social Security disability insurance benefits, a person is disabled when unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A).
Such a disability will be found to exist only if an individual's "physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that [he or she] is not only unable to do [his or her] previous work but cannot, considering [his or her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d) (2)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(B).
Plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the claimed impairments will prevent a return to any previous type of employment. Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Once this burden has been met, "the burden shifts to the [Commissioner] to prove the existence of alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy and which the plaintiff could perform." Id.; see also Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1551 (2d Cir. 1983); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir. 1980).
To determine whether any plaintiff is suffering from a disability, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") must employ a five-step inquiry:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920; Berry, supra, 675 F.2d at 467. If a plaintiff is found to be either disabled or not disabled at any step in this sequential inquiry then the ALJ's review ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) & 416.920(a); Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). However, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to develop the record. Gold v. Secretary, 463 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1972).
To determine whether an admitted impairment prevents a plaintiff from performing past work, the ALJ is required to review the plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and the physical and mental demands of the work done in the past. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) & 416.920(e). The ALJ must then determine the individual's ability to return to past relevant work given the RFC. Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision to craft an RFC without an explicit medical source statement that received significant weight. The ALJ found that plaintiff had the severe impairments of left shoulder dysfunction, bipolar disorder, and polysubstance use. [17.] After reviewing the record, the ALJ crafted the following RFC, reprinted here in its entirety:
[19.] Plaintiff argues that the level of detail in the RFC went beyond the information available on the record and would have required an opinion from a treating source or from a consultative examiner:
(Dkt. No. 7-1 at 11-13; see also Dkt. No. 9 at 2.) The Commissioner responds that plaintiff gave inconsistent information to his treatment providers over the years and that he has not met his burden of showing what portions of the record weigh against the RFC:
(Dkt. No. 8 at 13-15.)
The Commissioner has the better argument. "If all of the evidence we receive, including all medical opinion(s), is consistent and there is sufficient evidence for us to determine whether you are disabled, we will make our determination or decision based on that evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 416.920b(a). "We will assess your residual functional capacity based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). Here, plaintiff had normal range of motion as of March 2, 2015 [282], though a radiology report from March 15, 2014 suggested a limited range of motion in the left shoulder. [303.] On August 9, 2013, plaintiff was diagnosed with a mood disorder after reporting paranoid thoughts toward another physician and after reporting a "moody outburst." [342.] On February 4, 2017, plaintiff had a domestic violence incident while intoxicated; the incident included plaintiff locking himself in a room and threatening to kill his girlfriend and stepchildren. [374-75.] Plaintiff blamed his alcohol use; he was diagnosed with polysubstance use and post-traumatic stress disorder, though he did show fair insight and judgment in a mental status examination. [391.] An anger management session on April 9, 2014 ended prematurely when plaintiff decided that he did not want to stay; he stayed long enough to express agitation and sadness about his current financial status. [569.] An examination on August 1, 2014 showed persistent left shoulder pain with decreased strength and range of motion. [571.] The Commissioner has cited other portions of the record as well, and the clinical notes as a whole show a consistent profile: left shoulder problems that might have improved over time but that gave plaintiff diminished strength and range of motion for at least a while; and significant issues with mood, anxiety, and depression that seemed to be somewhat under control during the better portions of plaintiff's medication and polysubstance history. Cf. Gregory v. Comm'r, No. 1:14-CV-1012, 2016 WL 900647, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (RFC limiting interaction with the public affirmed, where mental health treatment notes and consultative examiner appointed only to "issues concerning generalized stress," and ALJ relied in part on claimant's own testimony); see also Titles II & XVI: Residual Functional Capacity for Mental Impairments, SSR 85-16, 1985 WL 56855, at *3 (Jan. 1, 1985) (suggesting consultative examination as an option "when treating medical sources cannot provide essential information"). This pattern is consistent with statements from plaintiff such as, "I just get frustrated very easily with people. And I just don't like being around a lot of people." [130.] Cf. Tankisi v. Comm'r, 521 F. App'x 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order) ("The medical record in this case is quite extensive. Indeed, although it does not contain formal opinions on Tankisi's RFC from her treating physicians, it does include an assessment of Tankisi's limitations from a treating physician, Dr. Gerwig. Given the specific facts of this case, including a voluminous medical record assembled by the claimant's counsel that was adequate to permit an informed finding by the ALJ, we hold that it would be inappropriate to remand solely on the ground that the ALJ failed to request medical opinions in assessing residual functional capacity.") (citations omitted). Additionally, although the ALJ did not invoke 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b) explicitly, he did cite portions of the record indicating that plaintiff felt independent with activities of daily living and would have better functioning without medication noncompliance and without polysubstance abuse. Cf. Halmond v. Comm'r, No. 18-CV-6337 HBS, 2019 WL 3450972, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019) ("The Commissioner has pointed to additional parts of the record indicating the same pattern as what the Court has cited above: a long history of dependency interrupted with some level of functioning and a desire to work during periods of sobriety. These circumstances suffice to persuade a reasonable mind that plaintiff's overall functioning and RFC would be better, as the ALJ has described, in the absence of substance abuse."). The record here required no interpretation at the level that caused concern in Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1999). See id. at 63 (ALJ decided on his own that plaintiff's "seizures were caused by a failure to take his medication" when no treatment provider said so). Plaintiff's clinical profile is consistent with the regulatory description of light work: "Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds." 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b). Substantial evidence thus supported the ALJ's RFC, and more detailed medical source statements were not necessary.
The Commissioner's final determination was supported by substantial evidence. For the above reasons and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner's briefing, the Court grants the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. No. 8) and denies plaintiff's cross-motion (Dkt. No. 7).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
