R. BARCLAY SURRICK, District Judge.
Presently before the Court in this insurance coverage dispute is Defendant Markel Insurance Company's ("Markel") Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery Responses (ECF No. 32). For the following reasons, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
The parties' dispute involves a Commercial Crime Policy issued by Markel to Plaintiff National Retail Systems, Inc. ("National Retail") as the Named Insured. (Policy, Declarations, ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff Keystone Freight Corporation ("Keystone") and a number of other entities are additional insureds under the Policy pursuant to Endorsement 1. (Policy, Endmt. 1.) Among the Policy's Insuring Agreements is one for Employee Theft, which provides, in relevant part:
(Policy § A.1.)
Plaintiffs allege that during a several month period in 2015 and 2016, two employees of Keystone, Richard Joseph Allen ("Allen") and Brian Keith Allison ("Allison"), acting under false pretenses and without permission, sold approximately seventy trailers and miscellaneous scrap metal owned by Keystone Freight and kept the proceeds. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-17, ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs allege that Allen's and Allison's theft caused National Retail and Keystone to sustain a loss in excess of $75,000. (Compl. ¶ 18.) National Retail reported the theft to the authorities, and Allen and Allison subsequently pled guilty to the resulting charges. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.)
On or about April 26, 2016, National Retail notified Markel of the loss and sought coverage under the Policy. (Id. ¶¶ 22-24.) By letter dated July 21, 2006, Markel denied coverage based on the following Policy exclusion (the "Prior Act Exclusion"):
D. Exclusions
(Disclaimer Ltr., ECF No. 1-4; Policy § D.1.b.) In its denial letter, Markel stated that the Prior Act Exclusion bars coverage because:
(Disclaimer Ltr. 2.)
On February 14, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Markel alleging that its denial of coverage constitutes a breach of contract. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-35.) On March 7, 2017, Markel filed an Answer to the Complaint (ECF No. 3). On March 24, 2017, Markel filed a Motion requesting a transfer of venue to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (ECF No. 8.) The Motion to transfer venue was denied by Order dated April 4, 2017.) (ECF No. 14.)
Discovery in this matter has been protracted, necessitating several teleconferences with the Court and amendments to the scheduling order.
"It is well-established that the scope and conduct of discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court." Marroquin-Manriques v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3D Cir. 1983). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, parties may obtain discovery regarding:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). While the scope of discovery under the Federal Rules is broad, it is not unlimited. See Bayer AG v. Betachem, Inc., 173 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 1999). "Indeed, Rule 26(b)(1) imposes `two content-based limitations upon the scope of discovery: privilege and relevance.'" Westport Ins. Corp. v. Hippo Fleming & Pertile Law Offices, 319 F.R.D. 214, 217 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Trask v. Olin Corp., 298 F.R.D. 244, 257 (W.D. Pa. 2014)). In addition, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides that — on motion or its own initiative — the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines that "the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive," or that "the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
Pursuant to Rule 37, a party who has received evasive or incomplete answers to discovery requests may move for an order compelling discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1), (4). A party moving to compel discovery bears the initial burden of establishing the relevance of the requested information. Morrison v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 203 F.R.D. 195, 196 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The burden then shifts to the party resisting disclosure to show that "the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure." First Sealord Sur. v. Durkin & Devries Ins. Agency, 918 F.Supp.2d 362, 383 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citing McConnell v. Canadian Pac. Realty Co., 280 F.R.D. 188, 193 (M.D. Pa. 2011)).
Markel seeks an order compelling Plaintiffs to supplement their responses to three interrogatories and two document requests, which Markel contends are "narrowly tailored" to seek information relevant to the Prior Act Exclusion.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Markel already has the requested information. (Pls.' Opp. 1, 8-9,10.) Plaintiffs further argue that the disputed discovery requests are not "narrowly tailored" but rather, are expansive and would require "National Retail to identify hundreds of employees and produce potentially hundreds of employee files." (Id. at 1.) According to Plaintiffs, Markel has failed "to justify its requests given the burden and expense of the proposed discovery [versus] the speculative nature, at best, of any likely benefit." (Id.)
The discovery requests at issue in Markel's Motion are as follows:
As to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 2, the following information is potentially relevant to Markel's defense: (1) the positions and titles held by Piscitelli; and (2) the identities and titles of Piscitelli's supervisors and subordinates, if any, to whom he reported the 2004 termination of Allison. Markel has failed to articulate how the identities and titles of every one of Piscitelli's superiors and subordinates during his 34-year tenure are relevant to the issues in this case, or how the dubious relevance of this information outweighs the substantial burden and expense of its production. Similarly, Markel has not established the relevance or proportionality of its request for communications regarding Allison's hiring in 2015, unless such communications also referenced Allison's 2004 termination. Accordingly, as to these requests, the Motion will be granted only as to the potentially relevant information noted above.
As to Interrogatory No. 6, Markel's Motion limited the request as follows:
Document Request No. 1 seeks, without any time limitation, all documents related to Piscitelli, including his personnel file and the personnel files of all of his supervisors and subordinates. As with Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 4, Markel has not established the relevance or proportionality of documents relating to Piscitelli's supervisors and subordinates that have no connection to Allison's 2004 termination. This request is also problematic because it seeks personnel files, and Markel has not explained why it believes those files contain relevant information or why the information cannot be obtained by less intrusive means, such as depositions. See Westport, 319 F.R.D. at 218 ("Because there is a strong public policy against disclosure of personnel information, such requests are subject to a heightened relevancy standard.") Under these circumstances, we will grant the Motion only as to documents related to Piscitelli that identify his title or position with Plaintiffs or that refer to the 2004 termination of Allison.
Finally, Markel's Motion modified Document Request No. 4 as follows: "[Markel] will limit this request to records that are related to Mr. Allison's 2004 termination." (Def.'s Mot. 5.) The Motion will be granted as to this request, as limited.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion will be granted in part and denied in part. An appropriate order follows.