MICHAEL P. SHEA, District Judge.
In this appeal from the Social Security Commissioner's denial of benefits, Simone Mason, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner, and the Commissioner has filed a motion to affirm. Ms. Mason argues that the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in twelve respects. ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 1-12. These arguments fall into three general categories of error: (1) failure to find a severe impairment at step two of the analysis, id. ¶¶ 1, 3-8, 11; (2) failure to properly evaluate the credibility of Ms. Mason's allegations regarding her symptoms, id. ¶¶ 3-7; and (3) failure to provide Ms. Mason with a clinical examination, id. ¶¶ 2. Ms. Mason also seeks to introduce additional documentation of her disability and work history. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 12.
For the following reasons, Ms. Mason's motion is DENIED, and the Commissioner's motion is GRANTED.
I assume the parties' familiarity with the procedural history of the case, the ALJ's opinion, the record, and the five sequential steps used in the analysis of disability claims. I cite only those portions of the record and the legal standards necessary to explain this ruling.
Counsel for the Commissioner reports that she contacted Ms. Mason by letter to coordinate a joint statement of stipulated facts. ECF No. 24-1 at 2 n.2. Because Ms. Mason did not respond, the Commissioner set forth a narrative of the relevant facts "which is intended to be comprehensive and favorable to both parties." Ibid. I have reviewed this statement of facts as well as the underlying record in the case.
"A district court reviewing a final . . . decision pursuant to . . . 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is performing an appellate function." Zambrana v. Califano, 651 F.2d 842, 844 (2d Cir. 1981). As such, the Commissioner's decision "may be set aside only due to legal error or if it is not supported by substantial evidence." Crossman v. Astrue, 783 F.Supp.2d 300, 302-03 (D. Conn. 2010). The Second Circuit has defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence must be "more than a mere scintilla or a touch of proof here and there in the record." Id.
Furthermore, because Ms. Mason is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her claims of error liberally. See Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) ("A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed.").
Ms. Mason argues that the "Commissioner did not carefully review the Plaintiff's record," ECF No. 23 ¶ 1, "Plaintiff has symptoms of depression, anxiety, panic attacks," id. ¶ 3, "Plaintiff has substantial trauma," id. ¶ 4, "Plaintiff has difficulty concentrating," id. ¶ 5, "Plaintiff has difficulty remember [sic] things for the past 8 years," id. ¶ 6, "Plaintiff's memory issue is due to her anxiety," id. ¶ 7, "Plaintiff's involvement in her church should not prejudice her ability to receive disability benefits," id. ¶ 8, and "Plaintiff has attempted to bring normalcy to her life however, plaintiff is still unable to work competitively," id. ¶ 11. Because Ms. Mason is pro se, and these arguments concern the impact of Ms. Mason's alleged impairments on her ability to function, the Court construes these arguments as challenging the ALJ's severity determination at step two of the analysis.
At step two, the ALJ "determines whether the claimant has a `severe impairment' that limits her capacity to work." Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996). At this step, if the claimant has a mental impairment, the ALJ must follow the "special technique" set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a.
The ALJ's specific findings in each of the four functional areas were supported by substantial evidence. With regard to the first functional area, the ALJ found "no limitation" in activities of daily living and cited the claimant's testimony about doing projects at home, cooking, cleaning, attending conferences, and traveling. R. 17. In an earlier section of the decision, the ALJ provides further support for this finding. See, e.g., R. 14 & 40-42 (relying on Ms. Mason's testimony to find that "[she] likes to do projects in her apartment, and decorate," "likes to go to second hand stores," and "enjoys refinishing furniture, doing artwork, and sewing."); R. 15 & 327 (noting that Ms. Mason reported becoming a conservator for a man in her housing complex); R. 15 & 325 (noting that Ms. Mason "reported doing photography, community projects, and attending church"). In addition, the ALJ assigned great weight to the opinion of the consultative examiner, who noted that Ms. Mason's "[g]rooming and hygiene were meticulous" and she "appeared to be very well rested and very well nourished." R. 304. Thus, the ALJ's finding that Ms. Mason had "no limitation" in activities of daily living is supported by substantial evidence.
With regard to the second functional area, the ALJ found "mild limitation" in Ms. Mason's social functioning. To support this finding, the ALJ notes that Ms. Mason "is involved in many social organizations." R. 17. More specifically, she has reported "attending political conferences," R. 15 & 388, volunteering for political campaigns, R. 14 & 44-45, working as "a voluntary CEO for a non-profit," R. 15 & 415, serving "on the board" of a mental health organization, R. 14 & 43, "spending time with families in need of support," R. 15 & 346, and "getting involved with her housing complex's member government," R. 15 & 346. While Ms. Mason's treatment notes reflect that she prefers isolation at times, the notes also explain that she "displays insight into how isolation can increase her depressive" symptoms. R. 388. Similarly, although Ms. Mason reports anxiety that increases before leaving the house, she also reports that she can "work through her anxiety," R. 388, has an "ability to self-manage," R. 388, and "expresses having good stress management," R. 391. The ALJ also notes that Ms. Mason's Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores have ranged from 60 to 70. R. 16. Scores between 61 and 70 indicate only "mild symptoms in psychological, occupational and social functioning," while a score of 60 is the "highest end of moderate," meaning Ms. Mason's symptoms have generally been mild according to examining sources. R. 16. Her social functioning is further improved when she is on medication for her symptoms. See R. 322 (treatment notes explaining that she experiences "decreased racing thoughts since beginning prescribed medications."). The ALJ's determination that she has "mild limitation" in social functioning is therefore supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ found "mild limitation" in the third functional area concerning "concentration, persistence or pace." R. 17. During the hearing before the ALJ, Ms. Mason testified that although she pursues employment, she doesn't follow through because "[i]t gives [her] anxiety to [pursue work]." R. 36. This suggests that she does have some limitation in "persistence." Nevertheless, at the time of the hearing, she also reported taking public health classes online with the University of Albany Public Health School, R. 53 & 435, and reported attending other trainings and classes in the prior two years, R. 340, 354, 355. Further, the consultative examiner, Dr. Lago, stated that she "demonstrate[d] sustained concentration and persistence throughout the interview," "[h]er cognition was excellent," and "[s]he was insightful, attentive, and very well focused." R. 306-07. The ALJ gave "great weight" to that opinion, noting that it was consistent with the treatment notes in the record. R. 16. Moreover, as discussed above, Ms. Mason's activities and involvement in various organizations also support the finding that she does not have significant limitation in this area. R. 15 & 17. Thus, there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding that any limitation in this functional area is mild.
Finally, the ALJ found that Ms. Mason "has experienced no episodes of decompensation which have been of extended duration." R. 17.
20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
Ms. Mason's treatment notes similarly show little to no loss in adaptive functioning even when symptoms related to her delusional disorder momentarily increased. See R. 324 (noting that Ms. Mason "continues to focus on belief that she is being targeted by political figures stemming from white collar crime she reports was committed against her," but also noting that she had "no impairment" in perception and "minimal impairment" in judgment and insight); R. 334 (noting "delusions" and "moderate impairment" in insight, but also noting that Ms. Mason was "fully oriented," had "minimal impairment" in judgment, and "no impairment" in perception). R. 325 (noting that Ms. Mason "continues to report not sleeping in her bedroom due to an inability to see both entrance and exit ways from where her bed must be placed," but also noting "no impairment" in perception and "minimal impairment" in judgment and insight). As the ALJ noted, "the claimant's mental status examinations have generally been normal during sessions," and despite her diagnoses, she has an ability to function in daily life. R. 15; see R. 75 & 391 (treatment note stating that "[c]lient continues to demonstrate ability to function in her daily life").
Furthermore, the Commissioner correctly notes that "there was no evidence in the record of any psychiatric hospitalizations, complete incapacitation, or need for a supportive living environment." ECF No. 24-1 at 29-30. Indeed, Dr. Jain expressly noted that Ms. Mason is "not committable," R. 320, and none of the treatment notes suggest that such steps would have been appropriate for Ms. Mason. Thus, the ALJ's finding that Ms. Mason experienced no episodes of decompensation is supported by substantial evidence.
In sum, the ALJ's findings at each step of the special technique, and the ALJ's ultimate determination that Ms. Mason does not have a severe impairment, are supported by substantial evidence.
Ms. Mason argues that she "has symptoms of depression, anxiety, panic attacks," ECF No. 23 ¶ 3, "has substantial trauma," id. ¶ 4, "has difficulty concentrating," id. ¶ 5, "has difficulty remember[ing] things for the past 8 years," id. ¶ 6, and that her "memory issue is due to her anxiety," id. ¶7. Because Ms. Mason is pro se, and these arguments concern Ms. Mason's allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations, the Court construes these arguments as challenging the ALJ's adverse credibility assessment.
The ALJ found that "the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision." R. 14. The ALJ went on to explain that the "credibility of the claimant's allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations is diminished because those allegations are greater than expected in light of the objective clinical evidence and treatment notes." R. 14.
An ALJ has "discretion to evaluate a claimant's subjective testimony." Pardee v. Astrue, 631 F.Supp.2d 200, 220 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). "If the claimant's testimony concerning the intensity, persistence or functional limitations associated with his or her pain is not fully supported by clinical evidence, however, then the ALJ must consider additional factors in order to assess that testimony, including: 1) daily activities; 2) location, duration, frequency and intensity of any symptoms; 3) precipitating and aggravating factors; 4) type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any medications taken; 5) other treatment received; and 6) other measures taken to relieve symptoms." Ibid. Here, the ALJ considered such factors, noting that Ms. Mason "cooked, cleaned, made pastoral visits, and did counseling," "is involved in her local housing government, attend[ed] conferences, and [engaged in] frequent domestic and international travel," is in "active pursuit of employment opportunities," "functions at a higher level psychologically and cognitively[] than has been alleged," has decreased symptoms when taking prescribed medications, has a mixed record of attendance at therapy sessions, and prefers to "keep active, volunteer, and use diet and other natural methods to treat her conditions." R. 15-17. A court has "no reason to second-guess the credibility finding in [a] case where the ALJ identified specific record-based reasons for his ruling." Stanton v. Astrue, 370 Fed. Appx. 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2010). That is the case here. The ALJ provided ample support from the record to support the findings discussed above and the resulting credibility determination.
Ms. Mason argues that the "Commissioner failed to provide Plaintiff with [a] Clinical Examination." ECF No. 23 ¶ 2. An ALJ "has discretion to order a consultative examination to further develop the evidentiary record." Taylor v. Astrue, 32 F.Supp.3d 253, 269 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517. In this case, a consultative examination from Dr. Jesus Lago was ordered, R. 304-307, and the ALJ considered his opinion in making a disability determination. Dr. Lago's opinion was that Ms. Mason "demonstrate[d] sustained concentration and persistence throughout the interview," "[h]er social interactions with supervisors and coworkers in the past have been excellent," "she is capable of adapting to work setting," and "[work] would be very therapeutic." R. 306-07. As such, Ms. Mason's argument that the Commissioner failed to provide her with a clinical examination is without merit.
For the reasons set forth above, Ms. Mason's motion, ECF No. 23, is DENIED and the Commissioner's motion, ECF No. 24, is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
