KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge.
L.B. and J.B. (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), bring this Action individually, and on behalf of their child S.B., pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., seeking to overturn the State Review Officer's determination that Plaintiffs are not entitled to compensatory education as a remedy for the alleged failure of the Katonah-Lewisboro Union Free School District ("Defendant," or the "District") to provide a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") to S.B. during the 2011-12 and 2012-13 school years, as well as that the District is not required to reimburse Plaintiffs for their unilateral placement of S.B. at Westfield Day School ("Westfield") for the 2012-13 and 2013-14 school years. (Dkt. No. 27.) Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"). (Dkt. No. 55.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion is denied.
Because district courts generally owe appropriate deference to the findings of fact made by a the State Review Officer ("SRO"), see S.A. ex rel. M.A.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 12-CV-435, 2014 WL 1311761, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2014) (noting that the district court "is not an expert on education or childhood learning disabilities" and thus awarding "appropriate deference" to "[t]he SRO's findings of fact"), this Court adopts the SRO's factual findings as its own unless otherwise noted below, see id. (adopting "the SRO's findings of fact as its own unless otherwise noted"); T.L. ex rel. B.L. v. Dep't of Educ., No. 10-CV-3125, 2012 WL 1107652, at *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (giving "the SRO's well-supported findings of fact . . . due deference" and "therefore adopt[ing] the SRO's findings of fact as its own" (internal quotation marks omitted)). For the sake of convenience, however, the facts relevant to the instant determination are as follows.
S.B. is a child with a disability. (State Review Officer Decision ("SRO Op.") 3.) There is no dispute as to his eligibility for special education programs and related services as a student with an other health impairment. (Id. at 3 n.1; cf. J-6; J-8; P-II.)
On June 3, 2011, a Committee on Special Education ("CSE") convened to develop S.B.'s Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for the 2011-12 school year, when he would enter the tenth grade. (SRO Op. 3 (citing J-3).) The June 2011 CSE recommended one 40-minute session of resource room daily in a 5:1 ratio, as well as one 30-minute session of counseling per week in a 5:1 ratio. (Id. (citing J-3).) The June 2011 CSE further recommended additional supports and modifications, such as scaffolded study guides, checks for understanding, additional time for long-term projects, the breaking down of directions and tasks into smaller components, and the use of a graphic organizer. (Id. (citing J-3).)
The CSE reconvened on December 2, 2011 to consider Plaintiffs' request for additional resource room services for S.B. (Id. (citing J-4).) Following discussion on the issue, the December 2011 CSE declined to add another resource room in S.B.'s IEP. (Id. (citing J-4).) However, the December 2011 IEP indicated that his English and Global Studies teachers offered to provide "extra help" to S.B. and to "collaborate with [his resource room teacher] on a weekly basis." (Id. (alteration in original) (quoting J-4).) The IEP further stated that the CSE would "reconvene at the end of January [2012] to discuss whether this plan [was] enough to address [S.B.'s] educational needs." (Id. (first and second alterations in original) (quoting J-4).) As an added support, the December 2011 IEP provided that S.B.'s regular education teachers, in collaboration with his resource room teacher, would modify S.B.'s curriculum/classwork and homework assignments. (Id. (citing J-4).)
The CSE reconvened on January 31, 2012 and concluded that the "extra help" described in the December 2011 IEP "ha[d] worked," though "not consistently as [S.B.] d[id] not always cho[o]se to go" to additional help sessions with his teachers. (Id. (first and third alterations in original) (quoting J-5).) The January 2012 IEP added a testing accommodation for S.B. whereby he would take all Global Studies tests in a separate location. (Id. (citing J-5).)
On April 13, 2012, the CSE recommended that S.B.'s counseling services be provided on an individual basis, though such a change was not made to his April 2012 IEP. (Id. at 4 (citing J-6).) The April 2012 CSE also recommended that the District conduct a functional behavioral assessment ("FBA") and develop a behavioral intervention plan ("BIP"). (Id. (citing J-6).) Placement in a special class for English was discussed but not recommended. (Id. (citing J-6).) In an email to the District, dated April 18, 2012, Plaintiffs disavowed any interest in such placement. (Id. at 4 n.2 (citing D-16).)
At a meeting on June 4, 2012, the CSE added one 30-minute session of individual counseling per week to S.B.'s IEP and added access to a word processor/computer as a testing accommodation for Social Studies and English examinations. (Id. at 4 (citing J-7).) In a letter dated October 12, 2012, Plaintiffs "reject[ed]" the June 2012 IEP as "not appropriate." (Id. (alteration in original) (quoting P-B).) Plaintiffs stated that they would place S.B. at Westfield and "demand[ed] tuition reimbursement" from the District as well as the cost of "transportation to and from Westfield." (Id. (alteration in original) (quoting P-B).) Plaintiffs removed S.B. from the public school on October 16, 2012, (id. (citing D-21)), and the District acknowledged receipt of their completed "Withdrawal of Student Form" in a letter dated October 19, 2012, (id. (citing D-22)).
On October 25, 2012, the CSE convened to discuss a private evaluation of S.B. by a clinical neuropsychologist, which Plaintiffs had obtained and provided to the District. (Id. (citing J-8; J-22).) Upon consideration of this evaluation, the October 2012 CSE amended S.B.'s preexisting educational program to include a 15:l+l special class for English and Social Studies, one 30-minute session of individual speech-language therapy per week, and one 30-minute session of small group speech-language therapy per week. (Id. (citing J-8).) In addition, the October 2012 CSE added access to a word processor/computer as a supplementary aid/service and flexible scheduling as a testing accommodation. (Id. (citing J-8).) The IEP also reflected that Plaintiffs informed the CSE that it was their "intention to have [S.B.] continue [at Westfield]." (Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting J-8).)
On June 3, 2013, the CSE reconvened to conduct S.B.'s annual review. (Id. (citing J-31).) After considering a progress report card and letter submitted by Westfield, (J-29; J-30), as well as updated information provided by J.B., (J-24), the CSE recommended for the 2013-14 school year "continuation of all IEP program[ming] [and] service[s]" from the October 2012 IEP, (SRO Op. 4 (alterations in original) (quoting J-31)). The June 2013 IEP reflects that Plaintiffs rejected that program at the CSE meeting. (Id. (citing J-31).)
On August 28, 2013, the CSE reconvened to consider evaluations of S.B. recently conducted by the District as well as materials submitted by Plaintiffs. (Id. at 5 (citing J-40).) The August 2013 CSE revised S.B.'s speech goals "to more accurately reflect [his] needs as per the evaluations" and, aside from removing its special class recommendation for Social Studies, maintained its prior program recommendations. (Id. (quoting J-40).) In a letter dated September 6, 2013, Plaintiffs rejected the August 2013 IEP. (Id. (citing J-41).) Plaintiffs indicated that S.B. would attend Westfield during the 2013-14 school year and that they "reserv[ed] the right" to seek the costs of S.B.'s education as well as "mileage to and from . . . Westfield" for the 2013-14 school year. (Id. (alterations in original) (quoting J-41).)
Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their son S.B., filed a due process complaint notice against the District on January 2, 2013. (Id. (citing IHO-1).) In their second amended due process complaint notice, dated September 10, 2013, Plaintiffs alleged that the District failed to offer S.B. a FAPE for the 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14 school years and further, that it failed to implement S.B.'s IEPs during the 2011-12 and 2012-13 school years. (Id. (citing IHO-10).)
The impartial hearing took place over 13 days between May 2013 and November 2013. (Id. (citing Tr. 1-2664).) As noted by the SRO, (see id. at 7), the IHO's 81-page decision provides a comprehensive review of the testimonial evidence adduced during those proceedings, (see Impartial Hearing Officer Findings of Fact and Decision ("IHO Op.") 3-59). The Court, therefore, merely identifies those individuals whose testimony will bear on the resolution of the instant Motion:
In a decision dated February 21, 2014, the Impartial Hearing Officer ("IHO") found that the District offered S.B. a FAPE for the 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14 school years. (SRO Op. 6 (citing IHO Op. 63-72, 81).) The IHO accordingly denied Plaintiffs' requested relief. (Id. (citing IHO Op. 80-81).)
Having concluded that the District offered the student a FAPE for the 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14 school years, the IHO observed that she need not issue findings as to the appropriateness of Westfield or as to equitable considerations related to compensating Plaintiffs for the costs of having S.B. attend Westfield. (Id. at 8 (citing IHO Op. 72, 78).) Nevertheless, the IHO found, in the alternative, that Westfield was an inappropriate unilateral placement because Plaintiffs failed to introduce evidence that Westfield provided S.B. with specially designed instruction. (Id. (citing IHO Op. 74-75).) The IHO also issued alternative findings as to equitable considerations. (Id. at 9 (citing IHO Op. 78-80).) She found that Plaintiffs' failure to provide adequate notice of the S.B.'s removal from the District during the 2012-13 school year would have resulted in a complete denial of tuition reimbursement. (Id. (citing IHO Op. 78-79).) As for the 2013-14 school year, however, the IHO found that the District was aware of Plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with S.B.'s program because the impartial hearing commenced prior to the start of the school year and thus noted she would not have denied relief on that basis. (Id. (citing IHO Op. 79).) Highlighting arguments that "were distractions at best" and "several occasions on which [she] had to admonish counsel, parties, and witnesses," the IHO further noted that neither Party's conduct weighed in favor or against Plaintiffs' requested relief. (Id. (alteration in original) (quoting IHO Op. 80).) Lastly, the IHO denied Plaintiffs' request for transportation costs for the 2013-14 school year, considering that the District offered, but Plaintiffs declined, bus transportation for S.B. for the 2013-14 school year. (Id. (citing IHO Op. 80).)
Plaintiffs timely appealed the IHO's Decision to the New York Office of State Review ("OSR") seeking to reverse the IHO's decision denying compensatory education for the 2011-12 and 2012-13 school years, denying tuition reimbursement for the 2012-13 and 2013-14 school years, and denying transportation costs for the 2013-14 school year. (Id.)
On August 22, 2014, Plaintiffs commenced this Action against the District as well as the New York State Education Department, John B. King, Jr. in his representative role as Commissioner of Education for the New York State Education Department, OSR, and SRO Justyn P. Bates (collectively, "State Defendants"). (Dkt. No. 1.) The District filed its Answer to the Complaint on November 3, 2014, (Dkt. No. 12), and moved for judgment on the pleadings on December 16, 2014, (Dkt. Nos. 15-17). On December 17, 2014, State Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 18-20.)
Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint on January 30, 2015. (Dkt. No. 27.) The District filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint on February 13, 2015. (Dkt. No. 30.) On March 18, 2015, State Defendants submitted a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint along with supporting papers. (Dkt. Nos. 31-33.) Plaintiffs submitted their opposition papers on May 1, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 41-42), and State Defendants submitted their reply on May 22, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 43-44). The Court held oral argument on September 9, 2015 with respect to the thenpending motions. (See Dkt. (minute entry for Sept. 9, 2015).) By Order dated September 10, 2015, the Court denied the District's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Complaint as moot, denied State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as moot, and granted State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 52.)
Pursuant to a briefing schedule adopted by the Court on September 22, 2015, (Dkt. No. 54), Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Summary Judgment and accompanying papers on November 16, 2015, (Dkt. Nos. 55-58). The District submitted its opposition papers on December 16, 2015, (Dkt. No. 60-61), and Plaintiffs submitted a reply on January 15, 2016, (Dkt. No. 64). The Parties rely exclusively on the administrative record, having submitted no additional evidence.
The IDEA requires that states receiving federal funds provide a "free appropriate public education" to "all children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982) (describing the IDEA's predecessor statute as an "ambitious federal effort to promote the education of handicapped children"). A school district provides a FAPE when it offers "special education and related services tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child, [which are] `reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.'" Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). These services are set forth in the child's IEP, "the central mechanism by which public schools ensure that their disabled students receive a [FAPE]." Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 2002); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)-(B), (d)(3) (setting out requirements for IEPs and their development).
"The IDEA does not itself articulate any specific level of educational benefits that must be provided through an IEP." M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 245 (2d Cir. 2012). Rather, the statute ensures an "appropriate" education, but "not one that provides everything that might be thought desirable by loving parents." Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132 (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] school district fulfills its substantive obligations under the IDEA if it provides an IEP that is `likely to produce progress, not regression,' and if the IEP affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere `trivial advancement.'" Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130). Indeed, the IDEA does not require schools to "maximize the potential" of students with disabilities, but instead was intended "more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside." M.H., 685 F.3d at 245 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In New York, if a parent disagrees with an IEP prepared by a school district, the parent may challenge the IEP by requesting an "[i]mpartial due process hearing," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), before an IHO appointed by a local school board, see N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(a). The IHO's decision may be appealed to an SRO, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(2), and the SRO's decision may be challenged in either state or federal court, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see also M.H., 685 F.3d at 224-26 (generally describing the IHO and SRO process).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if a state fails in its obligation to provide a disabled child a FAPE under the IDEA, the IDEA permits parents to seek reimbursement from the school district for the private placement of their child. See Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246-47 (2009); Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 12 (1993); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). The IDEA allows a district court hearing civil actions brought under the IDEA to grant "such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 237 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)). However, parents who unilaterally withdraw their child from the public schools in favor of a private placement do so at their own financial risk. See A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 2009).
In deciding whether tuition reimbursement for such a private placement is warranted, a court must first consider (1) "whether the state has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA," and (2) "whether the IEP developed through the [IDEA's] procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits." Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). If the answer to these questions is yes, no reimbursement is permissible. See id. ("If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress[,] and the courts can require no more." (internal quotation marks omitted)). If no, the court then considers (3) "whether the private schooling obtained by the parents is appropriate to the child's needs." Id. If it is, "equitable considerations" must "support the [parents'] claim." A.D. v. Bd. of Educ., 690 F.Supp.2d 193, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[E]quitable considerations [relating to the reasonableness of the action taken by the parents] are relevant in fashioning relief." (second alteration in original) (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374)). Because a court may order "such relief" as it deems "appropriate," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and because a reimbursement award is discretionary, see id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) ("[A] court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of [private] enrollment. . . ."), courts "enjoy[] broad discretion in considering equitable factors relevant to fashioning relief," Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Carter, 510 U.S. at 16).
Unlike with an ordinary summary judgment motion, the existence of a disputed issue of material fact will not necessarily defeat a motion for summary judgment in the IDEA context. See T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Rather, "the procedure [in IDEA cases] is in substance an appeal from an administrative determination, not a summary judgment motion." M.H., 685 F.3d at 226 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
This posture means that the court owes "a significant degree of deference to the state educational agency, as [it is] essentially acting in an administrative-law-style capacity." Mr. & Mrs. P. ex rel. P. v. Newington Bd. of Ed., 546 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2008). The court "must give `due weight' to [the administrative] proceedings, mindful that the judiciary generally `lack[s] the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.'" Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 113 (second alteration in original) (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206); see also Cerra, 427 F.3d at 191 (explaining that the "IDEA's statutory scheme requires substantial deference to state administrative bodies on matters of educational policy"). While a reviewing court "must engage in an independent review of the administrative record and make a determination based on a preponderance of the evidence," M.H., 685 F.3d at 240 (internal quotation marks omitted), such review "is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review," Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. Rather, the standard for reviewing administrative determinations "requires a more critical appraisal of the agency determination than clear-error review but nevertheless falls well short of complete de novo review. In the course of this oversight, the persuasiveness of a particular administrative finding, or the lack thereof, is likely to tell the tale." M.H., 685 F.3d at 244 (alterations, italics, and internal quotation marks omitted).
"Deference is particularly appropriate when . . . the [SRO's] review has been thorough and careful." Mr. & Mrs. P., 546 F.3d at 118 (alteration in original) (quoting Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129). Specifically,
R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also M.H., 685 F.3d at 241 ("The SRO's or IHO's factual findings must be `reasoned and supported by the record' to warrant deference." (quoting Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 114)). This deference is further amplified when the IHO and SRO reach the same conclusion based on the same record before a court. See B.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 12 F.Supp.3d 343, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[D]eference is particularly apt where the IHO and SRO decisions are in agreement and are based on the same record as that before the district court."). Additionally, the Second Circuit has instructed courts that deference to an SRO's decision is more appropriate when the substantive adequacy of an IEP, as opposed to the procedural adequacy, is at issue; when the decision involves a dispute over an appropriate educational methodology versus determinations regarding objective indications of progress; and when the district court's decision is based solely on the administrative record that was before the SRO. See M.H., 685 F.3d at 244.
As noted above, to recover on their tuition reimbursement claim, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the District failed to offer S.B. a FAPE, that their unilateral placement of S.B. was appropriate, and that the equities support reimbursement. The Court thus first assesses whether "the [District] has complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA," and whether the IEPs "developed through the [IDEA]'s procedures [were] reasonably calculated to enable [S.B.] to receive educational benefits." Cerra, 427 F.3d at 192 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
As an initial matter, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that deference to the SRO's conclusion is unwarranted.
Adopting the IHO's findings and conclusions, (see id. at 15), the SRO affirmed that the District offered S.B. a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year, (id. at 16). In its thorough decision, the IHO found that: (a) S.B. passed all of his courses in tenth grade, (IHO Op. 63), and his social isolation did not impact him academically, (id. at 64); (b) the District's reduction of non-essential writing assignments, as needed, demonstrated a conscientious effort to meet S.B.'s needs, (id.); (c) the District was not required to provide a written plan to Plaintiffs regarding the reduction of S.B.'s assignments, although the IEP did refer to modified classwork/homework, and there were a number of written communications about the reduction, (id.); (d) the CSE appropriately determined not to add a second resource room for S.B., as he was not using his first resource room productively, and there was no educational reason provided in support of that request, (id. at 64-65); (e) the plan for S.B. to receive extra help directly from his English and Global Studies teachers was well-intentioned and beneficial to S.B., (id. at 65); (f) the District appropriately offered to place S.B. in a 15:1 special class for English, but this option was rejected by J.B., (id. at 66); and (g) the District conducted an appropriate, timely FBA, and the resulting BIP, though not fully implemented at the end of the 2011-12 school year, did not deny S.B. a FAPE because his behavioral needs were being adequately addressed, (id. at 66-67).
This "initial procedural inquiry . . . is no mere formality, as adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP." A.C., 553 F.3d at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, not "every procedural error in the development of an IEP renders that IEP legally inadequate under the IDEA." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For procedures to be sufficient, they must provide
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1). Inadequate procedures warrant reimbursement only if, individually or cumulatively, they "impeded the child's right to a [FAPE]," "significantly impeded the parents' opportunity to participate in the decision[-]making process," or "caused a deprivation of educational benefits." R.E., 694 F.3d at 190 (first alteration in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)); see also M.W. ex rel. S.W. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 725 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[P]arents must articulate how a procedural violation resulted in the IEP's substantive inadequacy or affected the decision-making process."). "Multiple procedural violations may cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if the violations considered individually do not." R.E., 694 F.3d at 190.
Plaintiffs argue that the District failed to adhere to proper procedures in developing the 2011-12 IEPs because (a) the District failed to conduct a timely FBA and devise an appropriate BIP; (b) Plaintiffs were never provided with a written plan articulating the reduction in S.B.'s assignments, and the District failed to adequately document that reduction; and (c) the plan for S.B. to receive additional teacher assistance was inappropriate. (See Pls.' Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. ("Pls.' Mem.") 7-12 (Dkt. No. 57).) Each claim will be addressed in turn.
First, Plaintiffs allege that the District "failed to conduct an appropriate FBA, resulting in a flawed BIP." (Id. at 9 (citation omitted).) They do not, however, offer any compelling reason for this Court to second-guess the IHO's decision to credit Lovallo's testimony that an FBA was not warranted prior to spring 2012, as it was not until then that S.B.'s academic decline was "precipitous." (IHO Op. 66.) Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs' claim, (see Pls.' Mem. 9 (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. ("NYCRR") tit. 8 § 200.22 (a)(2))), the record readily confirms the IHO's "find[ing] that multiple sources were used in the development of the FBA," (IHO Op. 67; see also SRO Op. 15 (adopting the IHO's conclusion that "the June 2012 FBA and BIP were developed in conformity with State regulations")), which took four weeks to complete, (see Tr. 489). These sources include classroom observation, (see id. at 489-90; J-20), multiple interviews with S.B., (see Tr. 490-91, 499; J-20), review of S.B.'s clinical file, (see Tr. 493; J-20), and interviews with S.B.'s teachers, (see Tr. 491, 493; J-20).
Plaintiffs further allege that there was no "schedule to measure the effectiveness of the [BIP]." (Pls.' Mem. 9.) Yet, the BIP itself explicitly identifies how the intervention is measured, who is responsible for recording data, and the timeline for review of the plan (6/2012, 9/2012, 11/2012, 1/2013, 4/2013, and 6/2013). (See J-21).
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs contend "[n]ot only does the SRO ignore the substantive and procedural inadequacies in the FBA/BIP, but he also completely ignores the fact that the District made no attempt to implement the BIP in the remainder of the 2011-12 school year after determining S[.]B[.] was in need of an FBA/BIP." (Pls.' Mem. 8.) The Court finds this statement wholly inaccurate, given the SRO's acknowledgment that "the IHO agreed with [Plaintiffs] that the BIP was not implemented in the 2011-12 school year," but determined "that this did not result in a denial of FAPE because the BIP `was only adopted [in June 2012] days before final exams and the end of the school year.'" (SRO Op. 7 (alteration in original) (quoting IHO Op. 67).) The IHO found that the failure to implement the BIP during the 2011-12 school year "is not enough to find [the] [D]istrict has not provided a FAPE to [S.B.]," (IHO Op. 67), and, considering the variety of other strategies used to address S.B.'s behavior (such as counseling services and extra help), (see J-4; J-5; J-6; cf. Tr. 221), the Court agrees, see T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 419 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the failure to create an FBA or a BIP did not deny a FAPE where the IEP contained other means to address the student's behavior); FB v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 923 F.Supp.2d 570, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (deferring to "the SRO's finding that the lack of a[n] FBA and a BIP did not deny [the student] a FAPE," in part because of evidence in the record of other means to address the student's behavior).
Plaintiffs also allege that they did not have the opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process "because [they] were never provided with a written plan explaining how S.B.'s assignments would be reduced or `modified.'" (Pls.' Mem. 10.) In her decision, however, the IHO noted that she could "find no authority for extending parental rights established under [the] IDEA to a written plan concerning curriculum requirements to be provided to a parent." (IHO Op. 64 (citing Winkelman ex. rel. Winkelman v. City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007)).) Indeed, Plaintiffs have offered no such authority. In any event, the record reveals that Plaintiffs did, in fact, "play[] a significant role in this process." Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs separately assert that there was no documentation as to the effectiveness of this reduction in non-essential assignments. (See Pls.' Mem. 10-11.) While there may not have been "ABC charts" or "plot charts" of relevant data, (see Tr. 310, 612), the record demonstrates that various other means of assessment were used. For example, Lovallo testified that S.B.'s teachers used his grades and classroom performance to measure whether the reduction in work was helpful to S.B. (Id. at 612.) Much of this evidence points toward some academic progress, which supports the IHO's finding that "the [D]istrict was conscientious in" reducing S.B.'s nonessential writing assignments so as to address S.B.'s needs and "to help [him] move forward with essential assignments." (IHO Op. 64.)
Furthermore, as explained by Lovallo and LoFaso, the reduction in S.B.'s workload was not continuous but rather implemented as needed throughout the year. (See Tr. 614-15, 1113.) The IHO acknowledged this pattern, noting that the modification "was not a constant reduction" and, although it went "well beyond the six-week trial," the program of reductions was tailored to address S.B.'s "cycle" of "inconsistent performance." (IHO Op. 64.) Finally, while Plaintiffs object to the alleged absence of a "documented definition" of which assignments were "nonessential," (Pls.' Mem. 10), the record reveals that the determination was left to the discretion of S.B.'s individual teachers, (see Tr. 613-14; J-8; cf. Tr. 1834-35), to which the Court defers, see S.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2016 WL 1271690, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) ("[T]eaching methodologies are typically left to the discretion of classroom teachers.").
Plaintiffs allege that the extra help made available to S.B. by his English and Global Studies teachers was ineffective in that it inappropriately placed the onus on S.B. to seek out assistance. (See Pls.' Mem. 11; Pls.' Reply Mem. of Law ("Pls.' Reply") 3 (Dkt. No. 64).)
Having considered Plaintiffs' claims of procedural deficiencies and found them to be without merit, the Court now turns to Plaintiffs' claims of substantive errors.
In reviewing for substantive errors, courts "examine whether the IEP was substantively adequate, namely, whether it was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. Substantive inadequacy automatically entitles the parents to reimbursement." R.E., 694 F.3d at 190 (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that the 2011-12 IEPs were substantively inadequate because: (a) the CSE did not add individual counseling services and did not conduct an FBA; and (b) the District improperly denied Plaintiffs' request for a second resource room. (See Pls.' Mem. 12-14.)
As to the first claim, Plaintiffs contend that "the CSE did not increase S[.]B[.]'s services to include individual counseling[,] nor did it conduct an FBA to develop a BIP. . . ." (Id. at 12 (citation omitted).) The record, as noted, supports the IHO's decision to credit Lovallo's testimony that an FBA was not warranted prior to spring 2012. (See IHO Op. 66.) Lovallo specifically testified that S.B.'s work avoidance was not consistent earlier in the 2011-12 school year, (see Tr. 480, 986-87), and the testimony of other educators corroborates this view.
The record also refutes Plaintiffs' argument with respect to individual counseling, as prior to the third quarter Lovallo "had been seeing S.[B.] in an individual setting as needed," which became "formal and more regular" after the recommendation at the April 2012 CSE meeting. (Id. at 484; see also J-6.) Lovallo testified that individual counseling as a direct service was not necessary before the 2011-12 school year because "S.[B.] was progressing in a satisfactory manner at the end of ninth grade," and "his goals could be achieved in a group setting." (Tr. 448.) Nevertheless, over the course of tenth grade S.B. did, in fact, receive schoolbased counseling both in a group format and on an individual basis. (See id. at 484-85.) According to Lovallo, the "counseling goals that he . . . had were appropriate" at that time. (Id. at 485.)
As a second alleged substantive error, Plaintiffs assert that "the District refused to consider [their] request for a second resource room." (Pls.' Mem. 13.) However, the record not only makes clear that the District did consider that request, (see, e.g., Tr. 463-64; id. at 2302-05), but also supports the IHO's determination to "credit the [CSE's] decision not to add a second resource room," (IHO Op. 64; see also SRO Op. 15 (adopting the IHO's finding that "the [D]istrict reasonably declined to recommend additional resource room services")). According to Lovallo, the CSE felt that a second resource room would not be advantageous because "at the time [S.B.] was already spending his free periods in the resource room . . . and he was not using that time productively." (Tr. 464.) The April 2012 IEP notes LoFaso's concern that the addition of a second resource room would "not address the underlying issues that [we]re overwhelming [S.B.]," since S.B. already came to the resource room "several times a day" but was "not productive." (J-6.) It was decided, instead, "that both his English and Global Studies teachers would offer S.[B.] consistent extra help." (Tr. 465.) Even if the Court "were inclined to disagree with the IHO's conclusions regarding the appropriateness of [an additional resource room], questions of class size, teaching methodologies[,] and educational environments involve exactly the types of educational policy issues that require district court deference to state administrative agencies." N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. v. V.S., No. 10-CV-5120, 2011 WL 3273922, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2011); see also Mr. & Mrs. P., 546 F.3d at 118 ("Independent judicial review `is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities they review.'" (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206)).
Moreover, as noted by the IHO, Plaintiffs offered no sound pedagogical justification for a second resource room. (See IHO Op. 64 ("I credit the committee decision not to add a second resource room, for which no sound educational reason was advanced."); id. at 65 ("[T]here was no educational reason provided to the CSE [in support of the proposal for a second resource room].").) Indeed, the only reason proffered was a hope that a different resource teacher would be helpful to S.B., not a belief that an additional resource room necessarily would be beneficial. (See Tr. 2134, 2215-16.) Any dissatisfaction with LoFaso, however, was never expressed to the District prior to this case, (see id. at 2418-19; cf. IHO Op. 65 ("[T]here was no evidence that this dissatisfaction was ever communicated to the [D]istrict, other than a single mention by [J.B.] to. . . Lovallo. . . .")), such that the CSE cannot be charged with failing to act, see R.E., 694 F.3d at 186 (holding that an IEP must be evaluated "prospectively as of the time of its drafting").
Having reviewed the record, the Court finds substantial evidence confirms the SRO's determination that the District provided S.B. a FAPE for the 2011-12 school year.
The SRO also affirmed the IHO's conclusion that the District designed and implemented appropriate IEPs throughout the 2012-13 school year. (SRO Op. 14 (citing IHO Op. 63-72).) Specifically, the IHO found that: (a) an FBA/BIP had been developed along with new goals concerning avoidant behaviors and dealing with stress, and J.B. agreed with the 2012-13 program as recommended at the June 2012 CSE meeting, (IHO Op. 68); (b) the CSE adopted a number of recommendations made by Egnal, (id.); and (c) the CSE's recommendation for special classes, with a 15:1 student-to-teacher ratio, was appropriate and consistent with Egnal's recommendation for a small, structured class setting, (id. at 68-69). The SRO also addressed in greater detail Plaintiffs' claim that the District failed to implement the BIP during the 2012-13 school year, determining that: (a) the District did implement the BIP for the portion of the school year that S.B. attended the public school; (b) the District sought Plaintiffs' assistance in implementing the BIP during that time, but they were not amenable to participating in the process; (c) Lovallo reviewed the BIP with S.B.'s teachers and guidance counselor; (d) the 2012-13 BIP was amended from the year prior, with minor changes made regarding strategies and interventions for S.B.; and (e) though Plaintiffs were not receptive, Lovallo did seek to involve them in developing appropriate rewards for S.B. (SRO Op. 15-16.)
Plaintiffs argue that the SRO wrongly affirmed the IHO's "finding that the 2012-13 FBA/BIP was appropriately written and implemented during [S.B.'s eleventh grade] year." (Pls.' Mem. 14 (citing SRO Op. 15).)
As an initial matter, ample evidence supports the SRO's conclusion "that the [D]istrict implemented [S.B.'s] BIP for the 2012-13 school year at the start of said school year." (SRO Op. 15.) Lovallo testified that the BIP was implemented during the five weeks S.B. attended school in the District in fall 2012, (Tr. 521-23, 1025), and the fact she could not recall the exact date "specifically offhand" does not undermine her testimony, (id. at 1025).
The record also contradicts Plaintiffs' contention that the revised 2012-13 BIP was inappropriate. As discussed by the SRO, (see SRO Op. 15), Lovallo reviewed the BIP with S.B.'s then-current English, mathematics, Latin, science, and resource room teachers, as well as with his guidance counselor, at the start of his eleventh grade year, (see Tr. 518-21; D-45).
As to the matter of rewards, Plaintiffs argue that it was inappropriate for the District to ask them to fashion and implement a system of rewards at home. (See Pls.' Mem. 14-15; Pls.' Reply 6.) While Plaintiffs may have struggled with this strategy (but offered no alternative), (see Tr. 528-29, 2364-65), their disagreement with the methodology does not constitute a procedural violation, see S.W. v. N.Y. Dep't of Educ., 92 F.Supp.3d 143, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ("The IDEA grants parents the right to provide input, not to have veto power."); P.K. ex rel. P.K. v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 569 F.Supp.2d 371, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("A professional disagreement is not an IDEA violation."); Sch. For Language & Commc'n Dev. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., No. 02-CV-269, 2006 WL 2792754, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006) ("Meaningful participation does not require deferral to parent choice.").
Plaintiffs also allege that "the IEP and the revised BIP are silent as to monitoring progress of the frequency, duration[,] and intensity of the behavioral interventions." (Pls.' Mem. 14 (citing J-7; D-6).) That contention, however, is simply inaccurate. The BIP expressly identifies that the "intervention will be measured through the use of behavior report cards and grades," designates the persons responsible for the collection of that data (i.e. S.B.'s special education teacher along with his regular education teachers and counselor), and sets out a schedule to review the plan. (See D-6.) While the information provided is somewhat cursory and unquantified, any such technical defect does not render S.B.'s 2012-13 IEP procedurally inadequate. See K.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 13-CV-7719, 2015 WL 1442415, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2015) (finding that an allegedly inadequate BIP did not result in the denial of a FAPE because, "although th[e] document did not contain the required data on the `frequency, duration, [and] intensity' of [the student's] interfering behaviors, it clearly went beyond simply listing behaviors and strategies in a non-differentiated manner" (second alteration in original) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting NYCRR tit. 8 § 200.22(b)(4)(i))). Plaintiffs further complain that "the Behavior Report Cards are not consistently completed[,] in violation of . . . § 200.22(b)(5)." (Pls.' Mem. 14 (footnote omitted) (citing P-O).) Plaintiffs, however, provide no legal support for this leap from seemingly incomplete progress reports to failed monitoring. Cf. NYCRR tit. 8 § 200.22(b)(5) ("The results of the progress monitoring [of a student's BIP] shall be documented. . . ."). Moreover, they wholly ignore the (not unlikely) possibility that these blank spaces may reflect S.B.'s absences or that a particular class did not convene on a given day. In fact, one of the Behavior Report Cards explicitly notes S.B. was absent on October 1, 2012, (see P-O), and Lovallo testified that his "attendance was not stellar" at the start of the 2012-13 school year, (Tr. 518).
Aside from this challenge to the appropriateness of the 2012-13 BIP, Plaintiffs assert that "[the District] suggested that S[.]B[.] enroll in a special class [for English], but J[.]B[.] needed more information." (Pls.' Mem. 15 (citing, inter alia, Tr. 183; id. at 421; id. at 2509; id. at 2560).) Not only is this statement ambiguous as to which CSE meeting it refers, but also the testimony cited does not support the proposition. (See Tr. 183 (testimony by McNulty regarding speech and language therapy services in spring 2010); id. at 421 (testimony by Hayes about behavioral data presented at the June 2012 CSE meeting); id. at 2509 (index for J.B.'s testimony); id. at 2560 (testimony by LePage that she and J.B. visited the special class on December 2, 2012).) Plaintiffs more specifically contend that "[the District] did not provide Plaintiffs with an opportunity to visit the [s]pecial [c]lass" during spring 2012, and, as a result, "they rejected it." (Pls.' Mem. 15 (citing, inter alia, Tr. 2359; id. at 2415; id. at 2558).) Yet, this distorts the record, which plainly shows that the CSE discussed the special English class at the meeting on April 13, 2012 (Friday), (see J-6), and on the morning of April 18, 2012 (Wednesday), J.B. wrote to Hayes to decline placement, (see D-16; cf. Tr. 256). Plaintiffs offer no evidence that they requested—let alone were denied—an opportunity to visit the special class within that short timeframe. (Cf. J-6 (noting only that S.B. and J.B. "will consider whether or not to switch to [the] special class"); J-7 (including no mention of a special class for English).) Quite the opposite, Plaintiffs once again cite testimony not relevant to their argument. (See Tr. 2359 (testimony by J.B. regarding an email exchange in September 2012); id. at 2415 (testimony by J.B. regarding her communication with LoFaso after the CSE meeting in January 2012); id. at 2558 (testimony by LePage that the CSE would not consider Egnal's input about the special class that she had not visited).)
After placement in a special class was again discussed at the October 2012 CSE meeting, (see J-8), J.B. was provided an opportunity to visit the classroom with LePage and Hayes, (see Tr. 271, 2372-73, 2481-82). Thereafter, the only feedback J.B. provided Hayes was that S.B. would never return to the public school. (See id. at 271; cf. J-8 (noting "it was the family's intention to have him continue [at Westfield]").)
In light of this record, the Court cannot find that a procedural violation took place, much less one that "resulted in the IEP's substantive inadequacy or affected the decision-making process." M.W., 725 F.3d at 139.
Plaintiffs challenge the SRO's decision that the IHO correctly found the 2012-13 IEP to be appropriate. (See Pls.' Mem. 16-17.) Claiming substantive deficiencies, Plaintiffs argue that the program offered by the District for S.B.'s eleventh grade year "was not sufficiently tailored to his needs to enable him to progress and thus he regressed." (Id. at 17 (citing, inter alia, Tr. 2106).)
The record, however, belies this claim of regression. According to Hayes' testimony, S.B.'s teachers reported that he started eleventh grade "on a positive note" academically. (Tr. 269; see also id. at 270 ("[H]e seemed to be off to a good start.").) At that time, S.B. expressed that he had a better plan to negotiate the school curriculum. (See id. at 269-70.) While Plaintiffs claim that S.B. "was afraid of his English teacher Lewis," (Pls.' Mem. 16 (citing Tr. 2513)), this bare assertion not only is unsupported by evidence, (see P-FFF (noting J.B.'s concerns about S.B.'s ability to successfully complete the English course)), but also is contradicted by S.B.'s statements to Lovallo that he thought Lewis was a "good teacher" who "explained things good," even as he anticipated that the course would be difficult, (P-Q).
There is some conflicting testimony regarding S.B.'s social and emotional functioning at the start of his eleventh grade year. On one hand, at the October 2012 CSE meeting Jilton noted that "[S.B.'s] anxiety remained high," "he was still very vulnerable to depression," and "[h]e still had not made social progress with any friends." (Tr. 2151). On the other hand, Lovallo testified that "generally [S.B.] was in better spirits than he had been the previous year." (Id. at 518; see also id. ("[J]ust his mood, his affect was more positive.").) According to Hayes' testimony, "Lovallo reported that S.[B.] was starting off in a good place," (id. at 270), with respect to the individual counseling that had been added to S.B.'s 2012-13 IEP to address his increased anxiousness and formalize the support she had given at the end of the previous school year, (see id. at 264; see also id. at 518 (testifying that "[h]e seemed more available for counseling" and was better able to engage with Lovallo)). Here, the Court defers to the IHO's determination to "credit . . . Lovallo's opinion that the [District] provided the appropriate level [of] support for [S.B.]," (IHO Op. 68), as it is not for a federal court to "cho[ose] between the views of conflicting experts on a controversial issue of educational policy. . . in direct contradiction of the opinions of state administrative officers who had heard the same evidence," Grim, 346 F.3d at 383; see also Y.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 12-CV-2590, 2013 WL 5722793, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2013) (declining "to choose between conflicting opinions of educational experts" and instead "defer[ring] to the [SRO's] conclusion").
In support of their challenge to the SRO's determination regarding the 2012-13 IEP, Plaintiffs re-emphasize Egnal's reports and testimony. (Pls.' Mem. 16.)
Egnal also testified that the 5:1 resource room was not suitable for S.B. as "too fractionated," (Tr. 2035), and not part of "an immersion program," (id. at 2013). However, she never expressed that opinion at the October 2012 CSE meeting, (see IHO Op. 69), and, to reiterate, evaluation of the IEP is limited to what was before the CSE at that time, see R.E., 694 F.3d at 186; R.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 12-CV-3763, 2013 WL 5438605, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013) ("[B]ecause this testimony was not available at the time of the CSE meeting, it is inappropriate for the [c]ourt to consider it at this time."), aff'd, 589 F. App'x 572 (2d Cir. 2014). Such testimony thus carries no weight here.
Based on the record, the Court finds the evidence amply supports the SRO's conclusion that the 2012-13 IEP was substantively adequate. It thereby reaffirms that the District offered S.B. a FAPE for the 2012-13 school year.
Lastly, the SRO affirmed the IHO's determination that the District offered S.B. a FAPE for the 2013-14 school year. (See SRO Op. 16.) The SRO adopted "the findings and conclusions of the IHO relating to the design and implementation of [S.B.'s] IEPs," (id. at 15), which included: (a) the new information before the CSE, in the form of progress reports from Westfield, updated evaluations performed by the District, and Egnal's updated testing, did not warrant a change to S.B.'s program, (IHO Op. 70); and (b) the 2013-14 IEP goals for S.B. were appropriate, based upon the reevaluations performed by the District, (id. at 71).
Plaintiffs argue that "[the District] significantly impeded [their] opportunity to participate in the decision-making process" by failing to timely conduct reevaluations of S.B. at the end of the 2012-13 school year. (Pls.' Mem. 17.) The IHO determined, and the SRO agreed, that this issue was not raised in Plaintiffs' due process complaint, (see IHO Op. 71; SRO Op. 14), which precludes review by this Court, see, e.g., B.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 12-CV-3247, 2013 WL 1972144, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) ("[A] parent's failure to raise an IDEA claim in his or her due process complaint deprives a court of subject-matter jurisdiction to address the claim."), aff'd, 569 F. App'x 57 (2d Cir. 2014); B.P. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 841 F.Supp.2d 605, 611 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) ("The scope of the inquiry of the IHO, and therefore the SRO and th[e] [c]ourt, is limited to matters either raised in the [p]laintiffs' impartial hearing request or agreed to by [the] [d]efendant.").
Plaintiffs contend that the 2013-14 IEP was substantively inadequate on the basis that it "did not significantly change" from prior programs, despite S.B.'s claimed progress at Westfield during the 2012-13 school year. (Pls.' Mem. 17-18 (citing J-8; J-40).) There is no dispute that the recommended services, goals, modifications, and testing accommodations contained in the August 2013 IEP remained the same, with the exception of removing the Social Studies special class and revising speech goals. (See SRO Op. 4 (citing J-40); compare J-40, with J-8.)
Even beyond the substantial deference owed to the state administrative officers on this question of educational policy, see Cerra, 427 F.3d at 191, the Court notes that this decision finds ample support in the record. Heldman and J.B. testified that S.B. underwent positive changes while at Westfield, (see, e.g., Tr. 1396; id. at 2374; id. at 2378-81; id. at 2390-91), but Plaintiffs' claims of "meaningful progress," (Pls.' Mem. 18), are controverted by other testimony and reports, (see, e.g., Tr. 1400; id. at 1652; P-OO; P-DDD). For example, Anderson testified that S.B.'s teachers at Westfield reported "concerns related to his completion of homework assignments, his ability to participate and communicate in class," and his difficulty with writing and mental arithmetic. (Tr. 1652.)
Accordingly, like both the IHO and the SRO, the Court finds no substantive errors in S.B.'s 2013-14 IEP. The evidence supports the determination that the District offered S.B. a FAPE for the 2013-14 school year.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 55.)
SO ORDERED.
Plaintiffs also argue that "this Court [should] reject the SRO's findings in whole" because "the SRO's decision was egregiously late." (Pls.' Reply 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).) "However, no authority permits courts to give less respect to SRO decisions on the basis of delay, nor is there any logical reason to do so." P.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 13-CV-4772, 2014 WL 3673603, at *7 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014); see also M.L. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 13-CV-574, 2014 WL 1301957, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (acknowledging "that the [SRO's] routine delays in issuing decisions is problematic" but finding "no authority in IDEA cases that allows [a court] to declare the SRO's decision a nullity" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In any event, it bears noting that Jilton conceded she was not familiar with IEPs in general and had no experience with a 15:1 English class. (See Tr. 2222-23.) Egnal's similar lack of familiarity is discussed below.
