NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Vasko Ilievski appeals from the judgment of the Law Division, finding him guilty of driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, following a trial de novo based on the record developed before the Montville Township Municipal Court pursuant to Rule 3:23-8. This is defendant's second DWI conviction. The trial court found defendant guilty of DWI based on: (1) having a.12 percent blood alcohol content (BAC), determined after he submitted to an Alcotest; and (2) the testimony of the arresting officer, New Jersey State Police Trooper Frederick Kuhrt, describing his observations of defendant's conduct at the time of the initial motor vehicle stop.

The court sentenced defendant to pay the mandatory fines and penalties, suspended his driving privileges for two years, directed that he serve two days in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center (IDRC) and two days in the county jail (which could be served in the IDRC), ordered him to perform thirty days of community service, and directed him to place an ignition interlock device on his vehicle for one year.

In this appeal, defendant claims the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's decision finding him guilty of DWI beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also challenges the legality of the initial motor vehicle stop, and questions the propriety of certain evidential rulings made by the trial judge. After reviewing the record before us and mindful of prevailing legal standards, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Mary Gibbons Whipple in her oral decision delivered from the bench on April 7, 2014. We gather the following facts from the evidence presented at trial.

Trooper Kuhrt testified that on November 13, 2012, he was on duty driving a State Police vehicle heading westbound on Route 80. He and another State Police Trooper had just completed a "mail run [in] which we [brought] the mail from Netcong Station down to Totowa Station." At approximately 11:56 p.m., Kuhrt observed a gray Toyota 4Runner enter the highway from the Route 46 entrance ramp. Kuhrt saw the Toyota drifting outside the lanes of traffic, at times going over the striped lane markings on the left side as well as the solid lane markings on the right. Kuhrt followed the Toyota for "a few minutes, a few miles," until it exited Route 80 West at Exit 47, heading toward Montville Township. The Toyota continued to drift outside the traffic lane and into the "zebra stripe" divider zone; at times the vehicle's left tires were fully on the lines, causing it to swerve abruptly to correct itself. According to Kuhrt, had the Toyota not made "that jerky movement," it would have struck the Exit 47 sign as it was exiting Route 80.

Kuhrt followed the Toyota as it made a left turn onto Hook Mountain Road. At this point, he activated his State Police vehicle's overhead-lights and directed the driver of the Toyota to pull over to the side of the road. As Kuhrt approached the Toyota, he was able to confirm that the driver, defendant, was the sole occupant of the car. Kuhrt asked defendant to produce his driver's license and motor vehicle credentials. As soon as defendant spoke, Kuhrt detected an odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from defendant's breath. Kuhrt also noted that defendant's eyes were bloodshot and watery, and his hand movements were slow. Kuhrt testified that when he asked defendant how much he had to drink that evening, defendant responded that he had had "two drinks and a shot."

Based on these initial observations, Kuhrt asked defendant to step out of his car. As defendant stepped out of the car, Kuhrt noticed he used the car to support and balance himself. Kuhrt asked defendant to perform certain field sobriety tests. According to Kuhrt, the area where defendant attempted to perform these tests was well-lit,1 free from any debris, and the surface was flat; the traffic was also "very light." Kuhrt explained orally to defendant what he wanted defendant to do. According to Kuhrt, defendant stated he understood the instructions and did not have any physical disabilities or injuries that could hinder his performance of any of these tests.

The first test Kuhrt administered to defendant is known as the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN).2 Kuhrt testified defendant "showed a lack of smooth pursuit, which is . . . when you're going across the face for about two seconds to the left and two seconds to the right, the eye has a . . . slight jerking movement . . . which is consistent with alcohol consumption[.]" Kuhrt next asked defendant to perform the walk-and-turn test. He instructed defendant to stand with his hands at his side with his right foot in front of his left foot; he then told defendant to take nine steps out and nine steps back, counting each step aloud, touching heel to toe.

Kuhrt testified defendant attempted to comply with these instructions by walking "very slow." However, he stepped off the line to his right on the third, fifth, and seventh steps. He also lifted his hands for balance during the entire test. On the return steps, defendant again raised his arms for balance on the fourth, fifth, and sixth steps; he stepped off to his right on his fourth step and to his left on the fifth step. In short, defendant exhibited four of the eight indicators of intoxication associated with this test.

Defendant was also unable to perform the one-leg stand test. Kuhrt instructed defendant to stand on one leg for thirty seconds with his hands at his side and one foot raised six inches off the ground and to look at his foot the entire time. According to Kuhrt, defendant used his arms for balance and swayed. Kuhrt concluded defendant also failed this test.

Based on the totality of these circumstances, Kuhrt found probable cause to arrest defendant for DWI. He placed defendant in his patrol car, read him his rights under Miranda,3 and drove him to the Netcong State Police Station. Kuhrt testified that the interior of the patrol car filled with the odor of an alcoholic beverage during the time it took to reach the station. Defendant arrived at the Netcong State Police Barracks at approximately 12:26 a.m. on November 14, 2012.

Prior to entering the processing room, Kuhrt removed all cell phones and portable radios from the room and again informed defendant of his rights under Miranda. After completing the forms necessary to document that defendant had been informed of his rights under Miranda, Kuhrt read defendant the Drunk Driving Standard Statement form. Kuhrt testified he observed defendant for a continuous twenty-minute period to make sure defendant had not ingested or placed anything into his mouth that may impair the administration or reliability of the Alcotest.4 Kuhrt testified defendant submitted two breath samples as instructed. The Alcotest reading was.12 percent BAC both times.

Defendant challenged the admissibility of the Alcotest results. The municipal court conducted a pretrial hearing at which defendant presented the testimony of Gary Aramini, who described himself as a "self-employed DWI consultant." Before retiring from the State Police in February 2004, Aramini served for twenty-five years as a Trooper and participated in "hundreds of DWI arrest investigations." He was also "the lead instructor of the 11 northern counties of all police agencies in breath testing, DWI . . . field testing." Although not directly stated, the record indicates the municipal court admitted Aramini as an expert witness in the field of DWI testing procedures and field sobriety tests. The municipal court denied defendant's motion to suppress the results of the Alcotest. Judge Whipple affirmed the municipal court's ruling as part of her de novo review.

Defendant now appeals raising the following arguments:

We review the decision of the Law Division under a sufficiency of the evidence standard. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964). We are also bound to uphold the trial judge's credibility finding unless

However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

Here, we reject defendant's arguments substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Whipple in her April 7, 2014 oral opinion. We make only the following brief comments. Among the arguments raised in this appeal, defendant argues the breath test was improperly admitted because Trooper Kuhrt failed to observe him for the requisite twenty-minute period. Defendant specifically challenges Kuhrt's testimony that he began observing him at 12:26 a.m., and claims the observation period actually began at 12:29:39 a.m.

The State disputes defendant's claim and notes the Alcotest machine "provides significant safeguards to ensure" the breath tests were done properly. Thus, any discrepancies are insufficient to overcome both the municipal and Law Division judges' determination that Trooper Kuhrt provided credible testimony concerning the observation period.

It is well-settled that a DWI suspect must be observed for twenty minutes prior to administration of the breath test. Chun, supra, 194 N.J. at 79. "Operators must wait twenty minutes before collecting a sample to avoid overestimated readings due to residual effects of mouth alcohol." Ibid. Additionally, "if the arrestee swallows anything or regurgitates, or if the operator notices chewing gum or tobacco in the person's mouth, the operator is required to begin counting the twenty-minute period anew." Ibid. The purpose of the observation period is to ensure the reliability of the test results, and the State must show by clear and convincing evidence it has met the requirement. State v. Ugrovics, 410 N.J.Super. 482, 489-90 (App. Div. 2009), certif. denied, 202 N.J. 346 (2010).

Here, any discrepancies between Kuhrt's trial testimony and the computerized documentation associated with this case were issues of credibility. The municipal judge found Trooper Kuhrt's testimony on this issue credible and "sufficient" to clear up the documentation discrepancy. Conducting her own de novo review, Judge Whipple determined "Trooper Kuhrt provided credible unequivocal convincing testimony" that he began observing defendant at 12:26 a.m., and observed him for twenty continuous minutes. She credited his testimony over the computerized record system because he provided a "first-hand account," as opposed to the report created by a third party. We discern no legal basis to interfere with Judge Whipple's fact-sensitive determination. Locurto, supra, 157 N.J. at 471.

One is "under the influence" when his or her mental faculties or physical capabilities are substantially deteriorated or diminished due to alcohol consumption. State v. Tamburro, 68 N.J. 414, 420-21 (1975). Importantly, the defendant need not "be absolutely `drunk' in the sense of being sodden with alcohol" to sustain a conviction. State v. Nemesh, 228 N.J.Super. 597, 608 (App. Div. 1988). Rather, the Legislature sought to prohibit "a condition which so affects the judgment or control of a motor vehicle operator `as to make it improper for him to drive on the highway.'" State v. Cryan, 363 N.J.Super. 442, 455 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 165).

Against this legal standard, the evidence presented in the form of Trooper Kuhrt's observations of defendant's conduct amply supports Judge Whipple's conclusion concerning defendant's state of intoxication. The remainder of defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.