ORDER

TIMOTHY D. DEGIUSTI, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants the Oklahoma Department of Labor (ODOL) and Lloyd Fields'1 Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 9], to which Plaintiffs have responded [Doc. No. 11]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.

BACKGROUND

According to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint,2 Defendant Christopher Holland filed a wage claim against Plaintiff GEO Exploration, LLC before the ODOL. During the proceedings before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Plaintiffs allege that although the ALJ permitted Holland to present his case, it refused to allow Agrawal to testify, thereby depriving him of protections under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Second Amend. Compl. at 2-3. Plaintiffs also contend that, despite GEO's pending bankruptcy, the ALJ found Holland was owed unpaid wages and entered judgment in his favor against Agrawal. Plaintiffs allege this ruling violated the "automatic stay" provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 362) Id. at 3.

Plaintiffs bring suit before this Court, alleging the judgment is void in light of the fact that (1) GEO was in bankruptcy, (2) Agrawal was not afforded an opportunity to be heard and defend his case, and (3) Agrawal was not Holland's "employer" for purposes of the wage statutes. Id. at 4. Alternatively, Plaintiffs seek that the Oklahoma Supreme Court certify two questions, namely, (1) whether the ALJ denied Agrawal the right to be heard and (2) whether an automatic stay was warranted under § 362. Id. at 5.3

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Defendants contend Plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed because (1) they are protected under the doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (3) Plaintiffs' claims are precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and/or claim preclusion; (4) Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Fields in his individual capacity; and (5) Plaintiffs have failed to present proper issues for certification.

The Court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to the facts of this case. "Generally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts `from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims actually decided by a state court and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-court judgment.'" PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006)). "The Supreme Court recently clarified the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, stating that it is `confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings Mexico, or a Mexican state. Id. § 1601.2. It also allows a court of last resort within the state to answer a question so certified by said jurisdictions. Id. § 1602. It is unclear in the Second Amended Complaint the jurisdiction to which Plaintiffs request the questions be certified. commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine applies to both claims that were brought and claims that could have been brought in the state court. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n. 16 (1983).

The Tenth Circuit approaches jurisdictional questions under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine "by asking whether the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress, paying close attention to the relief sought in the federal suit." Mo's Express, 441 F.3d at 1237 (citing Kenmen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 2002)). In this regard, the Court has taken judicial notice of the underlying state court proceedings in this case, which are available on Westlaw and publically accessible through http://www.oscn.net.4 The record shows that the ALJ's award was affirmed by the Oklahoma County District Court, which, in a reported decision, was affirmed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Agrawal v. Oklahoma Dep't of Labor, 2015 OK 67, 364 P.3d 618.

Based on its review of those proceedings, the Court finds that Plaintiffs unquestionably seek review and rejection of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision affirming the ALJ's award of unpaid wages to Holland. There, as here, Plaintiffs disputed the validity of the wage claim and alleged error in the failure to allow them to present evidence at the administrative hearing. "If the decision of a state agency has been upheld by a state court, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, because a challenge to the agency's decision necessarily involves a challenge to the judgment of the state court." Pretlow v. McPherson, 497 F. App'x 846, 848 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (quoting Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1994)). Consequently, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Court finds the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Even if the Court were to assume that Rooker-Feldman does not apply, Plaintiffs' claims would still be barred under the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. See Kemper v. LPR Const. Co., 271 F. App'x 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) ("Attempts merely to seek relief denied in state court — to relitigate a state case — are properly dismissed on grounds of res judicata or collateral estoppel."); Yancey v. Thomas, 441 F. App'x 552, 557 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) ("Under Oklahoma law, `[t]he principle of res judicata as claim preclusion teaches that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating not only the adjudicated claim, but also any theories or issues that were actually decided, or could have been decided, in that action.'") (citing Read v. Read, 2001 OK 87, ¶ 15, 57 P.3d 561, 567 n. 18).

Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 9] is GRANTED as set forth herein.5 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 7] is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[D]ismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice because the court, having determined that it lacks jurisdiction over the action, is incapable of reaching a disposition on the merits of the underlying claims.") (citations omitted). A judgment shall be issued forthwith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.