ARTHUR D. SPATT, District Judge.
On February 11, 2013, the Plaintiffs Joseph Sciascia and Carmine Fiorillo, As Trustees of the Special and Superior Officers Benevolent Association Welfare Fund., and Sciascia, as President of the Special and Superior Officers Benevolent Association, commenced this action pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §185, and Sections 515 and 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. In essence, the Plaintiffs seek to recover alleged delinquent fringe contributions under a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the Defendant Prime Security Services, Inc. and a union named the Special and Superior Officers Benevolent Association. The Clerk of the Court having noted the default of the Defendants on June 25, 2013, and the Plaintiff having moved for a default judgment against the Defendants on July 31, 2013, the Court referred this matter to United States Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen Tomlinson for a recommendation as to whether the motion for a default judgment should be granted, and if so, whether damages should be awarded, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
On February 19, 2014, Judge Tomlinson issued a thorough report recommending that the Court enter a default judgment against the Defendants Prime Protective Services, Inc., Prime Protective, Inc., Prime Security & Investigative Services, LLC, Prime Security Services, Inc., and Terry English. Judge Tomlinson also recommended that the Plaintiffs be awarded, as against the Defendants jointly and severally, (1) $33,485.00 for unpaid contributions; (2) $2,689.71 in interest on unpaid contributions; (3) $6,697.00 in liquidated damages; and (4) $2,636.69 in attorneys' fees and costs. To date, there has been no objection to Judge Tomlinson's report.
In reviewing a report and recommendation, a court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). "To accept the report and recommendation of a magistrate, to which no timely objection has been made, a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record."
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby: