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EASTERLING v. NEW JERSEY TRANSIT, A-5403-13T3. (2016)

Court: Superior Court of New Jersey Number: innjco20160112251 Visitors: 2
Filed: Jan. 12, 2016
Latest Update: Jan. 12, 2016
Summary: NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION PER CURIAM . Plaintiff, Shaconda Easterling, filed a personal injury complaint against defendant, New Jersey Transit. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and plaintiff responded by filing a cross-motion to extend discovery, which the trial court effectively denied when it granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court's decision denying her cross-motion to extend discovery to allow her to obtain n
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

Plaintiff, Shaconda Easterling, filed a personal injury complaint against defendant, New Jersey Transit. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and plaintiff responded by filing a cross-motion to extend discovery, which the trial court effectively denied when it granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff now appeals the trial court's decision denying her cross-motion to extend discovery to allow her to obtain needed medical opinions to defend against the summary judgment motion. Having considered the parties' arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

Plaintiff alleges that on June 27, 2011, she was injured when defendant's bus driver closed the doors of the bus on her arms and right foot as she was boarding. Plaintiff asserted in her complaint defendant's driver operated the doors recklessly and negligently. She also asserted defendant's actions caused her severe and permanent injuries, permanent loss of a bodily function, and serious and permanent disfigurement.

Plaintiff went to Cooper University Hospital the night of the accident where she complained of right foot, lower back, and bilateral arm pain. X-rays were taken of both her forearms, right foot and ankle, and lumbar spine. The x-rays were negative. She was treated with pain medication, given a splint, and released.

A few weeks after the injury, she sought treatment from a podiatrist for right foot pain. Plaintiff explained the pain was associated with the bus accident. The doctor noted the right foot was slightly edematous on the anterior ankle, and she walked with an abnormal gait. The doctor's impression was "[p]ain in [l]imb." The doctor prescribed medication for the edema and a cam walker to help plaintiff walk normally.

Plaintiff then sought treatment from a surgeon for a painful lump on the dorsal aspect of her right wrist. The doctor's records did not state the cause of the problem nor did plaintiff state how the injury occurred. The doctor diagnosed her with a ganglion cyst, which he surgically removed, but he did not causally relate the cyst to her accident.

Plaintiff saw a second podiatrist complaining of severe constant right foot pain. The report gave a history of plaintiff's foot injury, and stated that the pain began in June 2011, which was the time of the bus accident. His assessment included the following possible conditions: tarsal coalition, stress fracture, periostitis, acquired deformity, complex regional pain syndrome, and cuboid syndrome. The doctor did not state whether the pain or the condition of the foot was causally related to the bus accident.

On January 17, 2013, plaintiff underwent another right foot x-ray at Cooper University Hospital. The x-ray was compared to the x-rays taken the night of the bus accident. The film showed proper alignment, no soft tissue damage, and no fractures. There was a small heel bone enthesiophyte found.

She later underwent a right foot MRI. The MRI showed a ganglion cyst along one of the foot bones and was otherwise unremarkable.

Discovery was conducted and ended on February 22, 2014, after two extensions of the discovery end date. The parties then participated in mandatory arbitration. Defendant rejected the arbitrators' award and moved for summary judgment on April 15, 2014, arguing plaintiff failed to prove proximate causation linking her injuries to the accident, and plaintiff failed to prove her injuries crossed the threshold under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2(d), in order to recover damages for pain and suffering.

In response to defendant's summary judgment motion, plaintiff filed no opposition except a cross-motion to extend discovery. Plaintiff argued in her cross-motion there were exceptional circumstances justifying a ninety-day extension of the discovery end date. She contended her economic situation and insurance coverage combined to create exceptional circumstances prohibiting her from obtaining the proper diagnostic testing, specifically a bone scan. She requested the discovery extension in order to "establish objective evidence of a permanent injury in order to sustain a claim against New Jersey Transit under the Tort Claims Act." Plaintiff stated she had an upcoming appointment with a podiatrist, and if that podiatrist recommended a bone scan, coverage would be provided for the procedure. Defendant opposed the cross-motion. On June 6, 2014, the trial judge heard oral argument on both the summary judgment motion and the cross-motion.

At oral argument, the trial judge found plaintiff failed to provide any opinions from her doctors casually linking her injuries to the accident. He questioned the likelihood of a doctor causally relating her present condition to an accident that happened approximately three years earlier, even if plaintiff received further testing as to permanency. The trial judge concluded discovery should not be extended because there were no exceptional circumstances presented. The trial judge went on to grant defendant's summary judgment motion, effectively denying plaintiff's cross-motion to extend discovery.

On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and denying her cross-motion to extend discovery. Plaintiff points to various exceptional circumstances, including: the seriousness of her medical condition and her inability to afford proper medical care for her injuries, which resulted in her inability to offer sufficient proof with which to oppose, from a medical treatment standpoint, defendant's motion for summary judgment. She also argues defendant failed to cite credible reasons why a discovery extension would prejudice it. Furthermore, plaintiff also claims the trial judge erred in granting defendant's summary judgment motion, but gave no support for this contention in her brief.

Our review of the trial judge's decision is deferential. Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011). "We generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law." Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J.Super. 68, 80 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005). We apply this deferential standard to a trial judge's decision to deny a discovery extension. Pomerantz Paper Corp., supra, 207 N.J. at 371.

An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is `made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).

"The right of a trial court to manage the orderly progression of cases before it has been recognized as inherent in its function." Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Lustgarten, 332 N.J.Super. 472, 488 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607 (2000). Rule 4:24-1(c) provides in pertinent part that "[n]o extension of the discovery period may be permitted after an arbitration or trial date is fixed, unless exceptional circumstances are shown." The moving party must satisfy four inquiries to extend discovery based on exceptional circumstances:

(1) why discovery has not been completed within time and counsel's diligence in pursuing discovery during that time; (2) the additional discovery or disclosure sought is essential; (3) an explanation for counsel's failure to request an extension of the time for discovery within the original time period; and (4) the circumstances presented were clearly beyond the control of the attorney and litigant seeking the extension of time. [Rivers, supra, 378 N.J. Super. at 79 (citing Vitti v. Brown, 359 N.J.Super. 40, 51 (Law Div. 2003)).]

Plaintiff contends defendant failed to offer reasons why it would be prejudiced if the cross-motion were granted, but lack of prejudice does not create exceptional circumstances. Although the trial judge should not have speculated on whether a medical expert would have been able to give a causation opinion if the discovery period were extended, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding exceptional circumstances did not exist to justify a discovery extension.

The cross-motion to extend discovery in this case was made not only after the conclusion of the discovery period and after arbitration was scheduled, but after arbitration was completed. By choosing to go to arbitration rather than making a motion within the appropriate time frame, plaintiff's counsel was acknowledging the case was ready to proceed. Plaintiff's counsel did not obtain a report from a medical expert on causation or permanency, did not timely file for another extension of discovery, and proceeded to arbitration without necessary proofs. Plaintiff acknowledges she required additional medical reports to successfully defend against the summary judgment motion. The argument a discovery extension was necessary to obtain evidence of medical causation and permanency required to defeat a summary judgment motion demonstrates a lack of diligence by counsel, not an exceptional circumstance.

We do not address plaintiff's opposition to the trial judge's granting of summary judgment because the issue was not properly addressed in her brief. Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP v. N.J. Dep't of Law and Pub. Safety, Div. of Law, 421 N.J.Super. 489, 496 n.5 (App. Div. 2011) (explaining failure to address an issue in a merits brief is considered abandoned); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 4 on R. 2:6-2 (2016) (stating "an issue not briefed is deemed waived.").

Affirmed.

Source:  Leagle

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