MEMORANDUM

MARK A. KEARNEY, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, citizens of Lebanon County, Pennsylvania, claim Defendants' Power Morcellator surgical device employed during laparoscopic surgery in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania caused them damage.1 Defendants are citizens of New Jersey and Ohio. At this stage, the identified witnesses are located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the District of New Jersey or the Southern District of Ohio. (ECF Doc. No. 36-1) There is no connection to this District other than Defendants' New Jersey headquarters are within this Court's one hundred mile trial subpoena power. Defendants, however, agree to produce their subpoenaed witnesses within one hundred miles of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania even if the matter is transferred to the Plaintiffs' home forum. Absent any persuasive reason to retain venue, we transfer this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.2

This action could have been brought in the Middle District.

Under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), a district court "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, . . . may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties consented." "Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (internal quotation omitted); see also Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995).

Under §1404(a), we first ask whether the alternate venue is one in which the case "might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). Plaintiffs Jennifer and Randall Sanders reside within the Middle District, Mrs. Sanders' surgery occurred in the Middle District and her post-surgery treatment, as well as her continuing treatment, occurred and continue to occur within the Middle District. A substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. This action could have been properly brought there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).

Jumara factors warrant transfer to the Middle District.

We then ask whether Jumara's private and public interest factors support a transfer for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice. The party seeking the transfer bears the burden of establishing the need for the transfer. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. The Jumara private interest factors include:

Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (citations omitted).

The public interest factors include:

Id. at 879-80 (citations omitted).

The totality of the private interest factors weigh in favor of transfer to the Middle District. Although a district court should generally defer to a plaintiffs choice of forum, the "choice receives less deference when plaintiff files suit outside of plaintiffs home forum" and is "given less weight where none of the operative facts of the action occur in the forum selected by the plaintiff." Kiker v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 14-1445, 2014 WL 4948624, *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2014) (internal quotations omitted); see also Family Financial Centers LLC v. Cox, 14-5330, 2015 WL 790038, *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2015); A.S. ex rel. Miller v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 13-3684, 2013 WL 4401352, *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2013); Lehr v. Stryker Corp., suit in his home forum, he must make a strong showing of convenience in order for his choice to be given deference." Lehr, 2010 WL 3069633 at *3 (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs chose this venue "in the interest of calling live witnesses, who are not subject to subpoena power in Harrisburg," referring to the Ethicon Defendants who are primarily located in New Jersey. In response, the Ethicon Defendants waived the one hundred mile subpoena limitation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(c)(1)(A).3 Plaintiffs' one hundred mile argument is no longer a reason to retain venue.

The Ethicon Defendants prefer the Middle District, arguing Plaintiffs could not be inconvenienced by litigating in their home forum. Plaintiffs argue it is easier for the Ethicon Defendants to litigate this matter here because it is geographically closer to their corporate headquarters in New Jersey. The Ethicon Defendants do not agree. They instead agree to waive the one hundred mile rule for witnesses within one hundred miles of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As such, Plaintiffs are not prejudiced. The Ethicon Defendants correctly argue that their forum preference can be given weight as long as it does not shift inconvenience to the Plaintiffs who, as noted, reside within the Middle District. See e.g. Lehr, 2010 WL 3069633 at *4; Kiker, 2014 WL 4948624 at *4-*5. Defendants' forum preference does not "merely shift the inconvenience" to Plaintiffs. This factor weighs in favor of transfer. Kiker at *4-*5.

Plaintiffs admit their injuries occurred in the Middle District. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that the physical location of the sustained injuries should be given less weight because in products liability actions, there is no single "situs" of injury.4 Even accepting Plaintiffs' argument that "this suit has ties to multiple states," thus rendering the third Jumara factor neutral, there is no allegation that any of these "ties" are in the Eastern District. Plaintiffs reside, and the surgery occurred, in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. This factor weighs in favor of transfer.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth Jumara factors relating to the convenience of parties, witnesses, and location of books and records all weigh in favor of transfer to the Middle District or are neutral factors. Plaintiffs reside in the Middle District. The Ethicon Defendants waived the one hundred mile subpoena limitation for their witnesses. Both these factors weigh in favor of transfer. The parties agree that the "location of books and records" factor is neutral. There is no dispute that Plaintiffs' doctors and medical records are located in the Middle District. The Court notes the significant discussion regarding electronic discovery during the initial pre-trial conference. This production can occur in either fora. See e.g. Lehr, 2010 WL 3069633 at *6. Plaintiffs contend that all but the third and sixth Jumara public interest factors are neutral. Plaintiffs argue that the third factor — court congestion5 — and the sixth factor — the trial judge's familiarity with the applicable state law in diversity cases — weigh against transfer. On the sixth factor, Plaintiffs argue that the judges in either venue will determine choice-of-law issues. This factor is neutral. Plaintiffs have not articulated how this factor weighs against transfer.

Plaintiffs also argue the "very strong public policy to have witnesses testify live at trial." Plaintiffs do not explain how this relates to the applicability of other states' laws in this diversity case. At any rate, this concern is resolved by the Ethicon Defendants' waiver of the one hundred mile rule. Defendants contend that all but the fourth Jumara public interest factor — local interest in deciding local controversies at home — are neutral. The Ethicon Defendants, citing Lehr, argue that the fourth Jumara factor weighs in favor of transfer to the Middle District because that court has an interest in adjudicating claims arising there. We find, persuaded by Judge Slomsky's well-reasoned decision in Lehr, that the fourth Jumara public factor weighs in favor of transfer.

Conclusion

Jumara's private and public factors favor transfer "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice" to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs' injuries occurred in the Middle District and Plaintiffs reside there. The Ethicon Defendants certify that they waive the one hundred mile subpoena limits for their employee witnesses located within one hundred miles of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. As such, Plaintiffs' only claimed prejudice from a transfer is resolved. The accompanying Order transfers this matter to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.