LAU, J.
¶ 1 Jamie Stanley appeals the denial of her motion to vacate an arbitration award. She contends the award should have been vacated because her attorney was taking care of her ill parents for several months, which prevented her from filing a prehearing statement, appearing at the arbitration hearing, or timely requesting a trial de novo. Because the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding these circumstances did not justify relief under CR 60(b)(9) as an "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" that prevented Stanley from prosecuting her case, we affirm.
¶ 12 In mid-December 2004, Harold Cole pulled out from a stop sign and collided with Jamie Stanley as she was driving on Warren Avenue in Bremerton. On November 14, 2007, she commenced this lawsuit against Cole in Kitsap County Superior Court, claiming his negligence caused the accident and damages. The following month, Cole filed his answer and affirmative defenses.
¶ 13 Stanley's attorney, Vonda Sargent, filed a statement of arbitrability pursuant to MAR 1.2 on July 31, 2008. On August 22, the case was transferred to mandatory arbitration. An arbitrator was appointed in October 2008. He scheduled the arbitration hearing for December 5, 2008,
¶ 4 Cole timely delivered his prehearing statement to Sargent and the arbitrator. He admitted liability but contested proximate cause and Stanley's damages. The statement disclosed the evidence he planned to present. It included a witness list, Stanley's medical records, employment records, and Stanley's April 30, 2008 deposition transcript. The statement also confirmed the arbitration hearing date, time, and location. The record does not show whether Sargent communicated with Stanley about the upcoming arbitration. Sargent failed to submit a prehearing statement to Cole's attorney or the arbitrator.
¶ 15 Almost two months later, on February 6, 2009, Stanley moved to vacate the arbitration award under CR 60. To support the motion, she attached Sargent's declaration. She submitted no other evidence and cited no case authority. Relying on CR 60(b)(9)'s "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" provision,
¶ 6 Sargent's declaration testimony explained why she had neglected Stanley's case between late August 2008 and January 5, 2009. She described her mother's declining health and eventual death on November 17, 2008.
When Sargent returned to work in January 2009, she was "faced with a mountain of paperwork" and "finally located the arbitration award."
¶ 7 After Cole's attorney failed to return her telephone calls and moved to enter judgment on the arbitration award, Stanley filed the motion to vacate. The court denied the motion to vacate on February 13, 2009.
¶ 8 Stanley contends the superior court erred by denying her motion to vacate the arbitration award. Under CR 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or other proceeding in limited situations specified by the rule. We review the court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Pybas v. Paolino, 73 Wn.App. 393, 399, 869 P.2d 427 (1994). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds." Boguch v. Landover Corp., 153 Wn.App. 595, 619, 224 P.3d 795 (2009). "[D]iscretion is abused only where no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court." Carle v.
¶ 9 Stanley argues that the arbitration award should be treated as a default judgment because neither she nor her attorney appeared at the arbitration hearing. Courts apply CR 60(b) more liberally to judgments by default than those on the merits. Pybas, 73 Wash.App. at 399, 869 P.2d 427. While Stanley concedes the arbitration hearing was not "strictly" a default proceeding, she maintains that it was "similar," so the more lenient CR 60(b) standard for default judgments should apply. Appellant's Br. at 11. She relies principally on Pybas, which also involved a CR 60(b) motion to set aside an arbitration award. The court there concluded that the more liberal standard for vacating default judgments was inapplicable. Pybas, 73 Wash.App. at 399, 869 P.2d 427. It observed that this standard was rooted in a policy consideration favoring judgments on the merits but that consideration had "little relevance" in the case before it because there had been a hearing on the merits and "nothing suggests that [plaintiff] was deprived of an opportunity to present his case at the arbitration hearing." Pybas, 73 Wash.App. at 400, 869 P.2d 427 (emphasis added). Stanley argues that the opposite conclusion should be reached in her case because the arbitration proceeding was not a hearing on the merits and she had no opportunity to present her case. As a consequence, she claims the arbitration award is essentially a default judgment and the more liberal standard for vacating the judgment should apply.
¶ 10 We disagree. Under CR 55(a)(1), a party is subject to default if the party "has failed to appear, plead, or otherwise defend...." Stanley fully participated in prosecuting her case until Sargent's parents suffered illnesses. Sargent appeared for Stanley, filed a complaint, elected to set the matter for arbitration, selected an arbitrator, and participated in discovery. Stanley and Sargent's absence from the hearing therefore was not the equivalent of failing to appear and prosecute the action.
¶ 11 We next address whether the trial court abused its discretion because Stanley was entitled to relief under CR 60(b)(9).
¶ 12 Our Supreme Court adopted this rule in 1967 as part of its complete reorganization of Washington civil procedure rules. Curtis Lumber Co. v. Sortor, 83 Wn.2d 764, 766-67, 522 P.2d 822 (1974); Order Adopting
¶ 13 These cases support relief under the rule when events beyond a party's control— such as a serious illness, accident, natural disaster, or similar event—prevents the party from taking actions to pursue or defend the case.
¶ 14 Stanley maintains that the rule applies here because her attorney's parents became seriously ill and one of them died. We agree that under Adams and Scott, these circumstances qualify as an "unavoidable casualty or misfortune" under CR 60(b)(9). But an unavoidable casualty or misfortune alone is insufficient to allow relief under the rule. The rule further requires the party seeking CR 60(b)(9) relief to establish that the casualty or misfortune "prevent[ed] the party from prosecuting or defending" the case. This language serves to further limit the circumstances that warrant relief under the rule. Our Supreme Court applied this rule-based limitation in Swasey v. Mikkelsen, 65 Wn. 411, 118 P. 308 (1911). There, the defendant moved to vacate a judgment based on his wife's extended illness. The trial court denied his motion and the Supreme Court affirmed. It reasoned that "his attendance at his wife's bedside was not so constant, nor his duties there so exacting, that he could not have found time to employ counsel." Swasey, 65 Wash. at 415, 118 P. 308.
¶ 16 Stanley also relies on L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C.Cir. 1964), in which the court affirmed reinstatement of a plaintiff's personal injury suit after his attorney grossly neglected the case while dealing with his wife's illness and parents' deaths and then repeatedly misled his client about the status of his case. But that case involved FRCP 60(b)(6)'s federal "catch-all" rule,
¶ 17 Steuart is also inapplicable to Stanley's case for several other reasons. In Steuart, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's case eight months after filing suit for failure to prosecute. In contrast, the arbitrator awarded $7,000 in Stanley's favor after a hearing on the merits of her case. In Steuart, the court found persuasive evidence that the plaintiff repeatedly asked his attorney how the case was proceeding and his attorney actively misled him about the status of the case. Unlike in Steuart, Stanley presented no evidence that she acted diligently to stay informed about her case or that Sargent actively misled her.
¶ 18 Stanley next cites Barr v. MacGugan, 119 Wn.App. 43, 46, 78 P.3d 660 (2003) in a statement of additional authority. In that case, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's case (without a resolution on the merits) after her attorney failed to comply with an order compelling responses to discovery requests. After the plaintiff left several phone messages with her attorney to check on the status of her case, the attorney never responded. When she learned from a third party that her case had been dismissed and that her attorney had been suffering from severe clinical depression, she hired new counsel and successfully moved to vacate the dismissal order under CR 60(b)(11)'s "catch-all" provision. Barr, 119 Wash.App. at 44-45, 78 P.3d 660.
¶ 19 While acknowledging the general rule that an attorney's negligent conduct is binding on his client, we concluded that this rule did not necessary apply when a lawyer's severe mental illness or disability interfered with the attorney/client relationship. Barr, 119 Wash.App. at 47, 78 P.3d 660. In affirming the order vacating dismissal, we reasoned,
Barr, 119 Wash.App. at 48, 78 P.3d 660 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
¶ 20 Barr is not controlling here because (1) Stanley failed to offer argument or case authority under CR 60(b)(11)'s "catch-all" provision, (2) she offered no evidence to show her attorney suffered from a mental condition and she acted diligently to learn about the status of her case, and (3) Stanley's case was resolved on its merits, not by default judgment.
¶ 21 Finally, policy considerations further undermine Stanley's argument. In Washington, there is a strong policy favoring the finality of judgments on the merits. Lane v. Brown & Haley, 81 Wn.App. 102, 106, 912 P.2d 1040 (1996). Many attorneys face the all too common sudden illness of elderly parents and other family members. If these circumstances were sufficient by themselves to allow a party to vacate a judgment after months of inaction, the judicial system's compelling interest in finality and predictability would be unacceptably compromised. Lawyers owe a professional obligation to act diligently on behalf of their clients regardless of personal inconvenience and to adjust their work load to allow them to handle each case appropriately. See comments to RPC 1.3 and RPC 3.2. And RPC 1.4 requires lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about significant developments affecting the timing or substance of their representation. See comments to RPC 1.4.
¶ 22 In addition, allowing a party to avoid a mandatory arbitration judgment under these circumstances would also undermine the judicial economy goals underlying the mandatory arbitration process. The statute authorizing mandatory arbitration in certain civil cases is intended primarily to alleviate court congestion and reduce delay in hearing cases. Fernandes v. Mockridge, 75 Wn.App. 207, 211, 877 P.2d 719 (1994). The mandatory arbitration rules serve this purpose by providing a simplified and economical way to resolve disputes involving claims of $50,000 or less. See MAR 1-8; RCW 7.06.020. The rules impose a strict 20-day limit for seeking a trial de novo if a party is dissatisfied with arbitration results. MAR 7.1(a). Allowing a party to circumvent this rule through CR 60(b)(9) would undermine the entire mandatory arbitration scheme. Compare Pybas, 73 Wash.App. at 401-04, 869 P.2d 427 (strictly limiting ability to invoke CR 60(b)(1) in mandatory arbitration context).
¶ 23 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stanley's motion under these circumstances.
¶ 24 Cole requests attorney fees on appeal under MAR 7.3, which states, "The court shall assess costs and reasonable attorney fees against a party who appeals the [arbitration] award and fails to improve the party's position on the trial de novo." And if the party fails to achieve a better result by appealing to this court, it is required to pay
¶ 25 Cole also argues he should be awarded fees under RAP 18.9 because Stanley's appeal is frivolous. "[A]n appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues upon which reasonable minds might differ, and it is so totally devoid of merit that there was no reasonable possibility of reversal." Streater v. White, 26 Wn.App. 430, 435, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). The court considers the record as a whole and resolves all doubts against finding an appeal frivolous. Delany v. Canning, 84 Wn.App. 498, 510, 929 P.2d 475 (1997). Here, viewing the record as a whole, the appeal is not frivolous. Stanley cites relevant case law and raises arguments that are at least debatable. We deny Cole's attorney fee request.
¶ 26 Because the trial court properly exercised its discretion under the circumstances presented here, we affirm the order denying Stanley's CR 60(b)(9) motion to vacate arbitration award. And we deny Cole's attorney fees request.
WE CONCUR: SCHINDLER and GROSSE, JJ.
Emry, 334 N.W.2d at 792. And in an Iowa case, a defendant sought to vacate a judgment based on her illness. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Harlan v. Robinson, 464 N.W.2d 894, 895 (Iowa 1990). The court rejected her argument based on the circumstances of her case, explaining,
Robinson, 464 N.W.2d at 895-96.
In any event, Washington courts have not interpreted CR 60(b)(11) to allow a judgment to be vacated based on an attorney's "gross negligence." The traditional rule is that the incompetence or neglect of a party's own attorney is insufficient to justify relief from a judgment in a civil case. Lane v. Brown & Haley, 81 Wash.App. at 107, 912 P.2d 1040, Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wn.2d 539, 547, 573 P.2d 1302 (1978). But some federal circuits, following Steuart, have held that a client may obtain relief under FRCP 60(b) based on the "gross negligence" of his or her attorney. In Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (2002), the Ninth Circuit explained,
Tani, 282 F.3d at 1168-69 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). And in Tani, the court acknowledged a circuit split on the issue, citing the Seventh and Eighth Circuits' contrary precedents. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169 n. 11. We also note that Steuart has been criticized in the Second and Eleventh Circuits. See Stefanopoulos v. City of New York, 299 Fed.Appx. 49 (2nd Cir. 2008) (noting consistent reluctance to follow the approach of Steuart); Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 1130 (11th Cir. 1986) (limiting Steuart to situations where there is evidence client is diligent despite attorney's gross negligence).
In addition, the Tani court expressly relied on the fact that the district court had entered a default judgment. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1170. There was no default judgment here. We do not address whether the Tani, rule applies in CR 60(b)(11) cases because Stanley did not claim "gross neglect" by Sargent under CR 60(b)(11).