NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Bilal Muhammad appeals from a June 28, 2013 order denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). We affirm.

I.

Following a jury trial conducted in April 2008, defendant was convicted on five counts of second-degree sexual assault in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(4), fourth-degree aggravated assault with a firearm in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4), and third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). All of these convictions arose from assaults on one victim.

In February 2009, defendant was sentenced to prison terms of 10 years, with 85% of that time ineligible for parole in accordance with the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Specifically, on the second-degree sexual assault convictions, defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 10 years in prison, subject to NERA. Defendant was also sentenced to parole supervision for life. On the fourth-degree assault with a firearm conviction, defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of 18 months in prison, with 18 months of parole ineligibility. On the third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun conviction, defendant was sentenced to a concurrent term of five years in prison.

Defendant appealed and, on June 17, 2011, this court affirmed defendant's convictions, but remanded for resentencing. The resentencing was to address the mandatory registration and reporting requirements of Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to 9, and so that the sentencing judge could state on the record that the second-degree aggravated assault convictions were subject to NERA. State v. Muhammad, No. A-4981-08(App. Div. June 17, 2011)(slip op. at 3), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 430 (2012).

On April 20, 2012, defendant, representing himself, filed a petition for PCR. He was appointed counsel, and the PCR judge (Hon. Joseph C. Cassini, III, J.S.C.) heard oral arguments on the petition on June 25, 2013. In a written letter opinion dated June 28, 2013, Judge Cassini denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and also denied defendant's petition for PCR.

II.

This court set forth the relevant facts in an unpublished opinion issued on June 17, 2011. We need not repeat those facts in detail. In short, the trial testimony established that defendant physically and sexually assaulted the victim, Y.F. The assault included defendant striking, punching, grabbing and pointing a gun at Y.F. The sexual assault included defendant penetrating Y.F.'s vagina and rectum with his fingers and his penis, defendant forcing Y.F. to perform oral sex, and defendant performing oral sex on Y.F. When defendant finally released Y.F., Y.F. immediately reported the sexual assault. She was taken to a hospital where she was examined and evidence was collected.

III.

On this appeal of the denial of his petition for PCR, defendant makes the following arguments:

POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE THE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL.

POINT II: THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S PRO SE CLAIMS.

POINT III: THE PCR COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE BARRED BY R. 3:22-4.

We reject these arguments essentially for the reasons given by Judge Cassini in his well-reasoned written opinion issued on June 28, 2013. We make the following additional comments.

IV.

A PCR court need not grant an evidentiary hearing unless "`a defendant has presented a prima facie [case] in support of post-conviction relief.'" State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158, (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S.Ct. 140, 139 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1997). "To establish such a prima facie case, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the merits." Ibid. "However, a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the `allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative.'" State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (quoting Marshall, supra, 148 N.J. at 158). If the PCR court has not held an evidentiary hearing, we "conduct a de novo review" on appeal. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S.Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898 (2005).

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). First, "the defendant must demonstrate [] that counsel's performance was deficient." State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 279 (2012) (citing Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693). Second, "a defendant must also establish that the ineffectiveness of his attorney prejudiced his defense." Ibid.

To establish that his trial counsel was deficient, defendant must show his "`counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'" Ibid. (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693). In making that showing, a defendant "must overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance." Ibid. (citing Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694).

To establish prejudice from a deficiency, defendant must also show "`a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. at 279-80 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698). This "is an exacting standard: `[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 315 (2006)).

Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel (1) failed to prepare him for his trial testimony and cross-examination; (2) failed to move to dismiss the indictment; and (3) failed to argue for mitigating factors and failed to object to the weight given to aggravating and mitigating factors. Judge Cassini reviewed and correctly rejected each of these arguments. Most tellingly, a review of the record establishes that defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test.

Defendant next argues that his prior appellate counsel was ineffective in raising certain issues on the direct appeal filed in 2009. Judge Cassini correctly found that "defendant has failed to show that his appeal fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the exclusion of some claims were not due to appellate strategy." That finding is amply supported by the record. Moreover, the detailed thirty-one page opinion this court issued on June 17, 2011, also demonstrates that the direct appeal was comprehensive. Judge Cassini also ruled, in the alternative, that "defendant's claims that could have reasonably been raised on appeal are procedurally barred from being considered on post-conviction relief." The defendant takes issue with that alternative procedural ruling. Given that the arguments were correctly addressed and rejected for lack of substantive merit, we need not and do not comment on this alternative ground.

Finally, defendant's current appellant counsel asks us to consider arguments asserted in defendant's "pro se" certification. We have considered those arguments, but find that they lack merit. When those contentions are evaluated in light of the record and applicable law, we have also concluded that they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.