RONNIE ABRAMS, District Judge.
Pro se Plaintiff Mark Vaughn brings this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and provisions of New York State and City law for claims relating to work he performed while receiving in-patient substance abuse treatment at Phoenix Houses of New York, Inc. ("Phoenix House") as part of an alternatives to incarceration program.
On July 29, 2009, as part of two alternatives to incarceration programs—T.A.S.C. and D.T.A.P.—Plaintiff agreed to participate in an in-patient drug treatment program in lieu of a prison sentence. Am. Compl. at 7.
Plaintiff arrived at Phoenix House in Long Island City ("L.I.C.") on July 28, 2009 to begin a 30-day orientation program. Id. At that time, Jose Rosario was the managing director of the program; not long after, he was replaced by Defendant Denise Buckley. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that during orientation, residents of Phoenix House were required to work two eight-hour shifts on Saturday and Sunday. Id. at 8. Following orientation, the residents were required to work six eight-hour shifts a week. The residents were not paid for these shifts. According to Plaintiff, he "became concerned" when he learned he was required to work without pay and spoke to Phoenix House employee Ms. Cahill about it; she purportedly told him that work was part of the treatment program. Id. at 8. During a house meeting, Defendant Terrance Waring—the House Manager at the L.I.C. campus—informed Plaintiff that he was assigned to kitchen duty. Plaintiff refused the assignment, arguing that he was "not there as a laborer." Id. at 1, 8. After the meeting, Waring spoke to Plaintiff in his office and confirmed that he was at Phoenix House as part of the T.A.S.C. program. Id. at 8. Like Cahill, Waring purportedly told Plaintiff that the "job function" was a part of the treatment program and that he could not remain at Phoenix House if he refused to work. Id.
Plaintiff claims that because the alternative to the program was "going to jail, no ifs, ands, or buts about it," he initially agreed to perform his work duties and was subsequently assigned to work as the "basement point." Id. at 9. A "point person"—of which the basement point was one— was assigned a desk on a particular floor in the facility to relay information from the front desk to the residents on that floor; the point person also generally kept track of the comings and goings on the floor by recording such information in a "point sheet." Id. at 4. After approximately one month, Plaintiff's assignment was changed to the garbage room. Id. at 9. He worked in those two positions from about August 2009 until November 2009. Id.
Soon after starting his work duties, Plaintiff wrote a letter of complaint to the New York State Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse Services regarding the work requirement at Phoenix House. The reply he received, however, allegedly told him, in sum and substance, to "do the job function." Id.
In November 2009, Plaintiff was sent from the L.I.C. location to the 50 Jay Street location of Phoenix House to attend a carpentry class. Id. Defendant William Brown was assigned as Plaintiff's substance abuse counselor while at that location. Id. As his work duty, Plaintiff was again assigned to work as basement point. Id. In December, Plaintiff began carpentry classes from 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Id.
In mid-January 2010, Plaintiff refused to continue working at the facility. Id. at 9-10. This was reported to Brown, who told Plaintiff that he could decide to comply with the rules of the treatment program or choose to "go to jail," but that it "made him no difference." Id. at 10. After that conversation, Plaintiff worked at the point "for a few hours" but then abandoned the post; he repeated this pattern for a few days. Id. The staff was allegedly "furious" with Plaintiff for leaving the point unattended, which meant that they could not make contact with the other floors. Id. at 10-11. After Plaintiff was told that he would be discharged from the program if he abandoned his post again, he began reporting for work during the week but refusing to work on the weekends. Id. at 11.
Consequently, Brown arranged an "intervention" with Henry Algarin from the Brooklyn T.A.S.C. program. Id. Algarin purportedly told Plaintiff that he should "do what [he] needed to do to finish the program and go home." Id. On February 3, 2010, Brown wrote a letter to the judge regarding Plaintiff's non-compliance with his work assignments and the court directed Plaintiff to "correct this problem." Id. As a result of these interventions, Plaintiff worked "all points on all shifts" assigned to him from November 2009 to October 2010, when he finished the inpatient portion of the T.A.S.C./D.T.A.P. program. Id.
Upon his release from in-patient treatment, Plaintiff did not abide with the outpatient requirements of his agreement; he was therefore "mandated" back to Phoenix House in February 2011 for a minimum of six additional months. Id. Defendant Arthur Wallace was assigned as Plaintiff's substance abuse counselor during this stay. Id. at 12. After his 30 day orientation period, Plaintiff refused to complete his work duties despite another intervention by Algarin. Id. Wallace reported his refusal to the judge, who purportedly told Plaintiff that if he was kicked out of the program he would go to jail. Id. Plaintiff thus returned to work at various point assignments in the building from April 2011 to November 2012. Id.
Despite his eventual cooperation, Plaintiff wrote to the Department of Labor ("DOL") regarding his work assignments in the spring of 2011. On May 23, 2011, he received a response from the DOL informing him that it had no authority over his program. Id.
At the conclusion of the additional six-month residency, Plaintiff reported to the court and expected to be released. Because he had not complied with the "job function" at the facility, however, the court refused to release him. Id.
Plaintiff claims that his work duties at Phoenix House had no therapeutic value and merely provided unpaid labor for the facility that did not benefit Plaintiff or the other residents. Id. at 13. He also claims that those work duties prevented him from participating in treatment during work hours and that, as a result, he did not receive an adequate amount of therapeutic treatment while in the program. Id. at 13-14.
Plaintiff filed this action on May 12, 2014, and filed an Amended Complaint on September 10, 2014. He asserts violations of the United States Constitution, the FLSA, the New York Labor Law, and other provisions of New York State and New York City law. See Dkt. 1, 5. After Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on February 17, 2015, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against Defendants Terrance Waring, Herman Lazada, and William Brown. Dkt. 49, 50. The Court now dismisses the remaining causes of actions against Defendants Phoenix House, Denise Buckley, Arthur Wallace, Thomas Jasper, and Brendan Hoffman for failure to state a claim.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim has facial plausibility "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Where, as here, the complaint was filed pro se, it must be construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests." Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013)). In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "the duty of a court is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Hogan, 738 F.3d at 514 (quoting DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Defendants argue that the Amended Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because (1) Plaintiff's federal claims are untimely, (2) he fails to state a claim for relief under either § 1983 or the FLSA, (3) he fails to allege any personal involvement by Defendants Hoffman and Jasper in the conduct described, and (4) Defendant Hoffman was improperly served. Defendants further argue that because Plaintiff's federal claims must be dismissed, the Court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims under state and city law.
The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under federal law, which provides the basis for the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims under state and city law.
Plaintiff asserts federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the FLSA. Neither has merit.
According to Plaintiff, "Phoenix House required [him] to perform labor that [he] had a right not to be made to perform" and that it "used the court system[] to aid [it] in [its] illegal exploitation of [him] and [his] rights." Am. Compl. at 14. In so doing, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated his rights under the Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Am. Compl. at 15. The Court construes these claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's constitutional claims fail as a matter of law because neither Phoenix House nor the individual Defendants are state actors, nor were they acting under color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." The statute does not, however, provide a remedy with respect to "merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999) (quotations and citations omitted). To show state action, Plaintiff must establish both that his "`alleged constitutional deprivation [was] caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and that the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.'" Grogan v. Blooming Grove Volunteer Ambulance Corps., 768 F.3d 259, 263-64 (2d Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1895 (2015) (quoting Cranley v. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. of Vt., 318 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Although Plaintiff alleges that he was required to participate in Phoenix House's inpatient treatment program as an alternative to incarceration and that Phoenix House "used the Court system[] to aid [it] in [its] illegal exploitation," he has not plausibly alleged that Defendants are state actors. There is no dispute that Phoenix House is a private entity. The Second Circuit has held that the actions of such entities are only "attributable to the state" when they meet one of three tests:
Hollander v. Copacabana Nightclub, 624 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010) (quotations and alterations omitted). None of these tests is applicable here. There is no allegation that the state controlled or ran Phoenix House or that the state delegated a public function to it. Nor is there any allegation suggesting any "joint activity" between Phoenix House and the court or that Phoenix House's functions were "entwined" with state policies.
It is true that Plaintiff received treatment at Phoenix House as part of his T.A.S.C./D.T.A.P. agreement with the court, but he acknowledges that he voluntarily agreed to participate in the program in order to avoid a prison sentence. See Am. Compl. at 7, 9.
Plaintiff has also not plausibly alleged that Phoenix House was engaged in a public function. "Under the public function test, `the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the [s]tate' can constitute `state action.'" Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)). Although Plaintiff went to Phoenix House to fulfill his court-ordered obligations, at all times Phoenix House and its employees were exclusively engaged in providing substance abuse rehabilitation to the residents—a power not exclusively reserved to the state. See id. Furthermore, Phoenix House was not involved in any aspects of Plaintiff's criminal proceeding. Indeed, Plaintiff's allegations make clear that Phoenix House had no control or authority over Plaintiff's court case; it was the judge assigned to his case, and not Defendants, who determined whether he was in compliance with his T.A.S.C./D.T.A.P. agreement. See Am. Compl. at 7, 11, 12; Pl. Opp. (Dkt. 40) at 19. See also Smith v. Devline, 239 F. App'x 735, 736 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding no state action where private company providing treatment services in connection with re-entry had no authority to return resident to prison if he violated the conditions of the program).
That Plaintiff opted to participate in the program at Phoenix House in lieu of completing a prison sentence does not does not transform the treatment facility and its employees into state actors, nor does it render their actions in implementing the internal requirements of the treatment program—which were not created or directed by the court—into state action. See Velez v. SES Operating Corp., No. 07-CV-10946 (GEL), 2008 WL 2662808, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2008) ("[T]he fact that defendants operate a `drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility treating many parties who as a condition of their parole and/or criminal guilty plea undergo some drug and alcohol treatment' is [not] suggestive of state action."); Mele v. Hill Health Ctr., 609 F.Supp.2d 248, 258-59 (D. Conn. 2009) (finding no state action by defendants who administered a drug intervention program even though the state permitted criminal defendants to complete such program in lieu of prosecution or serving a sentence). But see Johnson v. White, No. 06-CV-2540 (LAP), 2010 WL 3958842, at *4 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010); Wilson v. Phoenix House, No. 10-CV-7364 (DLC), 2011 WL 3273179, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011).
In any event, even if the state action requirement were satisfied, Plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail because the facts alleged do not establish a constitutional violation under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or Fifth Amendments.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude. U.S. Cont. amends. 13. The Supreme Court has observed that "involuntary servitude" as contemplated by the Thirteenth Amendment "was intended `to cover those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like undesirable results.'" Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988)). Although the Thirteenth Amendment "was intended to prohibit all forms of involuntary labor, not solely to abolish chattel slavery," McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 2012), it does not, however, "bar labor that an individual may, at least in some sense, choose not to perform, even where the consequences of that choice are `exceedingly bad.'" Immediato, 73 F.3d at 459 (citing United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 485 (2d Cir. 1964)).
Plaintiff fails to state a Thirteenth Amendment claim, among other things, because he does not allege that his participation in the Phoenix House treatment program—including its work requirement—was involuntary.
Plaintiff's allegations further fail to establish a due process violation under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. As an initial matter, only the Fourteenth Amendment applies to Plaintiff's due process claim against Defendants, as they are not alleged to be federal government entities or employees. See Ambrose v. City of New York, 623 F.Supp.2d 454, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In any event, Plaintiff cannot establish a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment because he has not plausibly alleged that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest. Am. Mfrs., 526 U.S. at 59 ("The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in `property' or `liberty.'").
Plaintiff's liberty interests were not impeded because, as discussed above, he was free to decline to participate in the T.A.S.C./D.T.A.P. program, or to leave Phoenix House at any point. Plaintiff has also not plausibly alleged the deprivation of any protected property interest. To the extent he is alleging that he has a constitutional right to drug treatment, or to a specific type of drug treatment, there is no legal authority for such a claim. See Smith v. Follette, 445 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 1971) (no right to drug treatment for drug-related crimes); Doe v. Goord, No. 04-CV-0570 (GBD)(AJP), 2005 WL 3116413, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005) (same); Bailey v. Corbett, 2013 WL 4737312, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 3, 2013) (same); Mele, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 259 (same). As a result, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiff similarly fails to state a claim for relief under the FLSA. The FLSA requires the payment of minimum and overtime wages to anyone who qualifies as an "employee" within the meaning of the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e). Because Plaintiff does not qualify as a covered employee, however, he was not entitled to be paid for his work assignments at Phoenix House.
In the Second Circuit, "employment for FLSA purposes [is] a flexible concept to be determined on a case-by-case basis by review of the totality of the circumstances." Barfield v. NYC Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Thus, "the determination of whether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of the FLSA" is governed by an "`economic reality' test." Irizarry v. Catsimatidis, 722 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1516 (2014). The pertinent "economic realities" do not consist of a set of "uniform factors," but rather, are "assessed by reference to the particular situation with some factors more important than others depending on the FLSA question at issue and the context in which it arises." Brown v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 755 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
Another court in this district recently considered a scenario similar to that presented in this case, namely, whether someone who performs community service work as a condition of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ("ACD") of criminal charges qualifies as an employee within the meaning of the FLSA. Doyle v. City of New York, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___, 2015 WL 926001 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2015). Looking to "our common linguistic intuitions" as the "best guide" to determine if plaintiffs there were employees, Judge Furman concluded that they were not, as they did not perform their community service "for the purpose of enabling them to earn a living" or "to receive financial compensation of any kind." Id. at *6. Instead, the purpose of the ACD program was "to enable the parties to resolve cases involving minor offenses in a way that provides more substantial consequences than outright dismissal of the charges, but allows defendants to avoid the risks and anxieties associated with further prosecution and the `criminal stigma' that attaches to convictions." Id. (citing Lancaster v. Kindor, 471 N.Y.S.2d 573, 579 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1984)). As the Doyle Court observed, a contrary conclusion that the FLSA applied to persons agreeing to pursue these types of programs would threaten the objective of the programs while failing to further Congress's purpose in enacting the FLSA, which was to "eliminate, as rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions throughout the nation." Id. (quoting Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1950)).
The Court finds this analysis persuasive. Like the plaintiffs in Doyle, Vaughn did not agree to participate in the Phoenix House treatment program for the purpose of receiving monetary compensation; indeed nowhere in his Amended Complaint or opposition brief does he suggest that expected compensation played any role in his decision to enter the program. Rather, Plaintiff agreed to participate in the T.A.S.C./D.T.A.P. program in order to resolve the criminal charges against him. See Am. Compl. at 7, 9. Furthermore, although Plaintiff contends that it was Phoenix House and not he who benefited from the work assignments, he acknowledges that had he successfully completed the program, the charges against him would have been dismissed without a prison sentence. Id. at 7. It thus appears that the "principle benefit" of Plaintiff's participation in the program was to him and his assertions to the contrary are implausible. See Doyle, 2015 WL 926001, at *7 (citing Isaacson v. Penn Comm. Servs., Inc., 450 F.2d 1306, 1309-10 (4th Cir. 1971)).
Finally, the Second Circuit's holding in Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1996), that "the FLSA does not apply to prison inmates in circumstances in which their labor provides services to the prison, whether or not the work is voluntary" provides further support for this Court's conclusion. While Vaughn, like the plaintiffs in Doyle, was not a prison inmate, as with the relationship between inmates and the prisons where they are incarcerated, the relationship between Plaintiff and Phoenix House was "not one of employment." See id. at 42. Rather, Plaintiff's work assignments were "designed to train and rehabilitate" and his "labor [did] not compete with private employers." See id.; See also Sanders v. Hayden, 544 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that designated sex offenders working at treatment centers are not "employees" under FLSA); Wingate v. New York City, 2014 WL 3747641, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (concluding that FLSA did not apply to pretrial detainees).
Indeed, each of the work assignments described in the Amended Complaint are directly— and exclusively—related to the operation of Phoenix House. See Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 43 (describing duties that serve institutional needs such as "cook[ing], staff[ing] the library, perform[ing] janitorial services, work[ing] in the laundry, or carry[ing] out numerous other tasks that serve various institutional missions of the prison, such as recreation, care and maintenance of the facility, or rehabilitation"). Plaintiff alleges, for instance, that he was assigned to serve as the point person at various locations in the facilities. He also describes working as an overnight coordinator at the front desk of the facility to communicate messages to the point persons on other floors, and working in the garbage room and warehouse. Am. Compl. at 5-7. Plaintiff thus did not "produce goods or services that [were] sold in commerce," but rather, merely provided services for the facility where he received treatment. See Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 44; Doyle, 2015 WL 926001, at *8.
For these reasons, Plaintiff does not qualify as a covered "employee" under the FLSA and his claim fails as a matter of law.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), "district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." To determine whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, district courts must balance the "values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." See also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). "[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Id. at 350 n.7. Here, there are no unusual circumstances warranting the continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under state and city law. Accordingly, they too are dismissed.
Having dismissed the entirety of the Amended Complaint, the Court need not reach Defendants' additional arguments regarding statute of limitations, the involvement of Defendants Hoffman and Jasper in the conduct alleged, and service.
For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. In light of the principles articulated herein, the Court is doubtful that any amendment to the Complaint would cure its deficiencies. In deference to Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the Court grants leave to amend to the extent he has a good faith basis for doing so. See Neilsen, 746 F.3d at 62 ("Generally, leave to amend should be freely given, and a pro se litigant in particular should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that he has a valid claim.") (citation omitted). If he chooses to file a Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must do so within thirty days of this Opinion and Order or this dismissal shall become final.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close item 30 on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
In Johnson v. White, the district court suggested in dicta that the relationship between the state and a treatment center may be sufficient to establish that the facility was delegated a public function where the plaintiff was "required to undergo inpatient treatment at [the defendant facility] as an outgrowth of his sentence, and . . . [the facility] accepted him on those terms." 2010 WL 3958842, at *4 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2010). In that case, however, whether defendant was a state actor was not at issue; as a result, the court did not engage in a fact-specific analysis of the relationship between the court and the facility in question. See id.
