OPINION & ORDER

RONNIE ABRAMS, District Judge.

Plaintiff Khristina McLaughlin brings this action against Defendants MacQuarie Capital and Robert Ansell alleging violations of Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. Before the Court are Defendants' motions to compel arbitration. For the reasons set forth below, MacQuarie's motion is granted and the action is stayed.

BACKGROUND

McLaughlin began her employment with MacQuarie in February of 2012 as a Managing Director in its U.S. Cash Sales Group. FAC ¶ 43. Plaintiffs responsibilities included serving as an account manager for large, predominantly New York-based, hedge funds. FAC ¶ 44. In 2015, Plaintiff was promoted to the role of Head of New York Sales by the two managers of the U.S. Cash Department, a position in which Plaintiff managed a 14-person New York and Mid-Atlantic based sales team. FAC ¶ 66-67. In April of 2017, Plaintiff was promoted again, assuming the position of Head of U.S. sales. FAC ¶ 304. Upon the filing of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was responsible for overseeing 20 sales executives globally across MacQuarie's New York, Boston, San Francisco, Atlanta, and London offices, with more than $30 million in targeted attributed revenue to the U.S. business. FAC ¶ 87. Prior to the termination of his employment, Defendant Robert Ansell was an Executive Director in the U.S. Cash Equities department of MacQuarie. FAC ¶ 3.

On or about May 9, 2017, at the time of her most recent promotion, Plaintiff entered into a contract setting forth certain terms and conditions of her employment, to which she electronically agreed as a precondition to receiving the promotion and corresponding raise. See Weidy Decl., Exs. A, B, at 1-17, ECF No. 18-1. Annex A of the agreement contains a broad arbitration provision that sets forth Plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate all employment-related disputes. It states, in relevant part:

Weidy Decl., Ex. A, at 12-13.

Plaintiffs employment prior to May 9, 2017 was similarly governed by an agreement with a nearly identical arbitration provision, requiring "strictly confidential" arbitration of all claims "arising out of or relating to [her] employment relationship with MacQuarie." Weidy Decl., Ex. C, at 27-30. Plaintiff physically executed that prior agreement on February 6, 2012. Weidy Decl., Ex. C, at 26.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 14, 2017, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. FAC ¶ 27. Plaintiff then requested and received a notice of her right to sue. FAC ¶ 28. She filed her initial complaint on November 17, 2017, ECF No. 1, before filing the operative First Amended Complaint on December 8, 2017, ECF No. 14.1

On November 27, 2017, MacQuarie filed a Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") seeking a declaratory judgment that it has not committed discrimination or retaliation in violation of Title VII, the NYSHRL or the NYCHRL. Chinn Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 17. On November 30, the AAA served McLaughlin with MacQuarie's Demand. Chinn Decl. ¶ 8. MacQuarie and Robert Ansell moved to compel arbitration on December 22, 2017 and March 13, 2018, respectively. ECF Nos. 15, 30. On April 24, 2018, Ansell filed his Demand for Arbitration with the AAA, also seeking a declaratory judgment that he has not committed discrimination or retaliation in violation of Title VII, the NYSHRL, or the NYCHRL. Ansell Reply Mem., at 5 n.3, ECF No. 43. Both arbitration proceedings remain pending.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Enacted to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements," Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted), the FAA "embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts," Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). "This policy is founded on a desire to preserve the parties' ability to agree to arbitrate, rather than litigate, disputes." Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (alteration and citation omitted). "But the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so." Id. (citation omitted).

Under the FAA, a party to an arbitration agreement may petition a district court for "an order directing that . . . arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.C. § 4. "In resolving a claim that an action must be arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration agreement, [a district court] must determine: (1) whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate; (2) if so, the scope of that agreement; (3) if federal statutory claims are asserted, whether Congress intended those claims to be non[-]arbitrable; and (4) if some, but not all, claims are subject to arbitration, whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration." Begonja v. Vornado Really Tr., 159 F.Supp.3d 402, 408-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Guyden v. Aetna, Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2008)). Although federal substantive law governs the scope of an arbitration agreement, "the presumption [in favor of arbitration] does not apply to disputes concerning whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made." Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011). Instead, principles of state contract law govern "the threshold issue of whether the parties entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate at all." Begonja, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 413.

"In deciding motions to compel, courts apply a standard similar to that applicable for a motion for summary judgment." Nicosia, 834 F.3d at 229 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). A court must therefore "consider all relevant, admissible evidence submitted by the parties" and "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Id. (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. MacQuarie's Motion to Compel

A. A Valid Arbitration Agreement Covers This Dispute

The first two inquiries the Court must undertake are "(1) whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate [and] (2) if so, the scope of that agreement." Begonja, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 408-09. In opposing MacQuarie's motion to compel, Plaintiff does not contest that an arbitration agreement exists between herself and MacQuarie which covers the claims she seeks to raise before the Court. Nor would there be a valid basis for her to argue otherwise. The employment agreement between Plaintiff and MacQuarie clearly mandates confidential arbitration of any claims arising from her employment, including those for sexual harassment pursuant to Title VII and state law. Plaintiff clearly assented to these terms when she accepted the agreement.

B. Whether Congress Intended Title VII Claims to be Arbitrable

Plaintiff's opposition to MacQuarie's motion appears to be predicated on the notion that provisions in employment agreements requiring the arbitration of sexual harassment claims are contrary to public policy. The Court interprets this argument as Plaintiff asserting that the arbitration of such claims is inconsistent with Congressional intent underlying Title VII.2 This argument is dismissed.

Plaintiff fails to provide a single decision of any court in which a motion to compel arbitration of Title VII claims was denied on the basis that Congress intended such claims to be non-arbitrable. To the contrary, the well-settled law in this Circuit is that agreements to arbitrate claims such as those asserted here are permissible. See Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 487 (2d Cir. 2013); Raiola v. Union Bank of Switz., LLC, 47 F.Supp.2d 499, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Plaintiffs attempts to demonstrate that Congress intended to preclude compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims runs counter to the overwhelming weight of authority in this circuit finding arbitration of Title VII claims to be appropriate.").3 Plaintiffs attempt to rely on FLSA cases is also unavailing, as those opinions stand only for the uncontroversial proposition that confidentiality provisions in FLSA settlement agreements are contrary to public policy because they may incentivize employers not to comply with the statute. See Guerra-Alonso v. W. 54th Deli, Corp., No. 14-CV-7247, 2015 WL 3777403, at *1 (May 22, 2015). Further undercutting Plaintiffs argument, it is accepted in this Circuit that agreements to arbitrate FLSA claims are nonetheless consistent with Congress's intent in passing that law. See Alvarez v. Nat'l Debt Relief LLC, No. 16-CV-4156 (CM), 2017 WL 2876478, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2017).4

II. Ansell's Motion to Compel

Ansell has also moved to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against him. In light of the broad language of Plaintiffs employment contract, however, it is unnecessary to separately consider whether Ansell, as a non-signatory to the agreement, may also compel arbitration. Indeed, the arbitration provision, in addition to covering claims asserted against MacQuarie, explicitly encompasses claims against the company's "individual officers, directors, or trustees thereof." Parlo Decl., Ex. A., p. 11. In such circumstances, an employer can compel arbitration of any claims asserted against an individual who holds one of the enumerated positions. See Martin v. SCI Mgmt. L.P., 296 F.Supp.2d 462, 466-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Chamois v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 02-CV 9550 (MBM), 2003 WL 23022033, at *1-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2003).5 Accordingly, MacQuarie's motion is also granted as to the claims against Ansell.

III. Stay of the Proceedings

Finally, in addition to compelling arbitration, MacQuarie asks the Court to dismiss the matter. The Court declines to take such action and will instead stay the proceedings. The FAA requires a district court, "on application of one of the parties," to stay an action after determining that "any issue" in the action is "referable to arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3. In Katz v. Cellco Partnership, 794 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 596 (2015), the Second Circuit held that "the text, structure, and underlying policy of the FAA mandate a stay of proceedings [rather than dismissal] when all of the claims in an action have been referred to arbitration[.]" 794 F.3d at 347. Since all of the claims in this action will be referred to arbitration, this action is stayed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, MacQuarie's motion to compel arbitration is granted and the proceedings are stayed. Ansell's motion is now moot. Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction is also denied as moot. See Lundell v. Citicorp Inv. Servs., Inc., No. 94-CV-8562 (WK), 1996 WL 175009, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 1996). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions pending at docket entries fifteen, thirty, thirty-three, and thirty-six.

SO ORDERED.