NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Drew Buechlein appeals the April 2, 2013 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We discern the following facts from the record. On August 3, 2010, a Camden County grand jury charged defendant with third-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1). The indictment arose from the May 9, 2010 report of a residential break-in in Brooklawn. The resident reported that when she returned home on that date, she found the defendant, an acquaintance, sitting on her couch and drinking beer. Defendant did not have permission to be in the house. Upon seeing the resident, defendant jumped up, ran out the door, and told her not to call the police. As defendant was running out the door, the resident saw that he had her cell phone. Defendant threw the phone back at the resident through an open window as he fled.

On September 24, 2010, defendant pled guilty to the charge. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend three years of probation, conditioned upon defendant serving 364 days in jail, to run concurrent to the sentence on an unrelated matter in Gloucester County. On October 28, 2010, Judge Gwendolyn Blue sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. The judge also imposed the requisite fines and penalties, and ordered that defendant have no contact with the resident. Defendant did not file a direct appeal.

On March 23, 2012, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition, arguing that trial counsel gave him misinformation and poor advice, failed to investigate and consider potential defenses, and failed to file a motion to suppress evidence of an out-of-court identification. Subsequently, defendant's appointed counsel filed a brief supporting his PCR petition and setting forth the following arguments:

On April 2, 2013, Judge Blue, who had also presided over defendant's plea and sentence, heard oral argument on defendant's PCR petition and denied it. The judge found that defendant "failed to meet [his] burden of proving a prima facie case" that trial counsel was ineffective. In particular, the judge pointed out that defendant had failed to submit any evidence that would support his claim that trial counsel failed to conduct an investigation "that would have been beneficial to the defense." Additionally, the judge found that there was no evidence that defendant's trial counsel pressured him into pleading guilty or that he was misinformed about the applicable law. The judge also rejected defendant's argument that the elements necessary for burglary were not established. The judge reasoned that defendant simply had a case of "buyer's remorse" and noted that he admitted at the plea hearing to facts which constituted third-degree burglary.

On appeal, defendant raises the following legal arguments for our consideration:

We begin with a review of the well-established legal principles that guide our analysis. PCR constitutes New Jersey's "analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 310 (2014) (citing State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997)). "Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are particularly suited for post-conviction review because they often cannot reasonably be raised in a prior proceeding." State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992).

Both the United States Constitution and New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right of assistance of counsel to every person accused of a crime. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. This right to assistance of counsel "encompasses the right to effective counsel." State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 23 (1997).

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must satisfy the two prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, as adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). The test requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and "`that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'" Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693).

This standard also applies in the context of guilty pleas, where attorney competence is required and the prejudice prong "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210 (1985); see also State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (requiring a reasonable probability that defendant would have refused to plead guilty and insisted on trial), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996).

An evidentiary hearing for PCR is only required when the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to such relief by demonstrating "a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the merits." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (citing Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 463), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850, 118 S.Ct. 140, 139 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1997). "[B]ald assertions" of ineffective assistance are not enough. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J.Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999). A petitioner must "allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance" and the court must view the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Ibid.

Having considered the record in light of the applicable legal principles, we conclude that defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons provided by Judge Blue in her April 2, 2013 oral decision. We add only the following brief discussion.

A review of the plea colloquy reflects that defendant affirmed that he was entering his plea freely and voluntarily, that he was satisfied with trial counsel's performance, and that he pled guilty after having had an opportunity to review the evidence with trial counsel. He admitted that he entered the residence without permission with the intent of taking something, which, as Judge Blue found, was sufficient to constitute third-degree burglary. N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1); see also State v. Grenci, 197 N.J. 604, 620-21 (2009). We find defendant's argument that trial counsel pressured him into pleading guilty to be without merit based on the evidence in the record. Moreover, defendant's bare claim that trial counsel failed to investigate or raise any meritorious defenses are merely "bald assertions" unsupported by any evidence. Cummings, supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. Such mere allegations are insufficient to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel. Ibid.

We are satisfied that defendant has not established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. Furthermore, defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing as he has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. See Marshall, supra, 148 N.J. at 158.

Affirmed.