UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR., Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to L.T. ("Lynn").1 After careful review, we affirm the trial court's order.
On 4 December 2009, Wake County Human Services ("WCHS") filed a petition alleging that Lynn, as well as her older sister L.Y., was a neglected and abused juvenile. WCHS noted that respondent-mother's family had an extensive history of placement with Child Protective Services ("CPS") dating back to 1997. The juveniles had been placed in foster care in 2003 and 2007, but were returned to respondent-mother's custody on 8 October 2009. Following the 2009 return of the juveniles to respondent-mother's custody, WCHS received a CPS report that respondent-mother had threatened to choke L.Y.
WCHS then received a second report claiming that respondent-mother had abused Lynn. WCHS alleged that on 2 December 2009, respondent-mother and Lynn were working together on Lynn's reading. Respondent-mother became frustrated with Lynn, either because Lynn was having difficulty reading or because Lynn would not concentrate. Due to her frustration with Lynn, respondent-mother slapped Lynn in the face at least twice, leaving her with a swollen lip and face. L.Y. was in another bedroom and heard respondent-mother become angry and slap Lynn. L.Y. left her bedroom and observed respondent-mother slapping Lynn. Respondent-mother admitted slapping Lynn twice, but L.Y. reported that respondent-mother slapped Lynn enough times that "she lost count." The next day, Lynn and L.Y. went to a neighbor where they called someone for help. WCHS alleged that the children planned to "runaway [sic]" if required to return to respondent-mother's home. Respondent-mother was subsequently charged with misdemeanor child abuse stemming from the incident. WCHS obtained non-secure custody of the juveniles. The trial court adjudicated Lynn an abused and neglected juvenile, and L.Y. a neglected juvenile.
On 6 January 2010, WCHS filed a petition to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights to Lynn and L.Y. WCHS alleged that (1) respondent-mother had neglected the juveniles within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2009), and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2009); and (2) respondent-mother had abused Lynn within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) (2009), and pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1). WCHS further alleged that it was in the best interests of the juveniles to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights.
Hearings were held on the petition to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights as to Lynn on 29 July, 13 August, and 9 September 2010. The trial court concluded that respondent-mother had abused and neglected Lynn within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) and (15), and that there would be a repetition of abuse and neglect should Lynn be returned to respondent-mother's care. Therefore, the court concluded that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights to Lynn. The court further concluded that it was in Lynn's best interests that respondent-mother's parental rights be terminated. Accordingly, on 8 October 2010, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental rights to Lynn. Respondent-mother appeals.
Respondent-mother's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 to terminate her parental rights. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) due to abuse.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 sets out the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). "The standard of appellate review is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law." In re D.J.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 238, 615 S.E.2d 26, 32 (2005) (citing In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), disc. review denied, appeal dismissed, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001)).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) authorizes termination of parental rights where "[t]he parent has abused or neglected the juvenile." An "abused juvenile" is defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) as one whose parent inflicts upon the juvenile serious physical injury by other than accidental means, uses upon the juvenile cruel or grossly inappropriate procedures to modify behavior, or creates serious emotional damage to the juvenile evidenced by the juvenile's severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1).
A prior adjudication of abuse may be admitted and considered by the trial court in ruling upon a later petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abuse. See In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713-14, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1984). Although Ballard involved an adjudication for neglect,"the law and reasoning of Ballard apply equally when parental rights are terminated pursuant to a finding ofabuse." In re Alleghany County, 75 N.C. App. 467, 470, 331 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1985), aff'd per curiam, 315 N.C. 382, 337 S.E.2d 851 (1986). However, termination may not be based solely upon a prior adjudication. Where a prior adjudication of abuse is considered by the trial court, the court "must admit and consider all evidence of relevant circumstances or events which existed or occurred before the adjudication of abuse, as well as any evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence of prior abuse and the probability of a repetition of that abuse." In re Greene, 152 N.C. App. 410, 417, 568 S.E.2d 634, 638 (2002) (citation omitted); see also In re L.C., 181 N.C. App. 278, 285, 638 S.E.2d 638, 643, disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 354, 646 S.E.2d 114 (2007). Thus, where there is no evidence of abuse at the time of the termination proceeding, parental rights may nonetheless be terminated if there is a showing of a past adjudication of abuse and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence a probability of repetition of abuse if the juvenile were returned to his or her parents. See In re Reyes, 136 N.C. App. 812, 814-15, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000) (citation omitted) (stating same where ground for termination was neglect).
Here, the trial court found as fact that Lynn had been adjudicated an abused and neglected juvenile. Additionally, the trial court made findings regarding the fact that Lynn, as well as L.Y., had been removed and returned to respondent-mother's care several times previously due to respondent-mother's abuse and/or neglect of the juveniles. As a result, Lynn had spent thirty months of her life in respondent-mother's care, but fifty-two months of her life in the care of WCHS and Durham County Department of Social Services. Additionally, the trial court found as fact:
19. That [respondent-mother] has issues with impulse control. These issues occur not only in her interactions with her children, but also in her interactions with professionals involved in her children's lives.
. . . .
21. That [respondent-mother] does not have control of her emotions. She models disrespect for authority to her children.
22. That on December 2, 2009, [respondent-mother] struck [Lynn] out of anger and rage, not as a form of discipline. Her assaultive behaviors have only been directed toward her children.
23. That [respondent-mother] does not accept responsibility for her abuse and neglect of her children. She lays blame on others, including her oldest daughter, [L.Y.], for causing a stressful home environment. [Respondent-mother] acknowledges that she was frustrated, and that she hit [Lynn] on December 2, 2009 due to her frustration with [L.Y.].
24. That [respondent-mother] intended to hit [Lynn], and hit the child more than one time. She testified that she did not realize that she was hitting her face. The mother's rage was out of control if she did not realize or care that she was striking the child on her face.
25. That [respondent-mother] stated that she did not intend to strike [Lynn] on her face. Once again, she blames [Lynn], saying that she meant to strike her on the leg, but the child was moving around too much.
26. That [respondent-mother] acknowledges that she may have struck [Lynn] hard.
27. That [respondent-mother] told [Lynn] not to tell anyone how she got the bruise on her face. She kept the child home from school on December 3, 2009, so no one would see her injuries.
28. That [respondent-mother] and [Lynn] were engaged in normal, routine activity when the abuse occurred. They were working on [Lynn's] homework.
. . . .
37. That [respondent-mother] has been diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and major depressive disorder.
. . . .
44. That [respondent-mother] believes that she will be able to appropriately parent [Lynn] since she will be the only child in the home. The Court does not believe that only having one child in the home will prevent future abuse and/or neglect. [Lynn] has been described as challenging to correct. [Respondent-mother] described her as "strong-willed" and "bossy." This characterization could also be used to describe [L.Y.'s] behavior, with whom [respondent-mother] has repeatedly demonstrated an inability to parent appropriately. [Respondent-mother] does not appear to have the ability to consistently respond in a non-abusive manner, including both physical and verbal abuse, when any of her children challenge her authority.
45. That even though [respondent-mother] has completed parenting education, there is not a means to evaluate the level of her growth other than through demonstration of appropriate parenting techniques. [Respondent-mother] has failed to consistently demonstrate such appropriate parenting skills.
46. That [respondent-mother] has been an active participant in the Circle of Parents group, and has shared information on available community resources and how to access them, and the challenges of parenting young children. However, she has not demonstrated an ability to consistently parent her children in a non-violent manner.
. . . .
48. That [respondent-mother] claims that her current Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) has changed her life. However, she was previously engaged in DBT, and she abused and neglected [Lynn] after she completed that therapy the first time.
49. That there are no additional known services available in the Wake County area that could help [respondent-mother] effectively implement non-violent parenting. She has "successfully" completed every service made available to her, but she has not managed to apply the lessons taught in parenting her children.
50. That there are no additional mental health services to be offered to [respondent-mother], only ongoing therapy. [Respondent-mother] has been involved in mental health therapy for a long time, and no evidence was presented to indicate any progress in her therapy sufficient to indicate that [Lynn] would be safe in her care.
. . . .
53. That the assigned social worker knows of no other services that could be offered to [respondent-mother]. She has seen no growth in [respondent-mother's] skills or thought process. This lack of progress and growth further indicates that [respondent-mother] would continue to abuse and/or neglect [Lynn] if the child was returned to her care.
In her brief, respondent-mother does not challenge the above findings of fact, and they are thus binding on appeal. See N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) ("Issues not presented in a party's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.").
Based on its findings of fact, the court made an ultimate finding that repetition of abuse was "probable" should Lynn be returned to respondent-mother's home. We conclude that the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact amply support this finding. Furthermore, we conclude that, when coupled with the juvenile's prior adjudication of abuse, the finding that there would likely be a repetition of the abuse supports the trial court's conclusion of law that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1).
Respondent-mother additionally argues that the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights due to neglect. However, because we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that grounds existed for termination due to respondent-mother's abuse of the juvenile, we need not address the remaining ground found by the trial court to support termination. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
