ROBERT S. LASNIK, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on "Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaims and to Compel Discovery." Dkt. # 35. Having reviewed the memoranda, declaration, and exhibits submitted by the parties, the Court finds as follows:
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), case management deadlines established by the Court "may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to require scheduling orders that govern pre-trial as well as trial procedure. The purpose of the change was to improve the efficiency of federal litigation: leaving the parties to their own devices until shortly before trial was apparently costly and resulted in undue delay. Under the new rule, once a case management schedule is established, changes will be made only if the movant shows "good cause."
The Court sets the deadline for amending pleadings approximately two months before discovery closes so that the parties have a full and fair opportunity to investigate all relevant claims and defenses. In this case, the date for asserting new defenses and counterclaims was October 3, 2018.
Defendants were not diligent in pursuing their potential defenses and counterclaims. Having failed to show good cause for an amendment of the case management deadline, the motion to amend is DENIED.
Defendants seek an order compelling plaintiff to respond to (a) requests for admission seeking information regarding its use of the UNIONBAY mark in connection with footwear during various periods of time (Dkt. # 36-2) and (b) requests for production seeking "[a]ll documents" related to the promotion, marketing, advertisement, unpaid media coverage, monthly purchases, monthly and yearly revenues, license agreements, and use of the UNIONBAY mark on footwear since 1981 (Dkt. # 36-3). Plaintiff objected to the requests for admission as irrelevant and therefore not proportional to the needs of the case. It objected to the requests for production as irrelevant, unduly burdensome,
Defendants argue that the information they seek is relevant (1) to prove the proposed affirmative defenses and counterclaims, (2) to disprove plaintiff's allegation that it has continuously used the mark in commerce since 1981, (3) to challenge the credibility of plaintiff's president because he represented to the USPTO that plaintiff had used the mark in connection with footwear, and (4) to prove defendants' equitable estoppel defense. The first and second arguments are summarily rejected. Defendants' motion to amend has been denied, so any relevance the information may have to the proposed claims and defenses does not justify compelled production. Information regarding plaintiff's use of the mark in connection with footwear does not prove or disprove its use of the mark generally.
Defendants offer no case law in support of their impeachment argument. Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1), "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. . . ." A discovery request must therefore be relevant to a claim or defense. If requests for admission or production could be justified by nothing more than the hope of catching a witness in a lie, there would be virtually no limit on the scope of discovery. The fact that the Court may allow a party to cross-examine a witness regarding known instances of the witness' conduct that are probative of his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness under Fed. R. Ev. 608(b) does not change the scope of discovery under Rule 26.
With regards to defendants' equitable estoppel defense, defendants assert that plaintiff falsely claimed ownership rights in the UNIONBAY marks based on false statements of use in connection with footwear; that defendants relied on these false representations in entering licensing agreements with plaintiff; and that defendants were prejudiced by their reliance. Dkt. # 35 at 11. The defense, as stated by defendants, is actually based on fraud, not estoppel. For plaintiff to be estopped from pursing its trademark and breach of contract claims, defendants would have to show a prior act or statement by plaintiff that is inconsistent with its present claims.
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to amend its answer and to compel production (Dkt. # 35) is DENIED.