JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge.
Susan McCarthy ("McCarthy" or "plaintiff') is an elementary school teacher. On May 28, 2014, while classes were in session, school officials allege, and McCarthy disputes, that she threatened to kill herself. School officials excused her for the remainder of the day and informed local police officers, who hospitalized McCarthy against her will for a psychiatric evaluation. McCarthy then initiated this action against two groups of defendants. The first group is composed of Roosevelt Union Free School District (the "District"), Superintendent Dr. Deborah Wortham, Principal Clyde Braswell, and Assistant Principal Edith Higgins (collectively, the "School Defendants"). The second group is composed of Nassau County and police officers Joseph Stassi and Monique Amodeo (collectively, the "County Defendants").
Pending before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by the County Defendants (ECF No. 33) and the School Defendants (ECF No. 28). They previously filed cross-claims against each other for indemnity.
For the reasons set forth below, the County Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, summary judgment is unwarranted on the false arrest and false imprisonment claims. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to McCarthy, a reasonable jury could find that Officers Stassi and Amodeo lacked probable cause to detain and hospitalize her.
However, the Court grants the School Defendants' motion in its entirety. As for the discrimination claims, there is no evidence in the record from which a rational jury could find that any of the School Defendants' actions in this case were motivated by discrimination. In fact, at oral argument, McCarthy's lawyer acknowledged that he could point to no such evidence in the record. With respect to the false arrest claims, McCarthy failed to present evidence that the School Defendants were present at the "arrest" or that they instigated the officers' actions. For similar reasons, the Court grants summary judgment on the County Defendants' cross-claim for indemnity against the School Defendants.
The following facts are taken from the parties' 56.1 statements and their exhibits.
During the 2013-14 school year, Susan McCarthy was a first-grade teacher at Washington Rose Elementary School. (Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt. 50, 55.) She claims that newly appointed school officials targeted her because of her age and race. (Id. ¶¶ 55-62.) She is white and in her sixties, and Principal Braswell and Assistant Principal Higgins are both black. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 54.) Plaintiff alleges, for example, that she received constant criticism and was assigned an overwhelming number of students. This environment caused her "great stress," and she "felt sick every night." (Id. ¶¶ 61-63.)
On May 28, 2014, Principal Braswell called a meeting with the first-grade teachers and informed McCarthy that a troubled student was rejoining her class. (Id. ¶ 70.) When plaintiff challenged the decision, Principal Braswell scolded McCarthy and told her that she was ostracizing the child. (Id. ¶ 71.) That interaction caused McCarthy to leave the meeting and cry in the hallway, and when a substitute teacher tried to comfort her, McCarthy screamed at full volume. (Id. ¶ 72; Cnty.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 9, 14, 16, 23.) She testified that she suffered a "full blown panic attack" and experienced a migraine and chest pains. (Pl.'s Dep. at 23.) The migraine was so painful that plaintiff felt like she was going to die. (Cnty. 50-h Hr'g at 23-24.) A co-worker then retrieved a wheelchair and escorted McCarthy to the nurse's office. (50-h Hr'g at 24; Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 74.)
The parties dispute what happened after McCarthy's arrival at the nurse's office. Assistant Principal Higgins claims that in the nurse's office, McCarthy said, "Oh, I just want to kill myself" (Higgins Dep. at 87.) McCarthy asserts that this statement was never made; instead, she contends that Higgins asked plaintiff if she would "hurt herself' and McCarthy said, "[O]f course, not." (Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 78.) However, the parties agree that McCarthy discussed her history of depression and panic attacks (Cnty.'s 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20), and that she recounted a previous joke where she threatened to jump out of the window on the ground floor (Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt. vit 80, 85). After a short while, McCarthy left the school premises and went to her sister's home. (Id. ¶¶ 86, 88.)
According to the School Defendants, Assistant Principal Higgins informed Principal Braswell about McCarthy's threat, and as a result, he notified his supervisor, Dr. Mamie Hazelton. (School Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 59-60.) Three hours later, Dr. Hazelton instructed Principal Braswell to contact law enforcement.
After arriving at the school, the Officers spoke with Principal Braswell, Assistant Principal Higgins, the school psychologist, and an unnamed friend of McCarthy's. (Amodeo Dep. at 48.) Assistant Principal Higgins, for instance, told them that McCarthy was "very upset and out of control." (Stassi Dep. at 33.) According to Assistant Principal Higgins, she also described McCarthy as a "lovely lady" with a playful demeanor, and Assistant Principal Higgins explained that McCarthy was not dangerous nor threatening. (Higgins Dep. at 124-25, 127-28.) However, the Officers state that Assistant Principal Higgins never informed them that McCarthy was calm. (Stassi Dep. at 34, 58; Amodeo Dep. at 34-35, 44-45.)
After receiving McCarthy's sister's address from a school teacher, the Officers traveled to the sister's home. (Higgins Dep. at 126.) Upon arrival, they spoke with the sister, who invited them into her house to interview McCarthy; as the Officers discussed the events with McCarthy, she became more and more agitated, and the Officers state that she corroborated the fact that she threatened to kill herself. (Stassi Dep. at 64-65.) McCarthy, however, disputes that she made such a threat. (See Pl.'s Counterstmt. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 78-81.) Based on the Officers' assessment, an ambulance was called to transport McCarthy to a local hospital; the ambulance arrived around 2:45 p.m., and McCarthy stayed at the hospital for several hours. (Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 135.)
On or about June 17, 2014, following her hospitalization, McCarthy received a letter from Dr. Deborah Wortham, the school superintendent notifying plaintiff that she needed to undergo an examination to determine whether she was mentally fit for work. (Pl.'s 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 149.) McCarthy passed the assessment and returned to work as a first-grade teacher for the 2014-15 school year. (Id. ¶¶ 153-55.)
McCarthy filed this lawsuit on March 20, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) The County Defendants and the School Defendants each moved for summary judgment on November 7, 2016. (ECF Nos. 28, 33.) McCarthy submitted her opposition on January 17, 2017. (ECF Nos. 44, 47.) The School Defendants replied on February 3, 2017 (ECF No. 52), and the County Defendants replied on February 10, 2017 (ECF No. 53). The Court heard oral argument on April 13, 2017 (ECF No. 55) and has fully considered the parties' submissions.
The standard for summary judgment is well-settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). The moving party bears the burden of showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. See Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). Rule 56(c)(1) provides that a
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court "`is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments.' Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (summary judgment is unwarranted if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party").
Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party `must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). As the Supreme Court stated in Anderson, "[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). Indeed, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties alone will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). Thus, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials but must set forth "`concrete particulars' showing that a trial is needed. R.G. Grp., Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, it is insufficient for a party opposing summary judgment `merely to assert a conclusion without supplying supporting arguments or facts.' BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d at 33).
McCarthy raises several claims against all defendants: (1) false arrest under Section 1983, (2) procedural due process, (3) substantive due process, (4) due process liberty interest, (5) unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, (6) conspiracy under Section 1983, (7) assault under New York law, (8) false imprisonment under New York law, (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law, and (10) violation of the Mental Hygiene Law.
The centerpiece of her case is the involuntary hospitalization—that is, her allegedly false arrest. As a threshold matter, several claims are duplicative and will be construed as one claim for false arrest under Count V: (1) procedural due process, (2) substantive due process, (3) due process liberty interest, (4) unreasonable search and seizure, (5) false arrest under Section 1983,
The Court will first consider the County Defendants' motion for summary judgment, addressing the federal law claims and the state law claims in turn.
Under federal law, the remaining claims are for false arrest and conspiracy under Section 1983.
McCarthy argues that (1) the Officers lacked probable cause to transport her to a hospital, and (2) the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that there are material issues of disputed fact that preclude summary judgment on the Section 1983 false arrest claim as to the County Defendants, including the issue of qualified immunity.
Section 1983 prohibits "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" by a person acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; instead, it provides a procedure to vindicate rights established elsewhere. Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). Under Section 1983, a false arrest claim derives from the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006). As a threshold matter, it is undisputed that McCarthy was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that an involuntary hospitalization is tantamount to an arrest).
To withstand summary judgment on a false arrest claim, McCarthy needs to show a genuine issue of material fact on four elements: "(1) the defendant intended to confine [her], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.'" Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975)). The fourth element is the only one in dispute for purposes of the motion. With respect to this element, New York law provides that a police officer "may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others." N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.41.
As the County Defendants correctly argue, probable cause is a complete defense to a false arrest claim. See Heller v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 144 F.Supp.3d 596, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (collecting cases). In analyzing this defense, the Court evaluates "the totality of the facts and circumstances alleged to have been known to officers at the time of plaintiff's mental health arrest." Id. at 623.
The Officers assert that they hospitalized McCarthy because her actions and statements corroborated what they learned from school officials—namely, that she threatened to hurt herself. (Amodeo Dep. at 68-69; Stassi Dep. at 65, 84.) However, if a reasonable jury accepted McCarthy's version of events, it could conclude that the Officers lacked probable cause because she never threatened to kill herself and was acting properly at her residence, and the Officers ignored Assistant Principal Higgins' statements that McCarthy was calm at the school. In other words, there are genuine issues of fact as to whether, at the time of her detention and hospitalization, McCarthy appeared mentally ill and whether she conducted herself in a manner likely to result in serious harm to herself or someone else. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.41.
The County Defendants argue that, even if the Officers lacked probable cause, they are entitled to qualified immunity. As the Supreme Court recently affirmed, "[q]ualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct `does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" White v. Pauly, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam)). Even if a police officer lacked probable cause, he is still "entitled to qualified immunity so long as `arguable probable cause' was present when the arrest was made." Figueroa v. Mazza, 825 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Zalaski v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 390 (2d Cir. 2013)). "A police officer has arguable probable cause `if either (a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.'" Id.
In light of the evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Officers' assessment of McCarthy was objectively unreasonable, and that no officer of reasonable competence could find otherwise. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to McCarthy, a rational jury could find that Officers Stassi and Amodeo ignored Assistant Principal Higgins' statements about McCarthy being calm and effectively made a decision to arrest her upon arrival at the sister's house. This evidence, together with McCarthy's account (including that she never threatened to kill herself when the officers arrived at her residence) and the three-hour gap between the school incident and the Officers' in-person evaluation, creates material issues of disputed fact as to whether there was arguable probable cause and precludes summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. Thus, summary judgment is denied on the false arrest claim against Officers Stassi and Amodeo.
On a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show "(1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity; (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages." Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999).
The conspiracy claim is barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which provides "that the officers, agents and employees of a single corporate or municipal entity, each acting within the scope of his employment, are legally incapable of conspiring together." Henneberger v. Cnty. of Nassau, 465 F.Supp.2d 176, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Although the Second Circuit "has not yet determined its applicability to Section 1983 conspiracy claims," district courts have applied the doctrine in this context. See, e.g., Hicks v. City of New York, 232 F.Supp.3d 480, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). This Court also has concluded that this doctrine applies to Section 1983 claims. Here, the uncontroverted evidence indicates that the Officers acted independently and without direction from the School Defendants. (Amodeo Dep. at 67-68; Stassi Dep. at 86-87.) Because the Officers are employees of a single municipal entity and acted within the scope of their employment, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment on the Section 1983 conspiracy claim against the County Defendants.
McCarthy asserts state law claims under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. As for the County Defendants, she raises claims for false imprisonment, assault, and negligence. She also asserts an additional claim for negligent hiring, training, or supervision against the County itself
As discussed earlier, "the tort of false arrest is synonymous with that of false imprisonment." Posr, 944 F.2d at 96. However, unlike its federal counterpart, New York law permits supervisor liability for municipalities under a theory of respondeat superior. Sankar, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 313. "This applies even to discretionary actions by police officers where, as here, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether there was probable cause for arrest." See id. Thus, for the same reasons discussed in the false arrest analysis, the Court denies summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim against Officers Stassi and Amodeo, as well as Nassau County.
Under New York law, "an `assault' is an intentional placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact." United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Waterfront New York Realty Corp., 994 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1993). "The plaintiff must show that the defendant intended either to inflict personal injury or to arouse apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily contact." Wright v. Musanti, No. 14-cv-8976 (KBF), 2017 WL 253486, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2017) (citation omitted). "Although a plaintiff need not prove actual contact, she must allege some physical menace against her body." Id.
The record lacks any evidence that the Officers intended to inflict harm or to arouse the specter of harm. First, the only alleged physical contact came between McCarthy and Officer Stassi, who escorted McCarthy to the ambulance with "his hand on [her] elbow" in a "gentlemanly" fashion. (Cnty. 50-h Hr'g at 54-55.) Second, McCarthy describes the threat of harm as the "emotional upsetment [sic] of being locked in the psychiatric unit." (Cnty. 50-h Hr'g at 71; Pl.'s Dep. at 118.) Based on these allegations, no rational juror could find that the Officers acted in a threatening or menacing matter sufficient to establish liability for assault. See Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 86 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of assault claim because there were no allegations that "an officer acted in a way that placed [the plaintiff] `in fear of imminent harmful or offensive conduct').
Accordingly, the assault claim does not withstand summary judgment.
To survive summary judgment on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish "(1) the existence of a duty on the defendant's part as to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) resultant injury to the plaintiff." Field Day, LLC v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 04-CV-2202 (DRH)(WDW), 2005 WL 2445794, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005). However, here, any "offensive bodily contact with the plaintiff—if it occurred at all—was intentional and not negligent." Dewitt v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 10-CV-3319 (KAM), 2012 WL 4049805, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2012); see also Dineen v. Stramka, 228 F.Supp.2d 447, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("When a plaintiff asserts . . . assault claims which are premised upon a defendant's allegedly intentional conduct, a negligence claim with respect to the same conduct will not lie."). McCarthy alleges, for example, that the County Defendants "intentionally and recklessly" infringed her rights. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 135.) Thus, her negligence claim fails as a matter of law, and summary judgment is granted.
To assert a claim for negligent hiring, training, or supervision, a plaintiff must allege negligence with three additional requirements: "(1) the tort-feasor and the defendant were in an employee-employer relationship, (2) the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury prior to the injury's occurrence, and (3) that the tort was committed on the employer's premises or with the employer's chattels." Soliman, 2017 WL 1229730, at *12 (quoting Ehrens v. Lutheran Church, 385 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). However, where, as here, "employees were acting within the scope of their employment, an employer may not be held liable for negligent hiring, training, and retention as a matter of law." See Rowley v. City of New York, No. 00 Civ. 1793(DAB), 2005 WL 2429514, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005) (collecting cases). As is plain from the record, Officers Stassi and Amodeo acted within the scope of their employment, and McCarthy concedes as much. (Compl. ¶ 35.) Thus, the County is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
Next, the Court will address the School Defendants' motion. The Court will first address plaintiff's discrimination claims and then turn to McCarthy's remaining claims and the County Defendants' cross-claim for indemnity.
McCarthy asserts three discrimination claims against the School Defendants: (1) age discrimination under New York State Executive Law, (2) race discrimination under New York State Executive Law, and (3) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McCarthy also asserts two additional claims against the District itself: (1) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, and (2) race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that there is no evidence from which a rational jury could find that the School Defendants were motivated by any type of discriminatory intent. At oral argument, McCarthy's lawyer conceded that he could point to no evidence in the record of discrimination. Thus, the Court grants summary judgment in the School Defendants' favor on the discrimination claims.
The remaining claims against the School Defendants are for false arrest, false imprisonment, conspiracy, and assault.
As for the false arrest and false imprisonment claims, it is uncontroverted that the School Defendants were not present when McCarthy was arrested. When a defendant is a private actor and not an arresting officer, a plaintiff must show that the defendant "instigated" the arrest. King v. Crossland Say. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 255 (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, "`a plaintiff must show that the defendant took an active role in the arrest . . . such as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities to act, and that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff.'" Vlach v. Staiano, 604 F. App'x 77, 78 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting Lowmack v. Eckerd Corp., 303 A.D.2d 998, 999 (2003)). However, where, as here, private actors merely furnished information leading to an arrest, liability does not attach, and summary judgment is appropriate. See Kraft, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 421-22.
As illustrated by Officer Amodeo's sworn testimony, law enforcement made an independent determination to arrest plaintiff:
(Amodeo Dep. at 67-68.) Officer Stassi provided similar testimony:
(Stassi Dep. at 86-87.) Indeed, McCarthy presented no evidence that the School Defendants "instigated" the arrest by asking or encouraging the Officers to act. See King, 111 F.3d at 257 ("When police independently act to arrest a suspect on information provided by a party, that party is not liable for false imprisonment. . . .") Instead, the decision to contact the police was made by Dr. Hazelton, and both Principal Braswell and Assistant Principal Higgins followed the chain-of-command. However, there is no evidence of encouraging an arrest, and the Officers detained and hospitalized plaintiff based upon their own interactions with plaintiff at the residence. The Court, thus, grants summary judgment on the false arrest and false imprisonment claims against the School Defendants.
The assault and conspiracy claims against the School Defendants also cannot survive summary judgment. The School Defendants were not personally involved in McCarthy's arrest, nor did plaintiff present evidence that she feared any harmful or offensive contact by the School Defendants. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of the School Defendants on the assault and conspiracy claims.
Finally, the School Defendants move to dismiss the County Defendants' cross-claim for indemnity. The Court dismisses the cross-claim because the uncontroverted evidence in the record, including the Officers' own testimony, demonstrates that the Officers made their own assessment as to whether to detain and hospitalize McCarthy based upon their own observations at the residence, independent of the School Defendants. Thus, the cross-claim against the School Defendants must be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the School Defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety and dismisses the County Defendants' crossclaim. (ECF No. 28.) The County Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. (ECF No. 33.) The following claims will proceed to trial: (1) false arrest under Section 1983 against Officers Stassi and Amodeo, and (2) false imprisonment under New York law against all of the County Defendants. Finally, the Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Nassau County Police Department and Matthew Field as defendants in this case.
