ORDER

LOUISE W. FLANAGAN, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on petitioner's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (DE 60) and the government's motion to dismiss (DE 67). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), United States Magistrate Judge Robert T. Numbers, II, entered a memorandum and recommendation ("M&R") (DE 75), wherein it is recommended that this court deny petitioner's motion to vacate and grant the government's motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed objections to the M&R. In this posture, the issues raised are ripe for ruling. For the reasons stated herein, this court adopts the recommendation of the M&R, denies petitioner's motion to vacate, and grants the government's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2013, petitioner pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written agreement, to the following: conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine base (crack) and five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A) (Count One); and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Count Two). On July 8, 2014, this court sentenced petitioner to 273 months imprisonment on Count One and 240 months imprisonment on Count Two, to be served concurrently. Petitioner appealed, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. See United States v. Baum, 604 F. App'x 295 (4th Cir. 2015). Petitioner did not file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed the instant motion to vacate on March 14, 2016, asserting four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. On April 8, 2016, this court reduced petitioner's sentence to 221 months on Count One, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 1 On April 25, 2016, the government filed the instant motion to dismiss. On May 15, 2017, the magistrate judge entered an M&R. Petitioner then filed objections to the M&R, to which the government filed a response in opposition.

COURT'S DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The district court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge's M&R to which specific objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The court does not perform a de novo review where a party makes only "general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Absent a specific and timely-filed objection, the court reviews only for "clear error," and need not give any explanation for adopting the M&R. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.1983). Upon careful review of the record, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A petitioner seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must show that "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). "Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." Id. § 2255(b).

B. Analysis

Petitioner makes three arguments in his objections. See Objections (DE 76). Initially, petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to plead guilty to the money laundering charge (Count Two). Id. at 3-5. Next, petitioner argues that the M&R erred in finding that his trial counsel's failure to object to the three-level role enhancement was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 5-6. Finally, petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and make arguments in support of a reduced drug quantity. Id. at 7-8.

In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy a two-pronged test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Under the first prong, a petitioner must show that his counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The court must be "highly deferential" to counsel's performance and must make every effort to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 689. Therefore, the court must "indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. The second prong requires a petitioner to show that he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance by showing "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

1. Advice regarding plea

Initially, petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by advising him to plead guilty to the money laundering charge (Count Two). See Objections (DE 76) at 3-5. Petitioner contends that his trial counsel ignored the issue of guilt or innocence and merely recommended that he plead guilty to allow for favorable negotiations. Id. at 4. Petitioner further contends that he was prejudiced because his sentence was "19 months longer than it would have been." Id. at 5. Petitioner concludes that his trial counsel should have had him enter a plea to "animal fighting," which had far less sentencing exposure than money laundering. Id.

Petitioner's objection does not challenge the magistrate judge's reasoning, but rather submits an entirely new argument for why this court should conclude that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Where the government had the opportunity to respond, see DE 78, this court will consider the new argument. See United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[A]s part of its obligation to determine de novo any issue to which proper objection is made, a district court is required to consider all arguments directed to that issue, regardless of whether they were raised before the magistrate.").

This claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland standard. It fails under the performance prong because petitioner is essentially asking this court to second guess his trial counsel's strategy. According to petitioner's own description of events, his trial counsel advised him to plead guilty to "gain favor in other parts of the negotiations." See Objections (DE 76) at 4. This strategy benefitted petitioner and was reasonable for at least two reasons. First, the government agreed to dismiss a five-count indictment in exchange for petitioner's guilty plea to the two-count information, which involved less sentencing exposure.2 See Plea Agreement (DE 24) at 7. Second, the government agreed that petitioner was entitled to a downward adjustment of two to three levels for acceptance of responsibility. Id. at 8.

This claim fails under the prejudice prong because petitioner has failed to sufficiently allege prejudice. In order to state prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner must allege that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on proceeding to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Because this argument fails under both prongs of the Strickland standard, petitioner's first objection must be overruled.

2. Failed to object to role enhancement

Next, petitioner argues that the M&R erred in finding that his trial counsel's failure to object to the leadership role enhancement was not ineffective assistance. See Objections (DE 76) at 5-6. Petitioner references two affidavits he submitted in support of his § 2255 motion. Id. at 6 (citing Mot. Vacate (DE 60-2, 60-3)). According to petitioner, these affidavits create a "material fact in dispute." Id.

At sentencing, petitioner was given a three-level increase because this court found that he was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. See PSR ¶ 70 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b)). The following evidence supports the application of this enhancement: petitioner directed no less than three individuals. See PSR ¶ 17. In particular, petitioner exploited the mothers of his children by utilizing them to reside in and sell drugs from his stash houses. See PSR ¶ 17. According to multiple sources, petitioner received orders for cocaine and then directed his girlfriend or one of his children's mothers to complete the sale. See PSR Addendum ¶ 11. According to one statement, the women only sold crack. See PSR Addendum ¶ 11. Several witnesses confirmed that petitioner used the mothers of his children to store drugs at stash houses by providing a home for the women. See PSR Addendum ¶ 11. Petitioner also paid kennel workers to "work the dogs" in furtherance of his criminal activities, which included dog fights. See PSR Addendum ¶ 11; PSR ¶ 12. Petitioner received $40,000 to $50,000 for the dog fights he arranged. See PSR ¶ 12.

Given the foregoing evidence, this court could have easily found the leadership role enhancement applicable by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 2013) ("The burden is on the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing enhancement should be applied."). Thus, trial counsel's objection to the role enhancement would have been futile. Failure to lodge a meritless objection does not amount to ineffective assistance. See United States v. Kilmer, 167 F.3d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[a]n attorney's failure to raise a meritless argument . . . cannot form the basis of a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim"); Moore v. United States, 934 F.Supp. 724, 731 (E.D. Va. 1996) (holding that "[f]ailure to raise a meritless argument can never amount to ineffective assistance"). Consequently, petitioner's second objection must be overruled.

3. Failed to object to drug weight

In petitioner's final objection, he alleges that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and make knowledgeable arguments in support of reducing his drug quantity. See Objections (DE 76) at 7-8. Petitioner concedes that his trial counsel made arguments in support of a reduction in his drug quantity, but he claims that his trial counsel lacked the knowledge that a complete investigation into the facts would have revealed. Id. at 7.

In this objection, petitioner does not challenge the magistrate judge's reasoning, but rather, he submits an entirely new argument for why this court should conclude that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the government had the opportunity to respond, see DE 78, this court will consider the new argument. See George, 971 F.2d at 1118 ("[A]s part of its obligation to determine de novo any issue to which proper objection is made, a district court is required to consider all arguments directed to that issue, regardless of whether they were raised before the magistrate.").

Prior to sentencing, the U.S. Probation Officer determined that petitioner should be held accountable for the following: 24.18 grams of marijuana, 16,650.78 grams of cocaine, and 43,997.78 grams of crack cocaine, which had a total marijuana equivalency of 160,446.21.22 kilograms. See PSR ¶ 17.

At petitioner's sentencing, held on July 8, 2014, this court noted that there had been "some further discussions" and that the case had been continued to the extent that it was not taken up first. See July 8, 2014 Tr. (DE 49) at 3:10-12. This court asked counsel about discussions that would allow the case to move forward as scheduled. Id. at 3:13-15. Defense counsel responded by advising the court that there had been some disagreement over the drug quantity for which petitioner was to be held accountable. Id. at 3:16-18. Defense counsel advised that it was his understanding that the government had agreed to remove some of the drug quantity computed in the Presentence Report and would further agree that the two-level enhancement for the utilization of friends and family was not appropriate. Id. at 3:20-25, 4:1-4. The parties agreed that the total drug weight in the Presentence Report converted to marijuana was 160,446.22 kilograms. Id. at 4:7-8. This court asked the government what the readily provable amount was. Id. at 4:11-12. The government responded that it was a "total of 18,253 [kilo]grams." Id. at 4:13-16. The government noted that the drug weight came primarily from historical statements from multiple individuals who were debriefed and provided information. Id. at 5:8-24. The government noted that what the parties were asking the court to do was to remove two statements. Id. at 5:25, 6:1-4. The U.S. Probation Officer advised that his resulting calculations revealed a total marijuana equivalency of 18,170.727 kilograms, which equated to a base offense level of 36. Id. at 8:3-9.

This court noted that the parties' agreements would reduce the drug quantity to 18,253 kilograms of marijuana equivalency, and U.S. Probation had it calculated at 18,170 kilograms. Id. at 8:10-13. This court then proceeded to ask whether the parties agreed with this determination. Id. at 8:13. Defense counsel responded that petitioner agreed that was the proper drug weight. Id. at 8:14. The government also agreed that it was correct. Id. at 8:15. Then, this court asked petitioner, directly, whether he accepted that as the proper drug weight. Id. 8:16-17. Petitioner responded affirmatively. Id. at 8:18.

This claim must fail under both prongs of the Strickland standard. Petitioner's trial counsel was able to secure a very significant reduction in petitioner's drug quantity. Moreover, because petitioner's admission before this court that the drug quantity was correct foreclosed and rendered moot any additional, meaningful argument by his trial counsel. Accordingly, petitioner's third objection must overruled.

C. Certificate of Appealability

A certificate of appealability may issue only upon a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether the issues presented should have been decided differently or that they are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). After reviewing the claims presented on collateral review in light of the applicable standard, the court finds that a certificate of appealability is not warranted.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, this court ADOPTS the recommendation of the magistrate judge. The government's motion to dismiss (DE 67) is GRANTED. Petitioner's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (DE 60) is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is also DENIED. The clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

SO ORDERED.