McGEE, Judge.
DOCRX, Inc. (Plaintiff) appeals from an order denying its motion to enforce a foreign judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1C-1701 to -1708. For the reasons below, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.
The undisputed facts are that Plaintiff filed a Request To File Foreign Judgment in Superior Court in Stanly County on 2 August 2011. Plaintiff presented a certified copy of a default judgment order (the Alabama judgment) entered against EMI Services of North Carolina, LLC (Defendant) in the amount of $453,683.14, on 1 April 2011 in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama. Defendant filed a Motion For Relief From And Notice Of Defense To Foreign Judgment on 25 August 2011. Defendant argued,
On appeal, Plaintiff raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's motion to enforce the Alabama judgment as a judgment of North Carolina. In its order, the trial court first determined that the affidavits and exhibits submitted by Defendant supported Defendant's argument that Plaintiff obtained the Alabama judgment as a result of fraud. The trial court then determined that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1703(c) entitled Defendant to raise against enforcement of the Alabama judgment "`the same defenses as a judgment of this State[.]'" The trial court then stated that relief under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) was available if the trial court determined that "there was fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." Finally the trial court concluded that:
The appellate courts of our State have not yet addressed the nature of the relationship between the Full Faith and Credit Clause and N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A1, Rule 60(b). Traditionally, foreign judgments have been subject to attacks on limited grounds:
Hewett v. Zegarzewski, 90 N.C. App. 443, 446, 368 S.E.2d 877, 878 (1988) (emphasis added). Our Courts have continued to recite this general concept. See First-Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Four Oaks Bank & Tr. Co., 156 N.C. App. 378, 380, 576 S.E.2d 722, 724 (2003) ("However, to make a successful attack upon a foreign judgment on the basis of fraud, it is necessary that extrinsic fraud be alleged." (citations and quotation marks omitted)). In Florida National Bank v. Satterfield, 90 N.C. App. 105, 107, 367 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1988), this Court observed that "[t]he Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution requires North Carolina to enforce a judgment rendered in another state, if the judgment is valid under the laws of that state." Id. We further stated in Florida National Bank that: "A foreign judgment may be collaterally attacked only on the grounds that it was obtained without jurisdiction; that fraud was involved in the judgment's procurement; or that its enforcement would be against public policy." Id. We also stated that "[a]lthough extrinsic fraud is a defense to an action to recover on a foreign judgment, intrinsic fraud is not." Id.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1705(a) (2011). Likewise, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1C-1703(c) (2011) states that "[a] judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same defenses as a judgment of this State and shall be enforced or satisfied in like manner[.]" Defendant contends this statute entitles a foreign judgment defendant to utilize any defense applicable to an in-state judgment. As discussed above, in the present case, the trial court agreed and it utilized Rule 60(b) to set aside the Alabama judgment; indeed, such an interpretation is warranted from the plain language of the statute. There remain, however, constitutional implications that must be determined.
As stated above, our Courts have not yet addressed the interplay between N.C.G.S. § 1C-1705, N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b), and the United States Constitution. However, case law from other jurisdictions has addressed this issue involving similar statutes. For example, the appellate courts of Utah have concluded that "the remedies available under Rule 59 and 60 are limited by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution when a foreign judgment is at issue." Bankler v. Bankler, 963 P.2d 797, 799-800 (Utah App.1998). In Bankler, the Utah Court of Appeals noted that:
Id. at 799 (citation omitted).
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Montana addressed this issue in Carr v. Bett, 291 Mont. 326, 970 P.2d 1017 (1998), holding that: "We disagree with [the proposition that].... a foreign judgment duly filed in Montana can be subjected to the same defenses and proceedings for reopening or vacating as a domestic judgment, and remain consistent with full faith and credit." Id. at 1024. The Montana court held that "the only defenses that may be raised to destroy the full faith and credit obligation owed to a final judgment are those defenses directed at the validity of the foreign judgment." Id. Finally, the Montana court determined that:
Id. at 1024-25. The Colorado Court of Appeals has held similarly. See Craven v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 117 P.3d 11, 14 (Colo.App.2004) ("Postjudgment relief available from foreign judgments under C.R.C.P. 60(b) is limited to the following grounds: (1) the judgment is based upon extrinsic fraud; (2) the judgment is void; or (3) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.").
In opposition, Defendant cites two Third Circuit Court of Appeals cases in his discussion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and argues that any distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is "meaningless." In Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F.2d 1016
We find the reasoning of the Utah, Montana and Colorado appellate courts persuasive, and hold that in North Carolina, "the remedies available under Rule ... 60 are limited by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution when a foreign judgment is at issue." Bankler, 963 P.2d at 799-800. We hold that postjudgment relief from foreign judgments under N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b) is limited to the following grounds: "(1) the judgment is based upon extrinsic fraud; (2) the judgment is void; or (3) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Craven, 117 P.3d at 14.
In the past, this Court has, without addressing this framework explicitly, held in accordance with these principles. In Moss v. Improved B.P.O.E., 139 N.C. App. 172, 177, 532 S.E.2d 825, 829 (2000), this Court observed:
Id. at 177, 532 S.E.2d at 829. Further, in Walden v. Vaughn, 157 N.C. App. 507, 579 S.E.2d 475 (2003), this Court ruled that:
Id. at 510, 579 S.E.2d at 477 (citation omitted). We then observed that "[i]n North Carolina, accord and satisfaction is a valid defense against a claim to enforce a judgment." Id. Finally, we concluded that "the trial court did not err in considering defendants' defense of accord and satisfaction." Id.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold in the present case that, while the trial court's analysis is thorough and reasoned, the trial court did not have the benefit of the determination herein that the application of Rule 60(b) to a foreign judgment is limited by traditional interpretations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Plaintiff's motion to enforce the Alabama judgment should have been denied only if "(1) the judgment [was] based upon extrinsic fraud; (2) the judgment [was] void; or (3) the judgment [had] been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it [was] based [had] been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it [was] no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Craven, 117 P.3d at 14. In the present case, the trial court denied Plaintiff's motion to enforce the Alabama judgment on the grounds of "intrinsic fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct." As we have held, these grounds are not sufficient under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to warrant the trial court's denial of Plaintiff's motion to enforce the Alabama judgment.
Vacated and remanded.
Judges HUNTER, ROBERT C. and ELMORE concur.