ORDER

JUDITH C. McCARTHY, Magistrate Judge.

Presently before this Court is Plaintiff Samuel J. Smolen's ("Plaintiff") second Application for the Court to Appoint Counsel. (Docket Nos. 59 and 65).1 Plaintiff's first request for appointment of counsel was denied on August 14, 2018 by the Honorable Vincent L. Briccetti. (Docket No. 36). In his October 28, 2019 letter, Plaintiff argues that this Court should appoint counsel based on the "trials and tribulations" he has been put through by the State which has hindered his ability to effectively prosecute the case. (Docket No. 65 at 4). Plaintiff also references his September 6, 2019 request for counsel, where he primarily argued that the Court should appoint counsel because he became legally blind during the pendency of the case and, at that time, had not yet been provided with visual aids. (Docket No. 59).

In civil matters, indigent plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to counsel. See Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2011). However, courts "may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The Court has "substantial discretion" in determining whether to grant such a request. Massey v. Greinal, 164 F.Supp.2d 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quotations and citation omitted). In exercising this discretion, the Court must make two initial inquiries: (i) whether Plaintiff can afford counsel, and, if not, (ii) whether the merits of the case and Plaintiff's position "seem[] likely to be of substance." Id. (quoting Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir.1986)). Only after these initial findings may the Court "consider secondary factors such as the factual and legal complexity of the case, the ability of the litigant to navigate the legal minefield unassisted, and any other reason why in the particular case appointment of counsel would more probably lead to a just resolution of the dispute." Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61-62).

Upon review of the record, the Court notes that Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket No. 4). Therefore, Plaintiff has demonstrated that he is indigent and cannot afford counsel. Additionally, based on Judge Briccetti's January 28, 2019 Opinion and Order which denied in part a motion to dismiss that Plaintiff notably failed to oppose, the Court can conclude that the sole remaining claim — Plaintiff's procedural due process claim — may have merit. (Docket No. 41).

The Court has reviewed the entire record, including Plaintiff's prior application for appointment of counsel, (Docket No. 36 at 2-7), has considered the type and complexity of the case, the merits of Plaintiff's claims, and Plaintiff's ability to represent himself, as well as Plaintiff's legally blind status. Based on this review, the Court determines that no complex issues are involved, that Plaintiff has demonstrated his ability to represent himself, and that the appointment of counsel is not justified at this time. Plaintiff's September 6 and October 28, 2019 submissions fail to present sufficient facts from which this Court can infer that his legal blindness has substantially limited his ability to prosecute the instant case. Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges in his October 28, 2019 letter that he has now been provided with "all of the visual aids" that had been recommended, and was now in a "better position...[to] prosecute [his] claim." (Docket No. 65 at 2). While courts in some circumstances have appointed counsel where legally blind plaintiffs argued that they were unable to adequately represent themselves,2 such circumstances are not present in the instant case at this time.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's application for appointment of counsel is DENIED with leave to renew should circumstances change. See Ramey v. Dept. of Corrections, No. 13 Civ. 17, 2013 WL 1867342, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013).3 The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending application. (Docket No. 65).

SO ORDERED.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Anthony Medina, Fallsburg, NY, pro se.

Hillel David Deutsch, NYS Attorney General's Office, Department of Law, Rochester, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

HON. FRANK P. GERACI, JR., Chief Judge

*1 Before the Court is a motion to appoint counsel (ECF No. 8) filed by Plaintiff Anthony Medina ("Medina") and a motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 9) filed by five of the six defendants in this case.

BACKGROUND

Medina is a prisoner currently housed at Five Points Correctional Facility in Romulus, New York He brings this action pro se against five prison officials and the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision for problems arising out of his incarceration at Wende Correctional Facility ("Wende") in Alden, New York By Order dated March 17, 2015, the Court granted Medina's request to proceed in forma pauperis ECF No. 5.

The precipitating event in this action is a physical altercation between Medina and another inmate, during or after which Officer Barrett ("Barrett"), a corrections officer at Wende, allegedly struck Medina in the head with a baton ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 14-15 Medina asserts that Barrett and Officer McKeel ("McKeel"), another Mende corrections officer, then filed false reports about the incident, which resulted in Medina being placed in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU") at Wende. Id. at ¶¶ 17-20 Barrett and McKeel also allegedly gave false testimony about the incident during an ensuing disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in Medina remaining in the SHU for sixty days. Id. at ¶¶ 21-27, 36 While in the SHU, Medina alleges that he was denied certain accommodations that—as an individual who is legally blind—he needed to properly defend himself during the disciplinary proceeding and, more generally, he needs to function from day to day. Id. at ¶¶ 32-51. These accommodations include a closed circuit TV magnifier, a computer with software for the sight-impaired, and documents printed with enlarged font. Id. at ¶ 37. Medina further alleges that as result of not receiving these accommodations, he was not able to complete a form for medical care, and thus he was effectively denied medical care Id. at ¶¶ 52-54.

Accordingly, Medina brings claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S C. §§ 12101-12132), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794).

DISCUSSION

Medina has now filed a motion to appoint counsel ECF No. 8. He contends that counsel should be appointed here because he suffers from serious mental illness, scoliosis, osteoarthritis, and cervical spine syndrome, all of which interfere with his ability to write Id. at ¶ 2. He also contends that he is legally blind and without access to accommodating devices, which interferes with his ability to read and write. Id. at ¶ 3 Notably, he also asserts that "in a case less complicated than this one," the Second Circuit "agreed" that his legal blindness, mental illness, and lack of access to accommodating devices warranted the appointment of counsel. Id. at ¶ 4 (citing Medina v. Napoli, 554 F. App'x 65, 66 (2d Cir. 2014)).

It is well-settled that there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases See In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1260 (2d Cir. 1984). Although the court may appoint counsel to assist indigent litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Charles W. Sears Real Estate, Inc., 865 F.2d 22, 23 (2d Cir. 1988), such appointment is within the judge's broad discretion. Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986). The factors to be considered in deciding whether to appoint counsel include the following: (1) "whether the indigent's position seems likely to be of substance," (2) "the indigent's ability to investigate the crucial facts;" (3) "whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the fact finder," (4) "the indigent's ability to present the case" and, relatedly, "the complexity of the legal issues," and (5) "any special reason in that case why appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination" Id. at 61-62.

*2 The Court notes at the outset that Medina is very familiar with this type of action in federal court Since 2003, he has initiated at least nine actions, including this one, in the Northern, Southern, and Western and Districts of New York under at least one of the three statutes cited above, that is, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act Medina v. Buther; et al., 7:2015-cv-01955 (S.D.N.Y. March 12, 2015), Medina v. Barrett, et al.; 6:14-cv-06377-FPG (W.D.N.Y. July 10, 2014); Medina v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, et al., 6.13-cv-06384 (W.D.N.Y. July 26, 2013), Medina v. Fischer, No. 1:2011-cv-00176 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2011), Medina v. Skowron, No. 1:2008-cv-00573 (W.D.N.Y. August 4, 2008), Medina v. Gonzalez, No. 1:2008-cv-01520 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2008), Medina v. Napoli, No. 1:2007-cv-00497 (W.D.N.Y. July 30, 2007); Medina v. Hunt, et al., No. 9:2005-cv-01460 (N.D.N.Y. November 22, 2005), Medina v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., No. 1:2003-cv-09249 (S.D.N.Y. November 21, 2003).1 In five of these cases, Medina sought or seeks accommodations for his legal blindness and, thus, he specifically brought claims under all three statutes. Thus, based on the Court's brief review of Medina's filings in these cases, it is apparent that Medina has built up an expertise in this area of the law that rivals that of a lawyer Stated simply, even given his disabilities, the Court does not believe that Medina would have any difficulty investigating crucial facts or otherwise presenting this case

Medina is correct, however, that on a relatively recent appeal of one of these nine cases, Medina v. Napoli, 2012 WL 5288713, the Second Circuit observed as follows:

Medina v. Napoli, 554 F. App'x 65, 66 (2d Cir. 2014). In other words, after both sides agreed at oral argument that Medina's disabilities warranted the appointment of counsel, the Second Circuit also agreed that Medina's disabilities warranted such an appointment See id. On remand to the district court, Medina then renewed his motion to appoint counsel, and the district court heeded the Second Circuit's direction and appointed counsel See Medina v. Napoli, No. 07-CV-497-JTC, 2015 WL 5638101, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2015).

This Court will similarly heed the Second Circuit's direction and find that as a result of Medina's legal blindness and mental disabilities, appointment of counsel is justified here. The Court notes with caution, however, that "every assignment of a volunteer lawyer to an undeserving client deprives society of a volunteer lawyer available for a deserving cause "Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1989). Here, it must be observed that Plaintiffs assertions that he is effectively unable to read or write and does not have reasonable accommodations are somewhat belied by the fact that he has filed lucid, cogent complaints pro se in four federal actions since 2009, when his vision apparently started seriously deteriorating. Medina v. Buther, et al., 7:2015-cv-01955; Medina v. Barrett, et al.; 6:14-cv-06377; Medina v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, et al., 6:13-cv-06384, Medina v. Fischer, No 1:2011-cv-00176. Most recently, in March of 2015, he filed a 50-page typed complaint in the Southern District of New York against thirteen defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Medina v. Buther, et al., 7:2015-cv-01955. The Court reminds Medina that it determines whether to appoint a lawyer on a case-by-case basis, and the appointment of a lawyer in this case is not an indication that a lawyer will be appointed in any subsequent case.

CONCLUSION

*3 In sum, Medina's request for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED After counsel is appointed, the Court will issue a scheduling order setting forth the time in which Medina's counsel may respond to the partial summary judgment motion (ECF No. 9). Medina need not himself respond to the partial summaiy judgment motion

The Court hereby directs the Pro Se Litigation Unit to identify an attorney who is willing to represent Medina in this matter and to advise this Court when pro bono counsel has been identified.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations.

Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2016 WL 1271515.

DECISION AND ORDER

McMAHON, District Judge.

*1 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has submitted an application for the Court to Request Counsel from the pro bono panel. For the reasons stated below, I conclude that the Application for the Court to Request Counsel should be denied with leave to renew if future circumstances merit granting such an Application.

Application for the Court to Recprest Counsel

A federal judge has "broad discretion" when deciding whether to appoint counsel to an indigent litigant. Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986), see Bingos v. Hopkins, 14 Fad 787, 789 (2d Cir1994). "There is no requirement that an indigent litigant be appointed pro bono counsel in civil matters." Bingos, 14 F.3d at 789; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)). Indeed, appointment of pro bono counsel must be done judiciously in order to preserve the "precious commodity" of volunteer lawyers for those litigants who truly need a lawyer's assistance Cooper v. A. Scugenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172-73 (2d Cir 1989). Because this Court does not have a panel of attorneys who can be compelled to take on civil cases pro bono, and does not have the resources to pay counsel in civil matters, the appointment of counsel is a rare event.

The standard outlined by the Second Circuit in Hodge governs a review of Plaintiff's Application for the Court to Request Counsel Under the Hodge standard, a court must first determine "whether the indigent's position seems likely to be of substance" Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61; Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172. The "merit" factor commands the most attention Id. If an application meets this threshold requirement, the district court must further consider the plaintiffs ability and efforts to obtain counsel, as well as "his [or her] ability to handle the case without assistance in [ ] light of the required factual investigation, the complexity of the legal issues, and the need for expertly conducted cross-examination to test veracity." Cooper; 877 F.2d at 172 Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61-62 Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 Fad 390, 392 (2d Cir 1997).

An examination of the file reveals that Plaintiff fails to satisfy the Hodge test for appointment of counsel.

Plaintiff has filed the present prisoner civil rights complaint alleging that the defendants failed to provide him with proper medical treatment after he slipped and fell walking down a flight of stairs, as a result of a defective handrail in defendants' facility. Plaintiff claims that he injured his hip and back in the fall. The Court does not find this case to be one of the rare cases where the merit of the plaintiff's claim is so apparent that the Court feels compelled to appoint counsel to vindicate his cause.

The second factor enumerated in Hodge concerns Plaintiff's ability and efforts to obtain counsel. Plaintiff states that he contacted several attorneys, but none of them were willing to take his case While not an exhaustive search, defendants efforts suggest an attempt to satisfy this Hodge factor.

*2 With respect to the third Hodge factor (an inability to handle the case without assistance), it is clear from Plaintiff's submissions to the Court, which are thorough and show an understanding of the litigation process, that Plaintiff has sufficient intellect and sophistication to grasp and present the issues. (See, e.g., the present motion, the complaint, and various other filings with the court) Plaintiff's claims are not so complex or unique that a person of his intelligence would be unable to handle them at this stage.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Application for the Court to Request Counsel from the pro bono panel is denied. Plaintiff may renew the motion if subsequent submissions or proceedings indicate that this litigation is sufficiently meritorious to warrant appointment However, Plaintiff must understand that the Court is not required to provide counsel in civil cases, and we do not have either a stable of lawyers to appoint or the means to compel attorneys to provide free legal services.

All Citations.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2013 WL 1867342.