GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief District Judge.
Currently before the Court, in these consolidated pro se prisoner civil rights actions filed by Herman Carlee McMillian ("Plaintiff") against the above-captioned employees of New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision at Auburn Correctional Facility ("Defendants"), are the following: (1) United States Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart's Report-Recommendation recommending that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted, and that Plaintiff's Complaints be dismissed for failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act; (2) Plaintiff's Objection to the Report-Recommendation; and (3) Plaintiff's six motions for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. Nos. 125, 126, 127-32.) For the reasons set forth below, the Report-Recommendation is accepted and adopted in its entirety; Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted; Plaintiff's Complaints are dismissed; Plaintiff's six motions for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction are denied as moot; and he is directed to show cause why he should not be enjoined from filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind (including motions) in the Northern District of New York pro se without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her designee.
Even when construed with the utmost of special solicitude, Plaintiff's Objection to the Report-Recommendation fails to assert a specific challenge to the Report-Recommendation. (Compare Dkt. No. 126 [Plf.'s Obj.] with Dkt. No. 125 [Report-Recommendation].)
Based upon a careful review of this matter, the Court can find no clear error in the Report-Recommendation: Magistrate Judge Stewart employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to those facts. (Dkt. No. 125.) As a result, the Court accepts and adopts the Report-Recommendation for the reasons stated therein. (Id.) Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiff's Complaints are dismissed.
Because one of the issues presented by a motion for injunctive relief is whether the movant has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim, the relief sought by a plaintiff in a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction must relate to the claims of the plaintiff's complaint. See Bain v. Hofmann, 06-CV-0168, 2007 WL 1848035, at *3 (D. Vt. June 25, 2007) (denying a motion for injunctive relief because, inter alia, "[t]he claims set forth in Bain's motion are not claims that were presented in either his initial or his amended complaints").
As a result, where no complaint remains pending, no motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction remains available. See Wheeler v. Cohen, 15-CV-0170, 2015 WL 6872338, at *2 (D. Vt. Nov. 9, 2015) ("The Court will first consider the motion to dismiss, as dismissal would render moot the matter of preliminary injunctive relief."); Leed Indus. Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 09-CV-9456, 2010 WL 882992, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2010) ("On March 1, 2010, the Court issued a `bottom-line' order granting defendants' motion to dismiss, which rendered moot plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and expedited hearing.").
Here, because no claims remain pending in these actions, Plaintiff's six motions for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction are denied as moot.
It is well settled that "[a] district court may, in its discretion, impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the judicial process." Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996). Where a litigant persists in the filing of vexatious and frivolous suits, it may be appropriate to place certain limitations on the litigant's future access to the courts. See Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Iwachiw v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 [2d Cir. 2005]); see also Shafii, 83 F.3d at 571 ("The filing of repetitive and frivolous suits constitutes the type of abuse for which an injunction forbidding further litigation may be an appropriate sanction."). Before imposing such limitations, the court should consider the following:
Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 528 (quoting Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 [2d Cir. 1986]).
Under the circumstances, the Court finds that grounds may exist to enjoin Plaintiff from filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind (including motions) in this District pro se without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her designee.
Since he was incarcerated in 1990, Plaintiff has filed twenty-two (22) pro se civil rights cases in this District. Two of those cases are, of course, addressed above in this Decision and Order. A third case is currently pending before U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino, who has received a Report-Recommendation from U.S. Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart recommending dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See McMillian v. Walters, 16-CV-0277, Report-Recommendation (N.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 18, 2017) (Stewart, M.J.). Of the remaining nineteen (19) cases, ten (10) have been dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or failure to pay the required filing fee,
Based on a careful review of Plaintiff's litigation history in this District (as cited above), the Court finds that (1) he lacks a good-faith expectation in prevailing in his lawsuits and motions, (2) he has proven himself to be vexatious and indeed incorrigible when proceeding pro se, (3) he has caused needless expense to other parties and placed an unnecessary burden on the Court and its personnel, and (4) he has demonstrated that no lesser sanctions (e.g., such as dismissal or chastisement) would be adequate to protect the Court and other parties, given his prior conduct.
Notwithstanding the overwhelming support for the issuance of a Pre-Filing Order at this time, fairness dictates that Plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 529. As a result, he shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to show cause, in writing, why he should not be enjoined from filing any future pleadings or documents of any kind (including motions) in this District pro se without prior permission of the Chief Judge or his or her designee.
