MARTIN REIDINGER, District Judge.
On October 17, 2018, Sara E. Willis (the "Plaintiff") filed a Complaint against Cleveland County, Brian Epley ("Epley"), Dorothea Wyant ("Wyant" and with Cleveland County and Epley, the "County Defendants"), and Sam Lockridge ("Lockridge" and all together the "Defendants"), asserting several claims for violations of the Plaintiff's civil rights. [Doc. 1 at 21-54].
On February 6, 2019, the Court entered a Pretrial Order and Case Management Plan (the "CMO") in this action, setting a discovery deadline of November 11, 2019. [Doc. 17]. The Order states that "[m]otions to compel must be filed within the discovery period or they may be deemed waived." [
On October 14, 2019, the County Defendants filed a Stipulation to Extension of Discovery Period, stating that the parties had stipulated to extend the discovery deadline through November 22, 2019. [Doc. 27 at 2]. The Defendants, however, did not request a modification of the CMO to reflect that stipulation, and the CMO was never modified to reflect that stipulation.
On December 23, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Disclosures and Discovery from the County Defendants. [Doc. 31]. On January 21, 2020, the Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing on that motion. On January 23, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order denying the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel as untimely. [Doc. 42].
On February 6, 2020, the Plaintiff filed an Objection and Motion for Review or Reconsideration by the United States District Court of the Order of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 42) Filed 1/23/20. [Doc. 47]. On February 19, 2020, the County Defendants responded to that motion. [Doc. 53].
On February 10, 2020, the County Defendants issued notices and subpoenas for depositions of two non-parties, Zachary Lovelace and Meda Dixon. [Docs. 57-2; 57-3; 57-4; 57-5]. On February 24, 2020, the Plaintiff filed objections to the County Defendants' subpoenas of Zachary Lovelace and Meda Dixon because they were issued after the discovery period had ended. [Docs. 56; 57].
The Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge's Order denying her Motion to Compel [Doc. 42], arguing that her Motion to Compel was timely filed because it was filed within the extended discovery period as agreed to by the parties. [Doc. 47].
Pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may submit objections to a Magistrate Judge's ruling on a non-dispositive pretrial motion and seek that the Order be set aside in whole or in part if it is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Under this standard, "[a] finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
"The case law of this District is clear that motions to compel generally must be filed by the close of the discovery period."
While the Plaintiff argues that the parties stipulated to extend discovery past the original November 11, 2019 deadline, the Plaintiff also concedes that the parties never filed a request for an extension of the discovery deadline with the Court and that the Court never approved an extension of the discovery deadline. [Doc. 47 at 5-6]. As such, the discovery deadline was always November 11, 2019, regardless of the parties' own agreements.
The Plaintiff argues that the County Defendants' counsel "duped" the other parties by failing to request an extension of the discovery deadline when he moved for an extension of the motions and mediation deadlines. [Doc. 47-3 at ¶ 19]. The Plaintiff's counsel, however, could have filed a request to extend the discovery deadline. Moreover, the Plaintiff's counsel never checked the docket to ensure that the County Defendants' counsel moved for a formal extension of the discovery deadline. As such, the County Defendants' failure to file a request for an extension of the discovery deadline does not provide grounds for extending the discovery period.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, which was filed on December 23, 2019, was untimely because it was filed after the discovery period had ended. [Doc. 17 at 9 ("Motions to compel must be filed within the discovery period or they may be deemed waived.")]. Because the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel was filed after the close of discovery, it was properly stricken by the Magistrate Judge. It appears from the record that neither side took very seriously the deadlines imposed by this Court. No party should be surprised, however, that the Magistrate Judge enforced those deadlines. After all, they were more than mere suggestions. As such, the Magistrate Judge's Order is not clearly erroneous; it is consistent with this Court's prior Orders. Neither is it contrary to law. For these reasons, the Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden under Rule 72.
The Court turns next to the Plaintiff's Objection to Notice of Deposition of Zachary Lovelace [Doc. 56] and Objection to Notice of Deposition of Meda Dixon [Doc. 57]. The notices and subpoenas for the depositions of Zachary Lovelace and Meda Dixon were issued on February 10, 2020. [Docs. 57-2; 57-3; 57-4; 57-5]. Those depositions constitute involuntary discovery because the Plaintiff objects to them and does not appear to have ever agreed to them. While the Magistrate Judge's Order rightly allowed the parties to continue discovery by agreement, [