Filed: May 08, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: 10-4765-ag Rayamajhi v. Holder BIA Weisel, IJ A088 778 546 A088 778 547 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DA
Summary: 10-4765-ag Rayamajhi v. Holder BIA Weisel, IJ A088 778 546 A088 778 547 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DAT..
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10-4765-ag
Rayamajhi v. Holder
BIA
Weisel, IJ
A088 778 546
A088 778 547
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 8th day of May, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
ROBERT D. SACK,
REENA RAGGI,
Circuit Judges.
______________________________________
SABINA RAYAMAJHI, KARSANG GURUNG,
Petitioners,
v. 10-4765-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: Charles Christophe, Christophe Law
Group, P.C., New York, New York
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; James A. Hunolt, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Sarah L. Vuong,
Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Sabina Rayamajhi, a native and citizen of Nepal, seeks
review of an October 27, 2010 order of the BIA, affirming
the November 18, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
Robert D. Weisel, which denied Rayamajhi’s application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 See In re Rayamajhi,
Nos. A088 778 546/547 (B.I.A. Oct. 27, 2010), aff’g Nos.
A088 778 546/547 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 18, 2008). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review both
the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of
completeness.” Zaman v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 233, 237 (2d Cir.
2008). The applicable standards of review are well-
1
Because Rayamajhi was the lead applicant, and her
husband, Karsang Gurung, was a derivative beneficiary, we
refer only to Rayamajhi throughout this order.
2
established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Yanqin Weng v.
Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
Rayamajhi argues that the agency erred in finding that
she was not persecuted on account of her political opinion.
Section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, applicable
here because Rayamajhi filed her application in 2008,
provides that an asylum applicant “must establish that [a
protected ground] was or will be at least one central reason
for” the claimed persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(b); see
Rodas Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010). In
support, she points to her testimony that she was a member
of the Nepal Students’ Union (“NSU”) from 2002 to 2003; that
in 2007, she received two notes demanding that she renounce
the NSU and donate to the Maoist party; and that shortly
thereafter, Maoists broke into her home, demanded money,
stole money and property, hit her, and threatened her.
The agency properly weighed Rayamajhi’s testimony that
she was persecuted based on her political views alongside
evidence supporting the contrary conclusion that the
Maoists’ central aims were to extort and steal Rayamajhi’s
money and property. Rayamajhi was only an NSU member from
2002 until May 2003, at which time she left Nepal and spent
nearly four years in the United States. Even when Rayamajhi
3
was an NSU member years before the alleged persecution, her
political activities were limited to going to street
protests. Further, while the Maoists who broke into
Rayamajhi’s house said that she had not “pa[id] attention to
[their] note[s],” the record does not indicate whether the
Maoists were referring to the notes’ demand for money, their
demand that Rayamajhi renounce the NSU, or both. In light
of all this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude
that Rayamajhi’s political views were “incidental,
tangential, superficial, or subordinate” to the Maoist’s
primary objective of stealing from Rayamajhi. In re J-B-N-
& S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007).
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
conclusion that Rayamajhi did not demonstrate that either
the harm she suffered or her fear of future harm bore a
sufficient nexus to a protected ground. See Siewe v.
Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007).
To the extent that Rayamajhi argues that the IJ failed
to develop the record by questioning her about her political
activities, we decline to address the issue because
Rayamajhi failed to exhaust it before the BIA. See Lin
Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir.
2007). Having found that Rayamajhi did not establish a
4
sufficient nexus to a protected ground, the agency did not
err in denying her asylum and withholding of removal. See
Jin Jin Long v. Holder, 620 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2010);
see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346 (B.I.A.
2010) (holding that “one central reason” nexus standard of
REAL ID Act applies to withholding of removal). The agency
also reasonably denied Rayamajhi CAT relief, finding that
the fact that the police investigated the break-in incident
after Rayamajhi reported it indicated that the Nepalese
government was not likely to acquiesce in any harm she might
face at the hands of the Maoists. See Khouzam v. Ashcroft,
361 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
