ORDER

JAMES G. CARR, Sr., District Judge.

This is a federal prisoner's collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

On May 4, 2011, a grand jury returned a three-count indictment against pro se petitioner Charles W. Polinski. (Doc. 1 at 1-3). Counts 1 through 3 charged Polinski with Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). On May 11, 2011, Polinski appeared before a magistrate judge with counsel and entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.

On August 1, 2011, respondent United States of America filed a four-count Superseding Information against Polinski. (Doc. 10 at 76-78). Counts 1 and 2 charged Polinski with Felon in Possession of a Firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Count 3 charged Polinski with Possession of Machine Guns under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Count 4 charged Polinski with Unregistered Manufacture of a Firearm under 26 U.S.C. § 5822.

On September 7, 2011, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Polinski, with the advice of counsel, entered guilty pleas to Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Superseding Information. (Doc. 12 at 82-95). The plea agreement included a stipulation that at sentencing Polinski would receive a four-level enhancement in his base offense level for "alteration or obliteration" of serial numbers on the weapons. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.

On September 7, 2011, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") recommending that I adopt the plea of guilty. (Doc. 13 at 96-98). I issued an order adopting the R&R on September 27, 2011. (Doc. 15 at 15-16).

On April 16, 2012, I held a sentencing hearing. I sentenced Polinski to 108 months incarceration for Counts 1 through 4, to be served concurrently, three years of post-release supervision, and a $400 special assessment. (Doc. 17 at 149-54).

On November 19, 2015, Polinski filed a Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 19 at 156-83).

In his motion, he contends that the four-level enhancement was, as a matter of law, not applicable. He asserts that he manufactured the weapon components at issue himself, and that they therefore never had serial numbers that could be altered or obliterated in the first place. That being so, he contends, he would not have plead guilty (or, at least, not consented to a plea agreement that stipulated that the enhancement applied), had he — and his lawyer — known the enhancement was inapplicable.

In response (Doc. 26), the government contends that Polinski waited too long to file his petition because he is outside the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Polinski concedes that he is outside the limitations period, but argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling. The government counters Polinski is not entitled to equitable tolling because he did not diligently pursue his claim.

The government also contends that Polinski has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel, or that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged error.

Polinski's petition raises several factual and legal questions. Among them are:

Polinski's petition thus "turn[s] on substantial and complex procedural, legal or mixed legal and factual questions." Camcho v. United States, 2010 WL 4365479, *1 (N.D. Ohio). Polinski, however, is legally unsophisticated. See id. He would certainly benefit from assistance from counsel.

I have authority to appoint Polinski counsel to assist him in pursuing his claim.4 See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). I deem it appropriate to do so. See Camcho, 2010 WL 4365479, *1 (setting forth circumstances when appointment of counsel is warranted).

It is accordingly,

ORDERED THAT:

So ordered.