GARY L. SHARPE, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Michael Gonzalez commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments against Cheryl Morris, New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) Director of Ministerial, Family and Volunteer Services, and Stanley Barton, Deputy Superintendent of Programs at Adirondack Correctional Facility. (See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 1.)
Gonzalez was a New York State prisoner at the time of the events referred to in his complaint and when he filed the complaint.
After being transferred to Adirondack Correctional Facility, (Defs.' SMF ¶ 13), Gonzalez filed another grievance because he was denied matches or a lighter to burn offerings
Upon appeal, the superintendent also denied Gonzalez's grievance. (Id. at 10.) In his appeal statement to the CORC, Gonzalez wrote, among other things, "[I]f Native Americans are accom[m]odated why can [sic] Santeria too??" (Id.) The CORC upheld the denial and clarified the limitations on shrines.
Gonzalez claims that he filed six or seven grievances. (Dkt. No. 38 ¶ 2.) However, the only other grievance in the record before the court that proceeded to a CORC decision is one concerning religious meals. (Dkt. No. 35, Attachs. 8, 19.)
Gonzalez filed the instant action pro se in November 2014. (Compl.) About a month later, while this action was pending, Gonzalez was discharged from DOCCS' custody. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2.) Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Gonzalez asserted (1) a First Amendment free exercise claim, (Compl. ¶¶ 36-38); (2) an Eighth Amendment claim, (id. ¶ 40); (3) an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, (id. ¶¶ 42-45); and (4) a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), (id. ¶¶ 30, 45(B),(H)). In a prior Decision and Order, the court dismissed Gonzalez's Eighth Amendment claim, RLUIPA claim, and all claims against defendants besides Morris and Barton. (Dkt. No. 9 at 15-16.)
Counsel appeared on behalf of Gonzalez in October 2015, (Dkt. No. 25), and discovery was reopened, (Dkt. Nos. 26-29). Pending is the remaining defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 30.)
The standard of review pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is well established and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the standard, the court refers the parties to its decision in Wagner v. Swarts, 827 F.Supp.2d 85, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd sub nom. Wagner v. Sprague, 489 F. App'x 500 (2d Cir. 2012).
Defendants make three arguments for summary judgment: (1) Gonzalez failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his equal protection claim, (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 2-6; Dkt. No. 40 at 1-3); (2) Gonzalez's First Amendment free exercise claim fails as a matter of law, (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 7-14); and (3) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, (id. at 14-15). The court addresses each of these in turn.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) states that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Here, defendants concede that Gonzalez exhausted his claim regarding the limit of one bead strand in SHU, his shrine claim, and his claim regarding the denial of matches or a lighter with respect to the First Amendment. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 6.) Defendants argue that Gonzalez's equal protection claim regarding matches or a lighter is barred as unexhausted because he did not allege that Native American prisoners receive preferential treatment until his appeal statement to the CORC. (Id.; Dkt. No. 40 at 1-3.) Gonzalez contends that equal protection is a legal theory that did not need to be explicitly stated in his grievance. (Dkt. No. 34 at 12-14.)
"In order to exhaust [a grievance] . . . inmates must provide enough information about the conduct of which they complain to allow prison officials to take appropriate responsive measures." Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004). "As in a notice pleading system, the grievant need not lay out the facts, articulate legal theories, or demand particular relief. All the grievance need do is object intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the Second Circuit "has found it appropriate to afford pro se inmates a liberal grievance pleading standard, the grievance may not be so vague as to preclude prison officials from taking appropriate measures to resolve the complaint internally." Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006).
Here, Gonzalez filed a grievance that he was denied matches or a lighter to burn offerings. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 2 at 7.) He did not articulate that Native Americans are accommodated in such a manner until his appeal statement to the CORC, (id. at 7, 9-10), and allegations brought up for the first time in an appeal to the CORC are not properly exhausted.
Courts in the Second Circuit have noted that the claim brought in federal court and the grievance filed in prison "must be predicated on the same injury." Crichlow v. Fischer, 9:17-cv-00194, 2017 WL 6466556, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 6459512 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2017); Johnson v. Annucci, No. 15-cv-3754, 2016 WL 3847745, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2016); see Rentas v. Nason, No. 09 Civ. 5528, 2010 WL 3734086, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010). That is true here; whether tied to equal protection or some other legal theory, the underlying injury—that Gonzalez could not use matches or a lighter for religious purposes—is the same in both the instant lawsuit and his exhausted grievance.
Accordingly, in light of the parties' arguments, the factual record, and the governing law, Gonzalez exhausted his equal protection claim.
Gonzalez exhausted the following First Amendment free exercise claims: his inability to build a shrine, (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 3 at 8), the denial of matches or a lighter to burn offerings, (id.), the limit on the number of bead strands that he was allowed to wear, (id. at 6), and his request for additional religious meals for Santeria, (Dkt. No. 35, Attach. 19 at 2). Although Gonzalez references other requests and grievances, (Dkt. No. 34 at 2-5), those four are the only grievances in the record that he exhausted by appealing to the CORC. See supra Part II.A.
Defendants argue that despite filing a grievance requesting additional religious meals, Gonzalez never raised such a claim in his complaint. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 2 n.2.) Gonzalez did not respond to this argument in his opposition. (See generally Dkt. No. 34.) As defendants' argument is facially meritorious, Gonzalez's failure to respond is deemed as consent to summary judgment on this claim.
"[A]lthough prisoners do not abandon their constitutional rights at the prison door, [l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system[.]" Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, "a challenged prison regulation is judged under a reasonableness test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied: a regulation that burdens a protected right passes constitutional muster if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
"The prisoner must show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs." Id. at 274-75. "The defendants then bear the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that justify the impinging conduct; the burden remains with the prisoner to show that these [articulated] concerns were irrational." Id. at 275 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Although the Second Circuit has not decided whether the substantial burden test remains viable, see Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 220-21 (2d Cir. 2014), here defendants do not contest that Gonzalez satisfies that threshold element. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 8-14.) Even assuming a substantial burden exists, however, limiting inmates in SHU to one bead strand is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests of security and safety by preventing possible suicides or other serious self-harm by inmates left alone under periodic observation twenty-three hours a day. (Id. at 9-10, 12-13.) The court accords defendants "wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979), even in the context of claimed infringement on sincere religious belief, see Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 475-76 (2d Cir.1996).
The second factor—whether prisoners have alternative means of exercising the burdened right—supports this reasonableness determination. Allowing one bead strand to be worn demonstrates that not all means of expression are denied. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 12); see Williams v. Fisher, No. 9:11-CV-379, 2015 WL 1137644, at *27 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2015) (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987)). The third factor also weighs in defendants' favor; a prisoner in SHU allowed to have multiple bead strands who committed suicide or self-harm would have serious consequences on prisoners (their health and safety), guards (increased tensions between guards and prisoners), and resources (increased burden on medical staff). (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 12-13.) Finally, as for the fourth factor, "[t]he burden is on the prisoner challenging the regulation, not on the prison officials, to show that there are obvious, easy alternatives to the regulation." Hamilton v. Smith, No. 9:06-CV-0805, 2009 WL 3199520, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Gonzalez has not met that burden because he did not offer any alternatives, let alone any obvious, easy ones. (Dkt. No. 34 at 14-17.)
Gonzalez does not provide any analysis of how the relevant factors show that the limitation is unreasonable. (Id.) Instead, he argues that defendants do not "explain the difference in potential self-harm between permitting one strand of beads, as they do, and several strands of beads." (Id. at 17.) But this argument does not suffice to meet Gonzalez's burden to show that defendants' articulated concerns are irrational. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275. As explained above, defendants' safety and security concerns are rational, and one can readily imagine strands of beads tied together posing a higher risk than one strand of beads. Gonzalez's only other argument is that "a prisoner bent on self-harm and suicide already has more than what he needs to kill himself in the form of prison linens, such as bed sheets." (Dkt. No. 34 at 17.) Not only is this argument made out of whole cloth because it has no support in the factual record, but it is also unpersuasive because it fails to rebut defendants' analysis of the relevant factors.
As for the limitation of three bead strands in general population, Gonzalez did not contest the fact that he "was never in general population at Upstate [Correctional Facility] since he was always housed in SHU." (Defs.' SMF ¶ 6.) Gonzalez was not affected by the limitation and thus has no standing to claim that it violated his rights. See Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 1057, 1059-61 (2d Cir. 1991); Smith v. Marchewka, 519 F.Supp. 897, 899 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
There is no dispute that Gonzalez was authorized to build a shrine under certain restrictions. (Defs.' SMF ¶¶ 17-19, 22, 29.) Those restrictions included that any shrine had to be limited in size, could not consist of food subject to spoilage, and could "not include any items which are contraband, can be used as a weapon[,] or constitute a threat to the safety and security of the facility." (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 3 at 8.) Such restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274. Defendants' analysis of the relevant factors is persuasive, (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 13), especially in light of the court's mandate that it should not "substitute [its] judgment on . . . difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration . . . for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a prison." O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In opposition, Gonzalez fails to provide a counterargument or any analysis of the relevant factors and barely mentions his shrine claim. (Dkt. No. 34 at 5, 15.)
The court also agrees with defendants that prohibiting inmates from possessing matches or lighters is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 274. Again, the court finds defendants' analysis of the relevant factors persuasive. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 13-14.) And, as with his shrine claim, Gonzalez
The court thus grants summary judgment on Gonzalez's First Amendment claims in defendants' favor.
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 30, Attach. 7 at 14-15.) However, their argument is generalized and conclusory. (Id.) With no explanation, defendants state that they "followed DOCCS['s] constitutional policies and acted reasonably at all times." (Id. at 15.) This is insufficient to demonstrate that it was reasonable for defendants to believe that their conduct did not violate Gonzalez's constitutional rights and that no rational jury could conclude otherwise. See LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998). Even when officials follow an established prison policy, their entitlement to qualified immunity depends on whether a reasonable official might have believed that the challenged regulation was lawful in light of the legitimate penological interests supporting the regulation, which is something defendants fail to address. See Barnes v. Furman, 629 F. App'x 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2015).
Moreover, regarding Gonzalez's equal protection claim—the only claim that survives the instant summary judgment motion—the court cannot say as a matter of law that it was objectively reasonable for defendants to believe that denying Gonzalez an accommodation afforded to Native Americans was constitutional. See id. at 56-57. And the equal protection rights of prisoners are clearly established. See, e.g., Barnes v. Ross, 926 F.Supp.2d 499, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Tavares v. Amato, 954 F.Supp.2d 79, 101 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). Defendants bear the burden of proof for their qualified immunity defense, see Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 149 (2d Cir. 2012), a burden that their lip-service argument fails to meet.
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(Compl. ¶¶ 42-45); and
