PER CURIAM.
Defendant Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) appeals from the Law Division's February 24, 2015 order denying reconsideration of its August 29, 2014 order denying UCC's motion for a protective order to restrict dissemination of certain medical records filed in workers' compensation cases. While the judge denied UCC's motion, she fashioned an alternative protective order requiring notification to the former employees. If they failed to object or respond, the former employees were deemed to have waived all privacy interests in their medical records. UCC sought reconsideration, which the court denied. UCC now appeals. Because the judge's order does not provide the privacy protection required by
We glean the following facts from the record. James F. Seymoure (decedent), was married to plaintiff Gwendolyn Seymoure. In June 2012, decedent died from mesothelioma, a cancer of the lung caused by asbestos. Decedent had worked as a truck driver for various companies over several decades.
In July 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against several defendants, including UCC, alleging they were manufacturers, suppliers, or distributors of asbestos products that decedent used or was exposed to. Among the allegations in plaintiff's complaint are claims that decedent was exposed to asbestos while making deliveries and pick-ups at UCC's Bound Brook facility.
In 2013, plaintiff filed a broad discovery request seeking workers' compensation records of UCC employees. A special master recommended compelling UCC to provide the records, but limited production to its Bound Brook facility and to the times when decedent made deliveries to that plant. UCC appealed, and the Law Division judge upheld the recommendation and ordered production of the records.
UCC then moved for a protective order, seeking to limit disclosure of the files for any purpose other than this litigation. On August 29, 2014, the judge entered an order denying UCC's motion for a protective order, but added the following handwritten provisions:
UCC moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a stay pending a motion for leave to appeal. In an order entered February 24, 2015, the judge denied both of UCC's motions. In an accompanying decision, the judge reiterated that "to the extent any medical records may have been filed in Workers' Compensation Court, those records, absent any protective orders are part of the public record."
On March 4, 2015, we granted UCC's motion for leave to appeal and a stay of that portion of the court's protective order permitting disclosure of the records to third parties pending disposition of this appeal. UCC now raises the following points:
UCC acknowledges that it must produce its workers' compensation records for plaintiff's use in this litigation, but contends that the records are confidential in nature, and are thus entitled to a protective order prohibiting further dissemination beyond this litigation. Specifically, UCC contends that its current and former employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their workers' compensation records, and that the court erred in holding that those files and documents are "part of the public record" once they have been filed in workers' compensation court. UCC argues that the court should have weighed the privacy interests of the employees against plaintiff's interest in public disclosure using the factors articulated in
Plaintiff disputes UCC's arguments and claims the issue is not yet ripe for appeal because the court has not yet had occasion to hear the arguments of an objecting employee. We address the ripeness argument first.
To determine if a case is ripe for judicial review, the court must evaluate the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties caused by withholding court consideration.
No additional facts are required for our review. Moreover, the trial court order requires UCC to notify former employees that their medical records are subject to disclosure and relies on those employees to come forward to challenge that disclosure. Under the judge's order, failure to respond is treated as a waiver of any privacy rights the former employee may have in the records. We are satisfied that this issue is fit for judicial review and there is a potential for hardship if review is withheld.
In her four-page decision denying reconsideration, the motion judge held that UCC's former and current employees would not have their privacy violated by disclosure because "to the extent any medical records may have been filed in Worker's Compensation Court, those records, absent any protective orders, are part of the public record."
While we agree that
One of the two main substantive privacy interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters[.]"
When UCC submitted a proposed protective order, it contained a provision limiting the use of confidential information "only for preparation and trial of this case." At oral argument before the motion judge, counsel for plaintiff suggested that the proposal was "unworkable" because he sought to use records obtained in this case in other litigation against UCC:
In plaintiff's brief, her counsel admits that he intends to use the employee medical records obtained in this case "to prove [UCC's] liability in other litigation." During oral argument before us, plaintiff's counsel explained that this was necessary because victims of mesothelioma have a short life expectancy and it is important to avoid discovery delays.
The order entered by the motion judge places no restrictions on future use of medical records obtained in this matter. Former employees who consent to use of medical records in this case or fail to respond, risk having those records used in other litigation, without limitation.
As the judge's protective order fails to adequately protect the privacy interests of UCC's former employees, we are remanding this matter for the entry of a more comprehensive protective order. Both
Should plaintiff seek disclosure of medical records which could possibly identify the former employee, and that individual has not consented to disclosure, the trial judge should only order production after consideration of the factors set forth in
UCC notes that most of the impacted former employees have not worked for UCC for several decades and many of them are deceased. While privacy interests are not automatically extinguished by death, the legal protection accorded to this type of privacy interest is lessened once the employee is deceased.
Finally, the interest that plaintiff's counsel has in expediting other asbestos litigation against UCC does not outweigh the privacy interests the former employees have in their medical records. Unless the former employees specifically consent to the use of their unredacted medical records beyond this litigation, the use will be limited to this matter. We are not convinced that plaintiff has demonstrated a legitimate need for disclosure beyond that secured by defendant's proposed protective order.
Reversed and remanded for entry of a protective order consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.