John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge.
After a two-week jury trial, a jury found that defendant police officers Niguel Vega and Nicolett Davodian deprived the plaintiff of her right to a fair trial and awarded the plaintiff $1,181,549 in damages for past lost earnings. The defendants have renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) and have moved under Rule 59 for a new trial or, alternatively, remittitur. For the reasons explained below, the defendants' Rule 50 motion and motion for a new trial are
It is well-established that a district court should deny a Rule 50 motion unless, "viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, `the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable [persons] could have reached.'"
Under Rule 59, a "court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues — and to any party ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained that "[a] district court may grant a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 even when there is evidence to support the jury's verdict, so long as the court `determines that, in its independent judgment, the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or its verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'"
Remittitur is the "process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose between reduction of an excessive verdict and a new trial."
The plaintiff brought this action on September 9, 2016, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law relating to a February 18, 2016 incident between the plaintiff and defendant police officers Vega and Davodian in which the plaintiff was arrested and subsequently prosecuted. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's first amended complaint, and the Court granted that motion in part, denied it in part, and dismissed several of the plaintiff's claims. The defendants then moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's remaining claims. The Court again granted the defendants' motion in part, denied it in part, and dismissed several more of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff was left with claims under § 1983 for excessive force, failure to intervene, and denial of the right to a fair trial; and claims under state law for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties tried the plaintiff's remaining claims before a jury.
Following the jury's verdict, the defendants renewed their motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and moved under Rule 59 for a new trial or, alternatively, remittitur.
There was sufficient evidence introduced at trial from which the jury reasonably could have found as follows.
On February 18, 2016, the plaintiff parked her car in a crosswalk outside a Vitamin Shoppe on the corner of 55th Street and 8th Avenue in New York City, New York. Tr. at 524, 528-29. Officers Vega and Davodian approached the plaintiff's vehicle, and Officer Vega began writing the plaintiff a ticket. Tr. at 54, 66, 530-32. The plaintiff briefly went back into the Vitamin Shoppe and then waited in her car while Officer Vega wrote the ticket. Tr. at 65-68, 530-32. However, before Officer Vega finished writing the ticket, the plaintiff got out of her car, and an altercation between the two of them took place during which Officer Vega tried to restrain the plaintiff.
Following the plaintiff's arrest, Officers Vega and Davodian spoke to Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Michael McCarthy about the incident. Sometime after 10:00 PM on the night of the incident, Officer Davodian told ADA McCarthy that the plaintiff hit both of Officer Vega's legs with her vehicle, causing swelling, bruising, and pain in Officer Vega's legs. Tr. at 330, 332. Officer Davodian also told ADA McCarthy during that conversation that the plaintiff stated, "I'm the hero. The cops are not." Tr. at 332. In one conversation, Officer Davodian told ADA McCarthy that the plaintiff also stated that "all female cops are dykes." Tr. at 340.
ADA McCarthy spoke with Officer Vega sometime within a couple weeks of the incident.
The plaintiff was charged with reckless endangerment in the second degree, N.Y. Penal L. § 120.20; resisting arrest, N.Y. Penal L. § 205.30; leaving the scene of an incident without reporting personal injury, N.Y. Veh. Traf. L. § 600(2)(a), (c); and
The plaintiff was taken to the precinct following her arrest, where she remained in confinement for about twelve hours.
The plaintiff claims that Officers Vega and Davodian collectively made four false representations to ADA McCarthy: (1) that Officer Vega was struck by the plaintiff's car, (2) that Officer Vega sustained a leg injury, (3) that the plaintiff said that she was the hero and the cops were not, and (4) that the plaintiff said that all female cops are dykes. The jury could reasonably find that the officers made each of these representations and that the representations were false.
The jury was shown slow-motion and regular-speed videos of the point of the February 18, 2016 incident at which Officer Vega was allegedly struck by the plaintiff's car, as well as still photos derived from the videos. And the plaintiff testified that she did not hit Officer Vega with her vehicle. Tr. at 545-46. She added that she had checked to make sure there was space between Officer Vega and her vehicle before accelerating and that she did not feel any impact upon driving away. Tr. at 545-46. Moreover, two of the defendants' eye witnesses could not confirm that the plaintiff's vehicle contacted Officer Vega. Tr. at 1028, 1050.
Additionally, the jury was shown emergency room records from the day of the incident stating that Officer Vega suffered no bruising, swelling, redness, bleeding, loss of range of motion, or loss of sensation in the leg he claimed the plaintiff hit with her car. Trial Ex. I. And the plaintiff's expert witness testified that, based on the medical records, he did not believe that Officer Vega sustained an injury as a result of being allegedly hit by the plaintiff's car; he also testified that there was no objective evidence of such an injury. Tr. at 470-71. Additionally, Officer Davodian testified that she did not actually see any bruising or swelling on Officer Vega's legs, Tr. at 265, and Officer Vega testified that he did not develop any bruising on his leg on the day of the incident or the days after, Tr. at 129.
Finally, the plaintiff denied making either of the inflammatory statements relayed to ADA McCarthy by Officers Vega and Davodian, Tr. at 531, 554, and the defendants presented no evidence that the plaintiff made these statements to the defendant
As of February 18, 2016, the plaintiff was employed as a cancer surgeon at Montefiore Medical Center where she earned $450,000 annually and was eligible to earn a $25,000 yearly bonus. Tr. at 520-21. The plaintiff was placed on paid administrative leave shortly after the February 18 incident and was ultimately terminated from her position at Montefiore on July 5, 2016. Tr. at 573, 828, 839, 841, 903. Among other damages, the plaintiff sought damages for past lost earnings caused by her termination. The plaintiff's damages expert calculated the plaintiff's past lost earnings — from the time of the plaintiff's termination to the time of the expert's testimony — to be $1,181,549. Tr. at 904. This figure represented what the plaintiff would have earned had she continued working at Montefiore as a cancer surgeon during that period. Tr. at 903-04.
Dr. Michler, the surgeon-in-chief of Montefiore's Healthcare System, testified about the plaintiff's termination. Dr. Michler hired the plaintiff in the summer of 2015. Tr. at 825. He was also involved in the decision to terminate the plaintiff. Tr. at 830. Dr. Michler learned of the plaintiff's arrest through another Montefiore surgeon shortly after the arrest occurred and then saw a news article and news story about the arrest. Tr. at 827. Upon learning of the plaintiff's arrest, Dr. Michler immediately formed the opinion that the plaintiff should be terminated. Tr. at 841-42, 856. Dr. Michler testified,
Tr. at 829.
After initially hearing about the plaintiff's arrest from another Montefiore surgeon, Dr. Michler learned the details of the arrest primarily from the press.
The plaintiff testified that, following her termination, she was unable to obtain employment despite applying to "50 places or more" and receiving offers to interview at some of these places. Tr. at 572-77. The plaintiff attributed her inability to gain
With respect to the plaintiff's denial of the right to a fair trial claim, the Court instructed the jury as follows:
Tr. at 1213. The jury returned a special verdict form finding that Officers Vega and Davodian both denied the plaintiff her right to a fair trial. Tr. at 1270-71. The jury awarded the plaintiff $1,181,549 in damages representing past lost earnings, matching the figure to which the plaintiff's damages expert testified. Tr. at 904, 1271.
The defendants argue that no reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiff was denied her right to a fair trial by either defendant officer because: (1) the plaintiff presented no evidence that she suffered a deprivation of liberty due to the defendant officers' telling ADA McCarthy that the plaintiff struck and injured Officer Vega with her vehicle, (2) none of the allegedly fabricated statements were material to the charges brought against the plaintiff, and (3) recent Supreme Court precedent requires the plaintiff to prove that the proceedings terminated in her favor, which she failed to do. None of these arguments are persuasive.
The plaintiff may prove the deprivation of liberty element of her denial of the right to a fair trial claim by proving that, because of fabricated evidence, she made several court appearances and suffered some other restriction.
The defendants argue that there was no evidence that the plaintiff's deprivation of liberty was caused by the fabricated information because the plaintiff was lawfully arrested for — and could be charged on the basis of — parking illegally in a crosswalk, resisting Officer Vega's attempts to restrain her, and driving away from the scene. But ADA McCarthy testified that he relied on the statements of Officers Davodian and Vega, and that their claim that Officer Vega was struck and injured by the plaintiff's vehicle was important to his decision to bring charges. A reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff did not hit or injure Officer Vega with her vehicle, the defendant officers fabricated that evidence, ADA McCarthy would not have brought all four charges against the plaintiff but-for that fabricated evidence, and, as a result, the plaintiff would not have been held for the length of time the plaintiff was detained or required to make four court appearances.
Officer Davodian spoke with ADA McCarthy the night of the incident in question. A reasonable jury could conclude that if Officer Davodian had not told ADA McCarthy that night that the plaintiff struck and injured Officer Vega with her vehicle, the plaintiff would not have spent as much time detained at the precinct and Central Booking.
Therefore, the defendants' argument that the defendant officers' fabrication of evidence did not cause the plaintiff any deprivation of liberty fails.
The defendants also argue that the plaintiff did not show that the evidence Officers Vega and Davodian allegedly fabricated was material to the charges brought against the plaintiff. But, as stated above, ADA McCarthy found the officers' statements about the plaintiff's hitting and injuring Officer Vega with her car to be important in his decision to bring charges. A reasonable jury could certainly find that this information, which was important to the prosecutor's charging decision, was material — or, likely to influence a jury in the plaintiff's criminal case.
The defendants next argue that the recent Supreme Court decision
512 U.S. at 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The petitioner in
In
The plaintiff's denial of the right to a fair trial claim is a paradigm case where her claim does not question the validity of her conviction for the "offense" of disorderly conduct based on her parking in a crosswalk and obstructing pedestrian traffic. She never contested that issue. All of the misdemeanor charges against the plaintiff were dropped, including specifically the two charges as to which the alleged false evidence applied — namely the charge of leaving the scene of an incident without reporting personal injury and reckless endangerment in the second degree. Thus, her denial of the right to a fair trial claim only accrued under
Finally, the defendants contend that the past lost earnings the plaintiff suffered due to her termination from Montefiore are unrelated to the deprivation of liberty she
The parties agree that damages for past lost earnings can be awarded following a finding that a plaintiff has been denied the right to a fair trial. Pl.'s Supp'l Br. at 2-3; Defs.' Supp'l Br. at 3. Moreover, that proposition is supported by cases involving denial of the right to a fair trial claims and similar claims.
The defendants contend that the evidence Officers Vega and Davodian fabricated related only to one of the four criminal charges filed against the plaintiff: leaving the scene of an incident without reporting personal injury. The defendants maintain that because the other charges could have been brought against the plaintiff notwithstanding the fabricated evidence, her prosecution was valid and any damages resulting from her prosecution are not attributable to the officers' fabrication of evidence.
However, ADA McCarthy also testified that the evidence related to the plaintiff's hitting Officer Vega with her vehicle was "an important part" of the reckless endangerment charge brought against the plaintiff. Tr. at 343. And in any event, the jury found generally that the plaintiff was denied her right to a fair trial; it did not, and was not required to, attribute any such denial to a particular criminal charge for which the plaintiff was prosecuted. There can be more than one cause of a tort,
The defendants next argue that even if the fabricated evidence led to the plaintiff's deprivation of liberty — namely, her detention and subsequent related court appearances — it did not cause her to be terminated from her job. This argument has some force.
The plaintiff elicited testimony about the reasons for her termination solely from Dr. Michler,
The plaintiff points out that Dr. Michler testified that his decision to terminate the plaintiff was based upon his belief that the plaintiff struck a police officer with a vehicle and made a statement along the lines of "I'm the hero. The cops are not." Because this is the same evidence that the jury reasonably could have found to be fabricated by the defendant officers to ADA McCarthy, the plaintiff argues that the jury reasonably could have attributed the plaintiff's termination to the fabrication. But no evidence connects the fabricated evidence given to ADA McCarthy with the Montefiore surgeon who notified Dr. Michler of the plaintiff's arrest or the news sources through which Dr. Michler learned the details of the plaintiff's arrest when he decided to terminate her employment. And the plaintiff neither pleaded this connection in her first amended complaint nor pursued it throughout this litigation. In fact, in pleading a defamation claim in her first amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant officers themselves provided news agencies false information concerning the plaintiff's arrest.
Thus, the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to the jury that the fabricated evidence provided to the prosecutor on which her denial of the right to a fair trial claim was based, or the deprivation of liberty she suffered as a result, were substantial factors in her termination from Montefiore. And the plaintiff's past lost earnings claim for damages was based entirely on her termination — the $1,181,549 figure represented what she would have earned as a cancer surgeon at Montefiore between the time she was terminated and the time her damages expert testified at trial. Thus, a reasonable jury could not have awarded past lost earnings as compensation for the plaintiff's being denied her right to a fair trial.
An award of $1,181,549 as damages for denial of the right to a fair trial is plainly excessive and conscience-shocking where, as here, the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence connecting the defendant officers' fabrication of evidence, or the attendant deprivation of liberty she suffered, to the loss amount. But the record does support the conclusion that the defendant officers' conduct deprived the plaintiff of her liberty. The plaintiff was detained for about twenty-four hours, at least some of which a reasonable jury could attribute to the fabrications Officer Davodian made to ADA McCarthy the night of the plaintiff's arrest. The plaintiff was also prosecuted on four criminal charges and she made four court appearances related to those charges, and Officer Vega also provided information for those charges that the jury could find was false.
Because the plaintiff was deprived of her liberty, the Court should not negate all damages awarded to the plaintiff but rather remit the amount of damages from $1,181,549 to $200,000. This amount is in line with similar cases and, while not including damages for lost earnings, which are not supported, provides compensation for "physical injury, pain and suffering, mental anguish, shock, [or] sharp discomfort."
The plaintiff may accept $200,000 in damages or else retry the case solely on the issue of damages.
The Court has considered all the arguments raised by the parties. To the extent
The Clerk is directed to close docket number 210.
Although the jury did not award the plaintiff general compensatory damages in its verdict, the jury reasonably could have awarded such damages but refrained from doing so in light of the large amount it awarded in damages for past lost earnings.