Filed: Aug. 20, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2017
Summary: 11-4230 BIA Guo v. Holder A076 505 552 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMAR
Summary: 11-4230 BIA Guo v. Holder A076 505 552 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY..
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11-4230 BIA
Guo v. Holder A076 505 552
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL
RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 20th day of August, two thousand twelve.
PRESENT:
GUIDO CALABRESI,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
REN YONG GUO,
Petitioner,
v. 11-4230
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
FOR PETITIONER: Fuhao Yang, Law Offices of Fuhao
Yang PLLC, New York, New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Holly M. Smith,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Elizabeth
D. Kurlan, Trial Attorney; Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for
review is DENIED.
Petitioner Ren Yong Guo, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 15,
2011, decision of the BIA denying Guo’s motion to reopen.
In re Ren Yong Guo, No. A076 505 552 (B.I.A. Sept. 15,
2011). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for
abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s
admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v.
Gonzales,
448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Aliens seeking to
reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later
than 90 days after the date on which the final
administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is
undisputed that Guo’s July 2009 motion to reopen was
untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal
in April 2002. However, the time limitation for filing a
motion to reopen does not apply if the motion is “based on
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changed country conditions arising in the country of
nationality or the country to which removal has been
ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available
and would not have been discovered or presented at the
previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see
also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).
In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion
in denying Guo’s motion to reopen as untimely. Guo’s
decision to join the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) in the
United States constitutes a self-induced change in personal
circumstances that did not merit an exception to the time
limitation. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,
437 F.3d 270, 274
(2d Cir. 2006).
Further, although Guo argues that he provided articles
and a statement describing the arrest and detention of CDP
members and political activists in China, those materials do
not describe a change in country conditions since Guo’s
September 2000 hearing. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
247, 253 (BIA 2007) (holding that in evaluating evidence of
changed country conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence
of country conditions submitted with the motion to those
that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, Guo’s pending
motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as
moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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