SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Junior Walker and Tahera Bullen-Walker, on behalf of themselves and their infant children, T.W. and N.W. ("Plaintiffs"), appeal from a judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellants, the City of New York and various officers and employees of the New York City Administration for Children's Services ("ACS") (collectively, "Defendants"), on Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. After a source at T.W.'s school reported a possible incident of abuse, ACS began an investigation that eventually resulted in the removal of T.W. and N.W. from the family's home. ACS commenced and then pursued neglect proceedings against Mr. Walker in New York State Family Court. During a hearing conducted within a week of the removal, Family Court Judge Bryanne Hamill made on-the-record findings, following an in camera interview and examination of T.W., that T.W. was "afraid of his father" and "in this Court's opinion has been beaten." J.A. 201-02. However, the State Central Registry ultimately determined that the allegations were unsubstantiated, and, more than two years after the proceedings had commenced, the Family Court dismissed ACS's petitions. Plaintiffs then commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various constitutional violations and related state law claims. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. See Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2009). Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The reviewing court "must construe the facts in the light most favorable to" the party against whom summary judgment was granted and "must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences" in favor of that party. Beyer v. Cty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). "We may affirm . . . on any basis for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds upon which the district court did not rely." Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1993).

"[I]t is well settled that child protective services workers are entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct during the course of abuse investigations." Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 1999). In deciding whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, courts conduct a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether the facts before the court establish the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In analyzing the second prong, the standard is one of objective reasonableness. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986).

We have "adopted a standard governing case workers which reflects the recognized need for unusual deference in the abuse investigation context." Wilkinson, 182 F.3d at 104. Under that deferential standard, "[a]n investigation passes constitutional muster provided simply that case workers have a `reasonable basis' for their findings of abuse." Id. (citation omitted). At the same time, case workers are not "free to substantiate a claim of abuse . . . by ignoring overwhelming exculpatory information or by manufacturing false evidence." Id.

We agree with the district court that the record is devoid of evidence that Defendants perjured themselves or manufactured false evidence. None of the alleged misstatements or inconsistencies identified by Plaintiffs rises to the level of a due process violation. Cf. Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[T]his Court has found no constitutional violation where caseworkers allegedly committed `sins of commission and omission in what they told and failed to tell . . . the Family Court Judge.'" (quoting van Emrik v. Chemung Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1990))). Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process claims.1

We likewise affirm the district court's grant of qualified immunity with respect to the children's Fourth Amendment seizure claims. The children were removed pursuant to Family Court orders, and the individuals effecting their removal were thus entitled to qualified immunity absent "a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement" in procuring the removal orders. Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 146 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted). Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence to suggest that the alleged misstatements resulted from more than mere negligence.

Turning to Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims, we note that the law in our Circuit is unsettled as to whether child removal proceedings can give rise to a federal claim for malicious prosecution of a parent. See, e.g., Estiverne v. Esernio-Jenssen, 833 F.Supp.2d 356, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). We need not resolve this question at present, however, as Plaintiffs base their malicious prosecution claims on the same allegations of fabricated evidence that form the basis of their due process claims. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, no factual questions remain with respect to whether Mr. Walker was maliciously prosecuted.

Finally, Plaintiffs allege retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, arguing that Mr. Walker's objections to the ACS investigation motivated Defendants' conduct. Even if there were sufficient evidence to support such an inference of retaliatory intent in this case (an issue we do not reach), the existence of a "reasonable basis" for the removal proceedings would defeat Plaintiffs' claims. Cf. Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[B]ecause defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff, an inquiry into the underlying motive for the arrest need not be undertaken."); Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 1995) ("We have held previously that if the officer either had probable cause or was qualifiedly immune from subsequent suit (due to an objectively reasonable belief that he had probable cause), then we will not examine the officer's underlying motive in arresting and charging the plaintiff."). We thus affirm the grant of summary judgment on the First Amendment claims.2

We have considered Plaintiffs' remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.