SIDNEY A. FITZWATER, District Judge.
In this removed action, plaintiff Paul Bernard Gorman, Jr. ("Gorman") moves the court to determine the applicability of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001 (West 2015). For the reasons explained, the court concludes that § 18.001 applies in this case, and it sets deadlines for filing affidavits and controverting affidavits under § 18.001.
This is a suit by Gorman to recover from defendant ESA Management, LLC ("ESA") for injuries from a rat bite that he sustained while a guest at an Extended Stay America hotel. He originally sued ESA
Gorman now seeks a determination that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001 applies in this case. In opposition, ESA maintains that § 18.001 is a purely procedural statute that should not apply in this diversity case, but it acknowledges that "the use of § 18.001 can shorten the length of trials and reduce cost in personal injury cases." D. Br. 1. ESA requests that, if the court determines that certain portions of § 18.001 constitute substantive Texas law and allows Gorman to attempt to prove the cost and necessity of medical services via the mechanism the statute provides, the court impose a deadline by which such affidavits must be filed and a deadline for ESA to serve controverting affidavits.
Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001(b) provides:
Based on the current state of the law, the court concludes that § 18.001(b) is a substantive provision of Texas law that applies in this case. See, e.g., Butler v. United States, No. 3:15-CV-2969-M, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2017) (Lynn, C.J.) (order) (overruling objections to plaintiff's exhibits and holding that § 18.001(b) applied in Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") case governed by state substantive law); Bowman v. Cheeseman, LLC, 2014 WL 11515575, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2014) (Godbey, J.) (declining to strike § 18.001 affidavits and noting that Texas courts have indicated that § 18.001 "is more properly understood as a rule of sufficiency of the evidence than as a rule of evidence admissibility."); Rahimi v. United States, 474 F.Supp.2d 825, 829 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (Sanderson, J.) ("Were the court to find that section 18.001 embodies only state procedural law, it would deprive Plaintiff of means to avoid the significantly more expensive and time-consuming alternatives to proving damages which would otherwise be available in a personal injury action brought in a Texas state court."); but see Holland v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-3780, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2016) (Lindsay, J.) (order) (granting motion to strike affidavits in FTCA case, and stating that "[s]ince Rahimi, however, the Texas Supreme Court has explicitly characterized Section 18.001 as `purely procedural,'" and concluding that § 18.001(b) did not apply in FTCA case governed by state substantive law (quoting Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 397 (Tex. 2011))).
To the extent that § 18.001(d) imposes deadlines for filing affidavits and controverting affidavits,
Gorman's motion to determine the applicability of Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001 is granted to the extent the court concludes that § 18.001(b) applies in this case and sets deadlines for complying with the procedure under § 18.001.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001(d) (West 2015).