LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge.
Plaintiffs bring this action against six Defendants who are current or former government officials in Myanmar
Plaintiffs bring this action under the ATS and TVPA asserting that Defendants are responsible for genocide, torture, arbitrary detention, and other violations of U.S. and international law. On February 12, 2016, the United States filed a Suggestion of Immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 informing the Court that the Executive Branch recognizes Defendants Thein Sein and Wunna Maung Lwin, the President and Foreign Minister of Myanmar, respectively, as immune from suit. Attached to the Government's submission is a letter from Deputy Legal Adviser Katherine D. McManus of the U.S. Department of State to Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer of the U.S. Department of Justice, which states:
This Court is required by common law to recognize the State Department's Suggestion of Immunity for Defendants Thein Sein and Wunna Maung Lwin and therefore lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against them.
Under the two-step procedure developed after Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), a foreign sovereign can request a "suggestion of immunity" from the State Department. If the State Department files a "suggestion of immunity," the "district court surrender[s] its jurisdiction." Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2012).
The Federal Judiciary is bound by the Executive's decision to recognize immunity. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943) ("When the Secretary [of State] elects . . . to settle claims . . . rather than by continued litigation in the courts, it is public of importance that the action of the political arm of the Government taken within its appropriate sphere be promptly recognized. . . ."); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ("It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize."). As Schooner Exchange made clear, decisions to grant foreign immunity are a matter of "grace and comity," rather than imposed by the Constitution, and ones in which the courts have routinely deferred to the political branches. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). If the State Department declines to recognize immunity, a district court then "ha[s] authority to decide for itself whether all the requisites for such immunity exist[]." Samantar, 560 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 587)).
Here, the United States filed a Suggestion of Immunity on February 12, 2016, showing that the U.S. Department of State recognizes Defendants Thein Sein and Wunna Maung Lwin as immune from the jurisdiction of this Court while they remain in office. Therefore, this Court is bound by the Executive Branch's determination that these Defendants are immune from suit while in office. Accordingly, this Court has no jurisdiction over these Defendants while they remain in office. Defendants' immunity similarly precludes efforts to serve them with process while they are in office. See Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 628 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Executive's "power to preclude service of process in that same suit. . . .").
Plaintiffs make multiple arguments that exceptions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1602, et seq., allow for suit against Defendants Thein Sein and Wunna Maung Lwin. These arguments fail because, as foreign officials, the immunity of these Defendants is determined by common law, not the FSIA. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 324.
In 1976, Congress passed the FSIA, codifying the legal standards for foreign sovereign immunity and transferring from the Executive Branch to the Judicial Branch the responsibility for determining foreign sovereign immunity when a foreign state is subject to suit.
Plaintiffs also argue that common law provides no immunity where officials violates jus cogens or the norms of international law and act outside of their lawful authority. The Second Circuit has expressly rejected this argument — "A claim premised on the violation of jus cogens does not withstand foreign sovereign immunity." Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d. Cir. 2009); see also Ye, 383 F.3d at 627 ("The Executive Branch's determination that a foreign leader should be immune from suit even where the leader is accused of acts that violate jus cogens norms is established by a suggestion of immunity."). Courts routinely dismiss on grounds of immunity cases against heads of state and foreign officials who faced similar claims as those in this case. See American Justice Center et al. v. Modi, 14 Civ. 7780 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2015) (dismissing an action brought under the TVPA and ATS against Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India for the alleged massacre of Muslims in Gujarat); Tawfik v. al-Sabah, No. 11 Civ. 6455, 2012 WL 3542209, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) (dismissing claims brought under the TVPA and ATS against Sheik Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, the Emir and sitting head of state of the State of Kuwait for torture and other alleged violations of U.S and international law committed against Egyptian citizens working for democratic change); Manoharan v. Rajapaksa, 711 F.3d 178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court's dismissal of claims brought against the President of Sri Lanka under the TVPA).
Similarly, Plaintiffs maintain that the TVPA or ATS provide federal jurisdiction and that claims brought under these acts survive the assertion of sovereign immunity. Again, the Second Circuit has rejected this argument. In Matar v. Dichter, the Second Circuit held that a foreign official facing claims brought under the TVPA is immune from suit under common law principles of immunity, and that the TVPA would only "apply to any individual whom the Executive declines to immunize." 563 F.3d at 15; see also American Justice Center et al., 14 Civ. 7780 (claims under the TVPA and ATS did not override or create an exception to Executive Branch determination of foreign official immunity); Tawfik, 2012 WL 3542209, at *3-4 (recognizing the Court was bound recognize immunity determination of Executive Branch despite allegations under the TVPA); Manoharan, 711 F.3d at 180 ("[T]he common law of head of state immunity survived enactment of the TVPA.") (citing Matar, 563 F.3d at 15).
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Act of State doctrine does not shield Defendants Thein Sein and Wunna Maung Lwin from suit. This argument does not overcome the fact that this Court is bound to accept the suggestion of immunity by the Executive Branch.
Despite Plaintiffs' serious allegations that Defendants committed heinous acts of persecution, torture, and genocide against members of the Rohingya minority community, I am bound by the Executive Branch's decision to recognize Thein Sein and Wunna Maung Lwin as immune from the jurisdiction of this Court while they remain in office.
SO ORDERED.