KATHLEEN B. BURKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Debbie Jean Smith ("Plaintiff" or "Smith") seeks judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). Doc. 1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.2.
The ALJ stated that he gave some weight to the opinion of consultative examining physician Dr. Paul T. Scheatzle that Smith would require more frequent rest breaks than the average worker. However, the ALJ failed to account for that limitation in his residual functional capacity ("RFC") assessment and failed to explain the reason for omitting that limitation from the RFC. Accordingly, the Court should
On or about November 24, 2009, Smith filed an application for DIB.
In his December 8, 2011, decision, the ALJ determined that Smith had not been under a disability from May 8, 2008, through the date of the decision. Tr. 17-30. Smith requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council. Tr. 10-11. On March 16, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Smith's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 4-6.
Smith was born in 1957 and was 54 years old at the time of the hearing. Tr. 45, 46, 112. She is married and lives with her husband in a one-story home. Tr. 46. She has one son and two grandchildren. Tr. 584. She has no dependent children and no one else resides with Smith and her husband. Tr. 46. She has a high school education. Tr. 47. She last worked in 2008. Tr. 47. During the administrative hearing, Smith indicated that she stopped working because of "[t]he pain and everything that I have with my health issues." Tr. 47.
Smith has a reported history of depression beginning in her teenage years (Tr. 530) with some outpatient mental health treatment in 1999 and 2000 (Tr. 210-224). On January 11, 2011, Smith saw psychiatrist Rajnikant Kothari, M.D., for an initial evaluation. Tr. 584-593. She reported that her primary care physician had prescribed her Wellbutrin and Effexor. Tr. 586. She had not started the Wellbutrin because she had concerns about adding another medication. Tr. 586. Dr. Kothari concluded that Smith had major depressive disorder and advised Smith to continue the Effexor, add Wellbutrin, and follow up in four weeks. Tr. 585.
Smith saw Dr. Kothari on February 8, 2011, and reported side effects from the Wellbutrin. Tr. 606. She was very nervous. Tr. 606. Dr. Kothari continued the Effexor and prescribed Remeron. Tr. 606. Thereafter, Smith saw Dr. Kothari on June 27, 2011. Tr. 606. She was anxious and felt hopeless, helpless. Tr. 606. She had gained weight and wanted to change her medication. Tr. 606. Dr. Kothari made changes to her medication. Tr. 606.
On July 12, 2011, Dr. Kothari completed a Medical Source Statement wherein he offered his opinions with respect to Smith's abilities in the areas of social interaction (Section A); sustained concentration and persistence (Section B); and adaptation (Section C).
In the area of social interaction, Dr. Kothari rated Smith's ability to work in coordination with or close proximity to others without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes as moderately impaired. Tr. 608. He rated her ability to accept instruction from or respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors or superiors; respond appropriately to co-workers or peers; and relate to the general public and maintain socially appropriate behavior as moderately to severely impaired. Tr. 608.
In the area of sustained concentration and persistence, Dr. Kothari rated Smith's ability to carry through simple instructions and complete uncomplicated tasks independently as slightly impaired. Tr. 608. He rated her ability to work in cooperation with or in proximity to others without being distracted by them and her ability to use appropriate judgment in a work setting as moderately impaired. Tr. 608. He rated her ability to perform and complete work tasks at a consistent pace as moderately to severely impaired. Tr. 608.
In the area of adaptation, Dr. Kothari rated Smith's ability to care for herself and her ability to tolerate low stress work on a sustained basis as slightly impaired. Tr. 609. He rated her ability to respond appropriately to change in a work setting and her ability to remember locations and workday procedures and instructions as moderately impaired. Tr. 608. He rated her ability to behave predictably, reliably and in an emotionally stable manner as moderately to severely impaired. Tr. 609. He rated her ability to tolerate high stress on a sustained basis as severely impaired. Tr. 608-609. Dr. Kothari also noted that Smith's condition was likely to deteriorate if she was placed under stress of a job because she "becomes inappropriate in her reactions to others or she walks out. She cannot tolerate any stress without being verbally aggressive." Tr. 609.
On August 4, 2010, William E. Mohler, M.A., saw Smith for a consultative evaluation. Tr. 529-532. He diagnosed Smith with depressive disorder NOS and anxiety disorder NOS. Tr. 531. He assessed a GAF of 60.
Tr. 532.
On September 24, 2010, Paul T. Scheatzle, D.O., saw Smith and completed a consultative physical evaluation. Tr. 554-560. He offered the following opinions regarding her limitations:
Tr. 559-560.
On October 12, 2010, state agency reviewing physician Arthur Sagone, M.D., reviewed Smith's file and offered his opinions with respect to Smith's physical impairments. Tr. 566-573. He opined that Smith could perform light work with frequent climbing of ramps and stairs and only occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; balancing; stooping; kneeling; crouching; and crawling. Tr. 567-568. Smith was limited in her ability to reach, including overhead reaching. Tr. 569. Smith was not limited in her ability to handle, finger, or feel. Tr. 569. He indicated that Smith had no visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. Tr. 569-570.
Dr. Sagone agreed with Dr. Scheatzle's opinion that Smith would be capable of light work. Tr. 572. However, Dr. Sagone disagreed with Dr. Scheatzle's opinion that Smith would require a change of position every 30 minutes and would require more frequent rest breaks than the average worker due to fibromyalgia. Tr. 572. Dr. Sagone disagreed with that portion of Dr. Scheatzle's opinion because he believed that those opinions were based on Smith's self-reports, which, according to Dr. Sagone, were of limited credibility. Tr. 572. Thus, Dr. Sagone gave only partial weight to Dr. Scheatzle's opinions. Tr. 572.
Smith was represented by counsel and testified at the hearing as follows (Tr. 45-63):
Smith discussed the problems that she has had with her feet, including a ganglion cyst and arthritis. Tr. 47-48. She has had three surgeries on her right foot and stated that her left foot is getting worse. Tr. 47-48. As a result of the problems with her feet, Smith stated that she can stand for about 10 minutes at time before having to sit down. Tr. 48. She has to sit for a couple of minutes before starting to walk again. Tr. 49. She also indicated that she can sit for only about 10 minutes at a time. Tr. 48. Based on walking her dog around her yard, she estimated being able to walk about 50 or 60 steps or about 10 minutes. Tr. 48-49. She does not have any problems with driving. Tr. 49. She can lift about a gallon of milk. Tr. 49.
In November 2010, Smith went to the foot and ankle clinic and reported that her orthotics were not helping. Tr. 55. She had new orthotics made and they help with her arches. Tr. 55. As a result of having a bone removed from her foot, it still hurts to walk. Tr. 55. She is seeking additional treatment to address that issue. Tr. 55. Smith described her fibromyalgia as feeling like she has the flu 24 hours a day. Tr. 55. She aches, has burning pain, and swelling. Tr. 55. She likes to lie down and apply a heating pad everywhere. Tr. 55. She has had trigger point injections on several occasions. Tr. 55. The injections help for about two to four weeks. Tr. 56. She indicated that her restless leg syndrome makes her feel like she has been jogging non-stop. Tr. 56. Her hips and back are constantly hurting. Tr. 61. During the hearing, Smith was up and down two or three times because of her pain. Tr. 61. For pain in her hips and feet, Smith takes prescription Naproxen and Arthritis Tylenol. Tr. 58. Because of her pain, Smith lies down three or four times for an hour at a time during the day. Tr. 62.
When discussing her depression, Smith stated that she cries a lot, does not want to be around people, and feels worthless. Tr. 56. She takes medication which helps. Tr. 56. Beginning in January 2011, Smith started mental health treatment with a new doctor, Dr. Kothari. Tr. 56-57. Prior to seeing Dr. Kothari, Smith's family care physician prescribed medication for her depression. Tr. 57-58. Also, prior to 2008, Smith had seen a different doctor for mental health treatment. Tr. 57.
Smith described her typical day as including waking at 7:00 a.m., letting her dog out,
Smith's sister and her friends visit her on occasion. Tr. 52. They usually talk and have coffee or tea. Tr. 52. She enjoys reading. Tr. 52. Because she has difficultly sitting, when reading, she reads a little, gets up, and then can sit back down and continue reading. Tr. 59.
Smith had recently been seen for congestive heart failure. Tr. 53. Her doctor recommended that she use a CPAP machine and that she see a cardiologist because she stopped breathing every 45 seconds while she was sleeping. Tr. 53. She reported that the CPAP machine was helping her breathe and sleep. Tr. 53.
In September 2009, Smith was kicked by a horse while putting grain out on the family's farm.
Vocational Expert Mary Beth Copar ("VE") testified at the hearing. Tr. 63-70. The VE described Smith's past work. Tr. 65. She worked as (1) a deli worker, an unskilled, light level position;
The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual of Smith's age and with the same educational and work experience as Smith who is able to lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; can stand and walk for 6 hours during an 8-hour day and sit for 6 hours during an 8-hour day; requires a sit/stand option with a change in positions every hour; can perform occasional overhead reaching; can understand, remember and carry out simple one to two-step job instructions, but would be unable to perform work that would require directing others, abstract thought or planning; can maintain attention and concentration to perform simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements or quotas; can have only superficial contact with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public
The VE indicated that the described individual would be unable to perform Smith's past work. Tr. 67. The VE also indicated, however, that the described individual would be able to perform other work, including (1) marker, an unskilled, light level position, with over 300,000 positions available nationally and approximately 2,000 locally; (2) order caller, an unskilled, light level position, with over 250,000 positions available nationally and approximately 2,000 locally; and (3) ticket seller, an unskilled, light level position, with over 250,000 positions available nationally and approximately 2,500 locally.
In response to questions from Smith's counsel, the VE indicated that, if the hypothetical individual was limited to sitting for no more than 4 hours in an 8-hour workday and standing for no more than 4 hours in an 8-hour workday, the VE's testimony regarding the availability of jobs would not change. Tr. 69. The VE also indicated that, as long as the individual did not stray from her work area, the listed jobs could be performed sitting or standing and would remain available to the individual if she had to change position every 10 minutes because of physical impairments, i.e., sit for 10 minutes and then stand for a few minutes before sitting again. Tr. 69. The VE further indicated that, in order to maintain employment, an individual would need to be on task 85% of the workday and be off task no more than 15% of the workday. Tr. 69-70. Finally, if an individual required 4 additional 10-minute breaks, in addition to the normal mid-morning and mid-afternoon break, there would be no work available to that individual. Tr. 70.
Under the Act, 42 U.S.C § 423(a), eligibility for benefit payments depends on the existence of a disability. "Disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Furthermore:
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2).
In making a determination as to disability under this definition, an ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis set out in agency regulations. The five steps can be summarized as follows:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42, 96 L. Ed. 2d 119, 107 S.Ct. 2287 (1987). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the burden of proof at Steps One through Four. Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at Step Five to establish whether the claimant has the RFC and vocational factors to perform work available in the national economy. Id.
In his December 8, 2011, decision, the ALJ found that:
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ determined that Smith had not been under a disability from May 8, 2008, through the date of the decision. Tr. 30.
With respect to her mental impairments, Smith argues that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of her treating psychiatrist Rajnikant Kothari, M.D., and the opinion of consultative examining psychologist William Mohler, M.A. Doc. 15, pp. 7-13. She asserts that, although the limitations included in both opinions were consistent with each other and/or supported by the record, the ALJ did not appropriately account for those limitations in the RFC. Doc. 15, pp. 7-13. In particular, Smith argues that Dr. Mohler and Dr. Kothari both found that Smith had marked limitations in her ability to withstand the stress and pressures of day-to-day work but the ALJ failed to include limitations on stress tolerance in the RFC. Doc. 15, p. 10. Additionally, Smith argues that the ALJ did not give appropriate weight and/or failed to adequately explain the weight provided to the opinions and failed to provide "good reasons" for the weight provided. Doc. 15, pp. 13-17.
With respect to her physical impairments, Smith argues that the ALJ did not properly account for limitations contained in consultative examining physician Paul T. Scheatzle's opinion. Doc. 15, pp. 13-18. Smith asserts that, although the ALJ provided some weight to the opinion of Dr. Scheatzle, he failed to account for Dr. Scheatzle's opinion that Smith would require more frequent rest breaks than the average worker due to her fibromyalgia. Doc. 15, pp. 13-18.
Defendant asserts that the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Dr. Kothari and Dr. Mohler when determining Smith's RFC. Doc. 17, pp. 11-14. She argues that the ALJ's decision to provide little weight to Dr. Kothari's opinion and the ALJ's reasons for the weight given that opinion are supported by substantial evidence. Doc. 17, pp. 11-13. Further, Defendant points out that the ALJ explained why he gave only some weight to Dr. Mohler's opinion regarding Smith's ability to adapt and argues that the ALJ was not obligated to provide greater weight to Dr. Kothari's opinion simply because Dr. Mohler's opinion was consistent with that opinion. Doc. 17, pp. 13-14.
With respect to Smith's argument that the ALJ did not properly account for Dr. Scheatzle's opinion, the Defendant asserts that the ALJ appropriately gave only some weight to that opinion and the record as a whole does not support Dr. Scheatzle's opinion that Smith would require more frequent rest breaks than the average worker. Doc. 17, pp. 14-18. In support of her argument, Defendant points to the fact that state agency reviewing physician Arthur Sagone, M.D., concluded that Dr. Scheatzle's opinion was only entitled to partial weight because his opinions appeared to be based on Smith's self-reports which Dr. Sagone concluded had limited credibility. Doc. 17, p. 14. Defendant also asserts that Smith's level of activity, minimal medical findings, and relatively conservative treatment did not warrant a finding that Smith required additional breaks. Doc. 17, pp. 14-15.
A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Besaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Brainard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). A court "may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
Smith argues that the ALJ erred because the ALJ gave some weight to the opinion of Dr. Scheatzle but then failed to account for or explain why he did not include a limitation to account for Dr. Scheatzle's opinion that Smith "[w]ould require more frequent rest breaks than the average worker due to fibromyalgia with decreased endurance and increased fatigue noted." Doc. 15, p. 14. Smith asserts that the ALJ's failure to incorporate such a limitation in the RFC was critical in light of the VE's testimony that the need for three or four additional 10 minute breaks during the workday would preclude work. Doc. 15, p. 14 (referencing Tr. 70, VE testimony). The Commissioner argues that the record supports the ALJ's decision not to include a limitation of more frequent rest breaks in the RFC. Doc. 17, pp. 14-15.
The responsibility for determining a claimant's residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). "[T]he adjudicator's assessment of an individual's RFC may be the most critical finding contributing to the final determination or decision about disability." SSR No. 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, *5 (July 2, 1996). An RFC assessment is "based on consideration of all relevant evidence in the case record." Id. at *5. "Adjudicators must weigh medical source statements under the rules set out in 20 CFR 404.1527 and 416.927, providing appropriate explanations for accepting or rejecting such opinions." Id. Social security rulings further provide that, "[i]f the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted." SSR No. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, *7 (July 2, 1996).
The ALJ stated the following with respect to Dr. Scheatzle's opinion:
Tr. 27.
Consistent with his decision to give some weight to Dr. Scheatzle's opinion, in the RFC, the ALJ limited Smith to light work and provided for her ability to shift positions each thirty minutes. Tr. 21. The ALJ explained his reservations with respect to Dr. Scheatzle's opinions regarding Smith's social interaction. Tr. 27. However, the ALJ did not account for more frequent rest breaks in the RFC nor did he indicate why he rejected that portion of the opinion. Although assessment of Smith's RFC was reserved to the ALJ and the ALJ may not have been required to adopt every limitation contained in Dr. Scheatzle's opinion, the ALJ expressly stated that he was providing some weight to the part of Dr. Scheatzle's opinion regarding the need for more frequent breaks but failed to explain his reasons for not incorporating that part of Dr. Scheatzle's opinion in the RFC.
The Commissioner suggests that the ALJ's decision not to account for more frequent rest breaks was proper because such a limitation was not supported by the record. Doc. 17, p. 14. In support of her argument, the Commissioner relies on state agency reviewing physician Dr. Sagone's opinion that only partial weight should be provided to Dr. Scheatzle's opinion because the part of the opinion regarding a change in position and more frequent rest breaks appeared to be based on Smith's subjective complaints, which Dr. Sagone found were not fully credible. Doc. 17, p. 14. Also, the Commissioner asserts that Dr. Scheatzle's findings that Smith retained full strength and showed no signs of muscle atrophy were not findings one would expect to be seen in someone whose fatigue limited her daily functioning. Doc. 17, pp. 14-15. Further, the Commissioner states that the record reflects that Smith walked 30 minutes for exercise (Tr. 281, 284, 295), engaged in a fair range of daily activities, and engaged in heavy exertional activity such as packing boxes for a move and caring for a horse on her farm. Doc. 17, p. 15.
Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner argues that, because of "her level of activity, minimal medical findings, and relatively conservative treatment, a finding that Plaintiff required additional breaks during the day was not warranted." Doc. 17, p. 15. However, since the ALJ did not provide the explanation that the Commissioner now provides for discounting Dr. Scheatzle's opinion,
Since the ALJ did not account for Dr. Scheatzle's opinion that Smith would require more frequent rest breaks in the RFC, the ALJ, consistent with social security regulations and rulings, including SSR No. 96-5p and SSR No. 96-8p, should have explained why he rejected that portion of Dr. Scheatzle's opinion. Without such an explanation, and in light of the VE's testimony that three or four additional 10 minute breaks would preclude work (Tr. 70), the undersigned is unable to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, although further proceedings may not result in a finding of disability, the undersigned recommends that the Court reverse and remand the Commissioner's decision for further consideration and/or analysis in accordance with the applicable social security regulations and rulings, including SSR No. 96-5p and SSR No. 96-8p.
Smith argues that the ALJ erred in not providing controlling weight to Dr. Kothari's medical source statement because his opinion was well supported by Smith's mental status examinations and fully supported by the findings of consultative examining physician Dr. Mohler.
Under the treating physician rule, "[a]n ALJ must give the opinion of a treating source controlling weight if he finds the opinion well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). If an ALJ decides to give a treating source's opinion less than controlling weight, he must give "good reasons" for doing so that are sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight given to the treating physician's opinion and the reasons for that weight. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. Further, when deciding the weight to be given, an ALJ must consider factors such as (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of the examination, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) the supportability of the opinion, (4) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the source, and (6) any other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 747 (6th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). While an ALJ's decision must include "good reasons" for the weight provided, the ALJ is not obliged to provide "an exhaustive factor-by-factor analysis." See Francis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 414 Fed. Appx. 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011).
With respect to Dr. Kothari's opinion, the ALJ stated:
Tr. 28.
Consistent with the treating physician rule, the ALJ provided reasons for providing little weight to Dr. Kothari's opinion and made those reasons sufficiently clear to allow for subsequent review. Smith takes issue with the ALJ's conclusion that Dr. Kothari's opinion was not consistent with the relatively benign mental status examinations included in the record. Doc. 15, pp. 9-10. She asserts that her mental status findings were not benign but were "profound" and "impaired" and therefore the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Kothari's opinion was not supported by the record. Doc. 15, pp. 9-10. However, the ALJ reviewed and evaluated the medical evidence and determined that the evidence showed relatively benign mental status examination results. Tr. 26. More particularly, the ALJ stated:
Tr. 26.
While Smith disagrees with the ALJ's conclusion that the mental status examinations showed relatively benign results, it is not for this Court to "try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Further, even though Smith argues that the evidence shows that her mental status examination results were not entirely benign, Smith has not demonstrated that the ALJ's conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Commissioner's decision cannot be overturned on that basis. Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003) ("if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant's position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ," the Commissioner's decision cannot be overturned).
Additionally, lack of consistency with the relatively benign mental status examination results was not the ALJ's only reason for providing little weight to Dr. Kothari's opinion. The ALJ also found that Dr. Kothari had not included a narrative to explain his conclusions
Smith also argues that the ALJ erred by not adopting Dr. Kothari's opinion that Smith was severely limited in her ability to tolerate stress on a sustained basis because that opinion was supported by Dr. Mohler's findings, which included his opinion that Smith's mental ability to withstand the stress and pressure associated with day-to-day work activity was markedly impaired. Doc. 15, p. 10; Tr. 532. Dr. Kothari rated Smith's ability to withstand stress under the area of adaptation. Tr. 608-609. The ALJ considered the opinion of Dr. Mohler and explained that, while Dr. Mohler's opinion was provided some weight, his opinion regarding Smith's ability to adapt was not supported by the record, noting for example that Smith had demonstrated the ability to move her household with little detrimental psychological effect. Tr. 28.
The responsibility for determining a claimant's residual functional capacity rests with the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). As demonstrated, the ALJ explained and supported his decision to discount Dr. Kothari's and Dr. Mohler's opinions that Smith was severely or markedly impaired in her ability to adapt, i.e., withstand stress, and the ALJ sufficiently accounted for the mental impairment limitations that the ALJ found were supported by the record when he concluded that Smith had the following RFC:
Tr. 21. Thus, Smith's claim that the ALJ was required to formulate a more restrictive RFC with respect to Smith's stress tolerance simply because Dr. Kothari and Dr. Mohler offered opinions that were similar with respect to Smith's ability to withstand stress is unpersuasive.
To the extent that Smith separately argues that the ALJ also failed to account for Dr. Mohler's and Dr. Kothari's opinions that Smith was moderately impaired in her abilities to relate to others, including fellow workers and supervisors and maintain concentration, persistence and pace to perform simple repetitive tasks, her argument is without merit. Doc. 15, p. 11. As discussed herein, the ALJ properly considered and sufficiently explained his analysis with respect to both opinions and/or adequately accounted for the limitations that he found supported by the record. For example, in the RFC, the ALJ provided for limitations in social interaction and accounted for limitations in pace, persistence and concentration by limiting Smith to simple, routine and repetitive tasks in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements or quotas. Tr. 21.
In sum, the ALJ's decision makes clear that the ALJ considered Dr. Kothari's opinion in accordance with the treating physician rule and provided "good reasons" for the weight he gave that opinion that were sufficiently specific to make clear to subsequent reviewers the weight given to the treating physician's opinion and the reasons for that weight. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. Accordingly, Smith's treating physician argument is without merit and not a basis for reversal and remand.
For the reasons stated above, the Court should
