JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Lehigh Gas Corporation ("Lehigh") appeals from a summary judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Glenn T. Suddaby, Judge) awarding damages to plaintiffs, Jimico Enterprises, Inc. ("Jimico") and Brownson Enterprises, Inc. ("Brownson," jointly "plaintiffs"), under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA" or "Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2841. Lehigh contends (1) that the PMPA does not provide a right of action to "trial franchisees" for violations of the Act's notice provisions, id. § 2804; and (2) that, if the Act does provide such a right of action, the District Court erred in awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest to plaintiffs. As we conclude (1) that the PMPA does provide a right of action, both to "full" and "trial" franchisees, when a franchisor fails to comply with the Act's notice provisions, and (2) that the District Court properly awarded damages, fees, costs, and interest to plaintiffs, we affirm the amended judgment of the District Court.

BACKGROUND

As the Supreme Court has explained, "[p]etroleum refiners and distributors supply motor fuel to the public through service stations that often are operated by independent franchisees. In the typical franchise arrangement, the franchisor leases the service-station premises to the franchisee, grants the franchisee the right to use the franchisor's trademark, and agrees to sell motor fuel to the franchisee for resale." Mac's Shell Serv., Inc. v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 559 U.S. 175, 130 S.Ct. 1251, 1255, 176 L.Ed.2d 36 (2010). This suit concerns the rights a franchisee1 has under the PMPA against a franchisor2 that summarily terminates the franchise.3 The essential, and undisputed, facts are as follows.

Prior to April 2007, plaintiffs operated five gas stations along the Governor Thomas E. Dewey Thruway ("Thruway"), more commonly known as the New York State Thruway, which extends from New York City, through Albany, Syracuse, and Buffalo, to the Pennsylvania state line. Jimico operated three stations — one on each side of the Thruway in Angola, and one in Seneca. Brownson operated two stations — one on each side of the Thruway in New Baltimore. In May 2006, the New York State Thruway Authority awarded Lehigh, an independent distributor of ExxonMobil gasoline, a contract to serve as franchisor to thirteen stations, including those of Jimico and Brownson.

On June 1, 2006, Jimico and Brownson, as franchisees, entered into franchise relationships4 with Lehigh, as franchisor. As the District Court correctly found, the contracts as to each of the five stations were "trial franchises," within the meaning of the PMPA, because Jimico and Brownson previously had not been party to a franchise with Lehigh; the initial terms of the contracts were for a period of less than one year; and the contracts included the necessary language, including a clear statement that the franchises were "trial franchises." 15 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(1).5 Between July 28, 2006 and April 1, 2007, without any notice, Lehigh terminated6 its franchises with Jimico and Brownson — first with Jimico's two Angola stations, then with Brownson's two New Baltimore stations, and finally with Jimico's Seneca station.

On May 31, 2007, plaintiffs filed this suit, claiming, inter alia, that Lehigh violated the PMPA when it terminated their franchises without any notice. The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on July 27, 2010, holding that Lehigh had failed to give adequate notice of termination under the PMPA. On October 14, 2010, after an evidentiary hearing on damages, the District Court awarded plaintiffs a total of $141,892.79 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages. The District Court subsequently awarded attorney's fees and costs, as well as pre-and post-judgment interest to plaintiffs, and entered judgment.7 On October 14, 2011, the District Court entered an amended judgment, correcting its previous calculation error regarding prejudgment interest. Lehigh now appeals the District Court's amended judgment.

DISCUSSION

Lehigh argues that the District Court erred in awarding damages, attorney's fees and costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest to plaintiffs on two grounds. First, Lehigh contends that the PMPA provides no right of action for inadequate notice of termination. Second, Lehigh urges that, even if the PMPA does authorize such an action, the District Court's damages, fees, and costs awards were inappropriate in these circumstances.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and "resolv[e] all ambiguities and draw[] all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the District Court's determination of the size of a damages award for clear error, Serricchio v. Wachovia Sec. LLC, 658 F.3d 169, 191 (2d Cir.2011), and its award of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion, Barbour v. City of White Plains, 700 F.3d 631, 634 (2d Cir.2012); see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir.2008) (noting that a district court abuses its discretion if it "base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or render[s] a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions" (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

A. Violation of the PMPA's Notice Provisions

Lehigh contends that the plain language of the PMPA does not permit a right of action for violations of the notice provisions contained in § 2804. As with any question of statutory interpretation, we begin by examining the text of the statute. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1885, 1891, 179 L.Ed.2d 825 (2011). "The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole." Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). "In interpreting the statute at issue, we consider not only the bare meaning of the critical word or phrase but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme." Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 6, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).

We previously have observed that "Congress enacted the PMPA to establish minimum Federal standards governing the termination and nonrenewal of franchise relationships for the sale of motor fuel by the franchisor or supplier of such fuel." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Karbowski, 879 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the PMPA addresses several concerns identified by Congress in the marketing of gasoline, "its paramount objective is to redress disparities in bargaining power and to prevent the ensuing arbitrary termination" by franchisors. Darling v. Mobil Oil Corp., 864 F.2d 981, 984 (2d Cir.1989); see also Mac's Shell Serv., 130 S.Ct. at 1255 ("[T]he PMPA was a response to widespread concern over increasing numbers of allegedly unfair franchise terminations and nonrenewals in the petroleum industry."); Mobil Oil Corp., 879 F.2d at 1055 ("The overriding purpose of the PMPA is to provide protection for franchisees from arbitrary or discriminatory termination or non-renewal of their franchises." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In order to prevent arbitrary action by franchisors, the PMPA sets out precise notice requirements, which must be followed prior to any termination. In particular, unless it would be unreasonable, a franchisor must provide notice at least ninety days prior to terminating a franchise. 15 U.S.C. § 2804(a). Such notification (1) must be in writing, (2) must be posted by certified mail or personally delivered to the franchisee, and (3) must contain a statement of the reasons for termination, the date of its effect, and a summary of the provisions of the PMPA. Id. § 2804(c). Even in circumstances where it would not be reasonable for a franchisor to notify a franchisee ninety days prior to termination, the franchisor must provide notice at the earliest "reasonably practicable" date. Id. § 2804(b).8

Section 2805 supplies a private right of action for enforcement of the PMPA's provisions. Under that section, "[i]f a franchisor fails to comply with the requirements of section 2802, 2803, or 2807 of this title, the franchisee may maintain a civil action against such franchisor." Id. § 2805(a). Lehigh argues that, because § 2805(a) does not specifically identify § 2804 — the Act's notification provision — in the list of sections giving rise to a right of action against a franchisor, plaintiffs have no right of action against Lehigh for its failure to comply with the PMPA's notification requirements.

Lehigh's argument, however, is contradicted by a plain reading of the statute and by controlling precedent. Indeed, although § 2805 does not specifically identify § 2804 in the list of sections giving rise to a right of action, it does provide a private right of action to enforce § 2802, which explicitly incorporates § 2804's notice requirements by providing that a franchisor may only terminate a franchise if "the notification requirements of section 2804 of this title are met." Id. § 2802(b)(1)(A).9 Hence, the PMPA provides a right of action when a franchisor fails to comply with the notification requirements prior to terminating a franchise because such a failure amounts to a violation of § 2802. We previously have said as much in Ceraso v. Motiva Enterprises, LLC, 326 F.3d 303, 314 (2d Cir. 2003) ("In order to effect a valid termination, the franchisor must give the franchisee written notice of termination...."), as has the Supreme Court, in the nonrenewal context, Mac's Shell Serv., 130 S.Ct. at 1263 n. 12 (noting that if a franchisor "fail[s] to renew a franchise relationship without providing the statutorily required notice.... a franchisee would ... have a surefire claim for unlawful nonrenewal" (emphasis in original)). We also have emphasized that "[t]here must be strict compliance with the notice provisions of the PMPA." Ceraso, 326 F.3d at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lehigh further claims that, even if a right of action exists to enforce the notification provisions with respect to a full franchise, there is no right of action for failure to comply with the notification provisions with respect to a trial franchise. Although we have not previously had an opportunity to address this precise question, Lehigh's contention finds no support in the text of the PMPA.

Section 2803 governs trial franchises. It exempts franchisors who fail to renew trial franchises from complying with the requirements of § 2802 because, unlike full franchises, trial franchises may be nonrenewed for any reason.10 15 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1), (c)(1); see also Shukla v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc., 115 F.3d 849, 852 (11th Cir.1997); Razavi v. Amoco Oil Co., 41 F.3d 1549, 1550 (D.C.Cir.1994). However, franchisors must still comply with the notice provisions of § 2804 before nonrenewing a trial franchise because § 2803 explicitly incorporates its requirements: "[i]f the notification requirements of section 2804 of this title are met, any franchisor may fail to renew any franchise relationship — (1) under any trial franchise...." 15 U.S.C. § 2803(c)(1); see also Shukla, 115 F.3d at 852; Razavi, 41 F.3d at 1550.

Nevertheless, Section 2803 does not exempt franchisors who terminate11 trial franchises from complying with the requirements of § 2802. See 15 U.S.C. § 2803(a)(1) ("The provisions of section 2802 of this title shall apply to the nonrenewal of any franchise relationship — (1) under a trial franchise." (emphasis supplied)). As a result, the requirements of § 2802 prohibiting franchisors from "terminat[ing] any franchise," id. § 2802(a)(1), without complying with the notice requirements of § 2804, id. § 2802(b)(1)(A), apply to the termination of trial franchises.12

Both the structure and purpose of the PMPA reinforce our conclusion that the termination provisions — including the notice requirement — of § 2802 apply to trial franchises, even though the nonrenewal provisions of § 2802 do not. Under Lehigh's reading of the PMPA, a franchisor need not provide notice before terminating a franchise (the more sudden event), but must provide notice before failing to renew one (the less sudden event). That interpretation is not only illogical, but runs counter to the articulated purposes of the statutory scheme, see Holloway, 526 U.S. at 6, 119 S.Ct. 966, because Lehigh's reading would provide an incentive for franchisors to skirt the notice requirements by terminating the franchise early and without notice — a result that would undermine "strict compliance with the notice provisions of the PMPA," Ceraso, 326 F.3d at 314, and encourage arbitrary and unfair terminations, Mac's Shell Serv., 130 S.Ct. at 1255; Mobil Oil Corp., 879 F.2d at 1055.

Instead, we recognize the coherent and reasonable structure built by the clear text of the PMPA, and understand that a "trial franchise" is just that: a trial. Under a trial franchise relationship, the franchisee is guaranteed a trial period, during which it is free from arbitrary or sudden termination. See 15 U.S.C. § 2802(a), (b). At the conclusion of the trial period, however, upon proper notice, the franchisor may conclude that the experiment has failed and elect not to renew the relationship. See id. § 2803. The plain language of the statute articulates this framework, and we must therefore enforce it. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002) ("The inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In sum, we hold that a trial franchisee does have a right of action, under § 2805, against a franchisor that terminates its franchise without proper notice. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.

B. Damages, Fees, and Costs

Lehigh also challenges the District Court's award of compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest, pursuant to § 2805.13 Lehigh concedes that the District Court made no legal error as to the damages award, Appellant Br. 36 (stating that "the District Court made all the appropriate findings"), and so we only review its factual determinations for clear error, Serricchio, 658 F.3d at 191.

After reviewing the record, we find no clear error in the District Court's well-reasoned damages analysis. Furthermore, we find no error in the District Court's punitive damages award based on its finding of willful disregard of the PMPA's requirements, pursuant to § 2805(1)(B), and no abuse of discretion in the District Court's award of attorney's fees and costs and pre- and post-judgment interest, see Barbour, 700 F.3d at 634; see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d at 132.

Finally, plaintiffs request attorney's fees and costs for defending this appeal. Under the PMPA, a prevailing franchisee is entitled "to reasonable attorney and expert witness fees ... unless the court determines that only nominal damages are to be awarded to such franchisee, in which case the court, in its discretion, need not direct that such fees be paid by the franchisor." 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(1)(C); see also Mac's Shell Serv., 130 S.Ct. at 1260 n. 7 ("The Act requires courts to award attorney's fees and expert-witness fees in any case in which a plaintiff recovers more than nominal damages." (emphasis in original)). Inasmuch as plaintiffs have prevailed in this action and have been awarded more than nominal damages, they are entitled to fees for defending this appeal, in an amount to be determined on remand by the District Court. We emphasize that plaintiffs are entitled only to reasonable fees. 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(1)(C).

CONCLUSION

To summarize:

The amended judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED and the cause is REMANDED for adjudication of appellate attorney's fees.