MAE A. D'AGOSTINO, District Judge.
Plaintiff Skyler Jackson ("Plaintiff"), an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"), commenced this civil rights action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on October 16, 2013. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff has named a total of ten defendants in this action (collectively, "Defendants"). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment while confined at the Great Meadow Correctional Facility ("Great Meadow") by Correction Officers Nathan Yando, Daniel Mulligan, Jeremy Saunders, Joseph Courtright, Roger Morgan
On June 29, 2015, Defendants moved for partial summary judgment with respect to all claims against Defendants Thayer, Goodman, and Bezio. See Dkt. No. 69. In their motion, Defendants contend that (1) Defendant Thayer was not physically present at the time of the altercation, (2) Defendant Goodman provided Plaintiff with adequate due process at the disciplinary hearing, and (3) Defendant Bezio was not personally involved in Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing. See Dkt. No. 69-3. Plaintiff opposed the motion. See Dkt. No. 74.
On January 19, 2016, Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks filed an Order and Report-Recommendation, recommending that this Court (1) grant Defendants' motion as to the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Thayer and terminate him as a defendant, (2) grant Defendants' motion as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Goodman and terminate him as a defendant, (3) grant Defendants' motion as to the Fourteenth Amendment claim against Defendant Bezio, but (4) deny Defendants' motion as to the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Bezio. See Dkt. No. 76 at 23. Neither party has filed an objection.
Having reviewed Magistrate Judge Dancks' well-reasoned and thorough Order and Report-Recommendation, the record before the Court, and the relevant case law, this Court hereby affirms and adopts the Order and Report-Recommendation in its entirety.
First, when a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the district court makes a "de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, "[i]n those cases where no party has filed an objection . . . this court reviews the findings and recommendations of a magistrate judge for clear error." Johnson v. Cnty. of Wash., No. 1:10-cv-1497 (GLS/DRH), 2011 WL 2160895, *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 27, 2011) (citing Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No. 04-cv-484, 2006 WL 149049, *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006)). In general, "[a] finding is `clearly erroneous' when . . . the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendation made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
A court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the facts as to which there is no such dispute warrant judgment for the movant as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the court "cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried." Chambers, 43 F.3d. at 36-37 (quotation and other citation omitted). "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Moreover, it is well-settled that a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must do more than simply "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading" or "simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.11 (1986). "Conclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact." Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 369, 400 (2d Cir. 1998). Instead, a party opposing summary judgment is required to submit admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine factual dispute. See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
In assessing the record to determine whether any such issues of material fact exist, the court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 36 (citing Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255) (other citations omitted). Where the non-movant fails either to respond to the motion or otherwise dispute the movant's statement of material facts, the court may not rely solely on the moving party's Statement of Material Facts pursuant to N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 7.1(a)(3); rather, the court must be satisfied that the citations to evidence in the record support the movant's assertions. See Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that factual assertions contained in a statement of facts that are otherwise unsupported by record citations are insufficient to meet a movant's burden on summary judgment).
Further, "in a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than that accorded to `formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (other citations omitted). The Second Circuit has opined that the court is obligated to "make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants" from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a legal education. See Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). However, this does not mean that a pro se litigant is excused from following the procedural requirements of summary judgment. See Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (citing Showers v. Eastmond, No. 00 CIV. 3725(SAS), 2001 WL 527484, *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001)). Specifically, "a pro se party's bald assertions, unsupported by evidence, are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Showers, 2001 WL 527484, at *2 (citing Cary v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Here, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's statement of material facts as required under Local Rule 7.1(a)(3). See Dkt. No. 76 at 9. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status and the fact that both of his submissions were verified, Magistrate Judge Dancks properly construed Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and Opposition to Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as affidavits in opposition to the motion. See id.; see also Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). Moreover, Magistrate Judge Dancks properly considered only those facts in Defendants' Rule 7.1 statement "to the extent they are supported by evidence in the record." See id. at 10.
Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended granting summary judgment to Defendant Thayer on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against him. See id. at 13. As set forth in Defendant Thayer's declaration, he did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene and prevent the alleged harm to Plaintiff
Next, Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended granting summary judgment to Defendant Goodman on Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims against him because she determined that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Plaintiff was denied due process during his disciplinary hearing. See Dkt. No. 76 at 21.
In connection with the alleged altercation, Goodman found Plaintiff guilty of Violent Conduct (two counts), Assault on Staff (two counts), Refusal to Comply with Frisk Procedures, and Possession of a Weapon. See Dkt. No. 39 at ¶¶ 29, 34, see also Dkt. No. 69-5 at ¶ 16. Thereafter, Plaintiff was sentenced to thirty-six months of punitive segregation in the Special Housing Unit ("SHU"). See Dkt. No. 39 at ¶ 35.
Plaintiff claims he was denied due process at his disciplinary hearing because Defendant Goodman (1) failed to conduct a thorough investigation, (2) failed to turn over requested materials before Plaintiff had the opportunity to question certain witnesses, (3) found Plaintiff guilty of the charges based on insufficient evidence, and (4) failed to conduct the hearing in a fair and impartial manner. See Dkt. No. 76 at 14.
In the context of prison disciplinary hearings, the Fourteenth Amendment entitles an inmate to a hearing affording a reasonable opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence, and a fair and impartial hearing officer. See Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004). In the prison context, however, due process protections do not necessarily equal "`the full panoply' of rights due to a defendant in a criminal prosecution." Id. As stated by Magistrate Judge Dancks, the due process clause requires only that a hearing officer's decision be supported by some reliable evidence. See Dkt. No. 76 at 14-15 (discussing Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), and Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2004)). Further, the inmate must demonstrate prejudice in connection with the alleged denials by showing that they affected the outcome of the hearing. See, e.g., Clark v. Dannheim, 590 F.Supp.2d 429, 429 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Powell v. Coughlin, 953 F.2d 744, 750 (2d Cir. 1991)) (other citations omitted).
Based on the hearing transcript, Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly found that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that either the delay in requested documents, or the denial to recall certain witnesses resulted in any prejudice to Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 76 at 18. Moreover, Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined that the delay in producing the requested documents did not affect the outcome because they were read to Plaintiff at the hearing, and he was provided "ample opportunity, with several adjournments, to prepare for the hearing." See id. at 4, 18.
Further, Defendant Goodman's denial to reexamine certain witnesses was based on the fact that such witnesses were "already questioned and testified that their written misbehavior reports were accurate." Id. at 17. Defendant Goodman was only permitted to rely on information contained in the misbehavior reports and hearing testimony in making a determination of guilt. See Dkt. No. 69-7 at 73. As such, Magistrate Judge Dancks properly found that the denial did not result in any prejudice to Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 76 at 18.
Next, Magistrate Judge Dancks found that Plaintiff was not denied a fair and impartial hearing officer because the transcript and disposition sheet contained no evidence that Defendant Goodman was biased or predisposed in any way. See Dkt. No. 76 at 20. In making her determination, Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly articulated that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require absolute neutrality in the context of prison disciplinary hearings. See, e.g., Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 259 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The degree of impartiality required of prison officials does not rise to the level of that required of judges generally. It is well recognized that prison disciplinary officials are not held to the same standard of neutrality as adjudicators in other contexts.") (citations omitted); see also Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Because of the special characteristics of the prison environment, it is permissible for the impartiality of such officials to be encumbered by various conflicts of interest that, in other contexts, would be adjudged of sufficient magnitude to violate due process.") (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1985)). In particular, Magistrate Judge Dancks found that Defendant Goodman's reliance on documentary, testimonial, and tangible evidence satisfied the requirement that the hearing officer's decision be supported by "some evidence,"
Lastly, Plaintiff asserted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that his thirty-six month SHU sentence was "arbitrary and capricious" because under the old guidelines "the maximum amount of SHU time to be imposed was [twenty-four] months." See Dkt. No. 74 at 3. Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined that this argument was meritless because violations of DOCCS regulations do not give rise to liability under § 1983 without proof of actual bias. See Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416, 484 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
Plaintiff further contends that he did not receive a fair and impartial hearing because Goodman found him guilty of possessing a weapon despite testimony from Defendants Courtright and Kelly that they did not see one in Plaintiff's possession. See Dkt. No. 76 at 20; see also Dkt. No. 74 at 3. Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly found Defendant Goodman's determination of guilt based on the misbehavior reports, the testimony of the other witnesses, and the photograph was sufficient to satisfy the "some evidence" standard in Hill, 472 U.S. at 455, and the "reliable evidence" standard in Luna, 356 F.3d at 488. See Dkt. No. 76 at 20.
Based on the foregoing, Magistrate Judge Dancks properly determined that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Plaintiff was denied due process during his disciplinary hearing. See Dkt. No. 76 at 21.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bezio violated his right to due process by "overseeing and sustaining" Defendant Goodman's actions. See Dkt. No. 39 at 6; see also Dkt. No. 76 at 22. Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended granting summary judgment to Defendant Bezio on Plaintiff's Fourteenth amendment claim against him because Plaintiff failed to establish any underlying constitutional violation
Moreover, Magistrate Judge Dancks noted that Defendants neglected to address Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment supervisory liability claim against Defendant Bezio. See Dkt. No. 76 at 23; see also Dkt. No. 69-3 at 16-19. As such, Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined that Defendants failed to meet their initial burden demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, granting summary judgment to Defendant Bezio with respect to this claim is inappropriate.
After carefully considering Magistrate Judge Dancks' Report-Recommendation and Order and the applicable law, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court hereby
