THOMAS J. MCAVOY, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff Javell Fox commenced this action by filing a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."). Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order. Dkt. No. 67.
Plaintiff filed motions for preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. Nos. 37, 53 (the "PI Motions").
Plaintiff now seeks a temporary restraining order to enjoin "the defendants, their successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concert and participation with them from infringing on plaintiff's right to the freedom of exercise of religion by his hairstyle being in a Mohawk with dreadlocks" pending determination of the PI Motions Dkt. No. 67. Defendants oppose the motion. Dkt. No. 68. Plaintiff has filed a reply. Dkt. No. 69. Both parties have essentially reiterated the same arguments in those submissions that were asserted in support of, and in opposition to, the PI Motions.
As noted in the August 2016 Order, "`[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.'" Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis in original). The same standards used to review a request for a preliminary injunction govern consideration of an application for a temporary restraining order. Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992); Perri v. Bloomberg, No. 06-CV-0403, 2008 WL 2944642, at * 2 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2008).
"`The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve an existing situation in statu quo until the court has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for a preliminary injunction.'" Garcia v. Yonkers School Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 107 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n, PAA Chapter, 306 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir. 1962); see also 11A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2951, at 253 (2d ed. 1995) ("The [temporary restraining order] is designed to preserve the status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction. . . ."). By his motion, plaintiff seeks affirmative relief changing the status quo, therefore a temporary restraining order is inappropriate here. Moreover, plaintiff has not put forth evidence or specific facts to clearly show his entitlement to a temporary restraining order. See Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 965 F.2d at 1228; Perri, 2008 WL 2944642, at * 2; Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972.