JOHN R. ADAMS, District Judge.
The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff Catherine Anderson's Applications for a Period of Disability ("POD"), Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423, and 1381 et seq. Plaintiff Catherine L. Anderson then sought review of the Commissioner's decision. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3), and Local Rule 72.2(b)(1) this case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation ("R&R"). The Magistrate Judge has submitted a report recommending that this Court reverse the final decision of the Commissioner. Doc. 15. The Commissioner has filed objections to the R&R; Plaintiff responded in support of the R&R. Docs. 16 and 17. Neither party has identified an error in the factual and procedural history reflected in the R&R, which adequately sets forth that background. The Court will therefore adopt the history as written without reiterating those sections herein.
A Social Security Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") reviews applications for benefits to determine an individual's eligibility. An ALJ may find an applicant suffers from a disability for which she should receive benefits if the applicant is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to the existence of a "medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). An applicant's inability to engage in substantial gainful activity encompasses both the applicant's prior employment and any other work that exists in significant quantity in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
This Court conducts a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). That review is limited, however, to determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole, taking into account what fairly detracts from its weight. Wyatt v. Sec. of Health and Human Services, 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence in this context is "such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Miller v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 833 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court must also consider whether an administrative decision maker employed the proper legal standards. Queen City Home Health Care v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 236, 243 (6th Cir. 1992). "An ALJ's failure to follow agency rules and regulations `denotes a lack of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record.'" Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011), quoting Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2009).
The Commissioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's determination that the ALJ "failed to give good reasons for rejecting the limitations" stated by Plaintiff's treating physicians. Doc. 16, p. 1. The Commissioner further objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the ALJ provided no medical foundation for concluding "that the individual capable of performing the above activities could not have extreme or marked limitations in carrying out complex or simple instructions." Docs. 16, p.3 & 15, p.16.
The "good reasons" language used by the Commissioner addresses the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the ALJ failed to satisfy the requirements of the treating physician rule. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explains that in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502, the Commissioner "has elected to impose certain standards on the treatment of medical source evidence." Cole, 661 F.3d at 937. According to the Sixth Circuit, one such standard is the "treating physician rule" through which the Commissioner requires an ALJ to "give a treating source's opinion controlling weight if it `is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.'" Id. quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2).
The applicable regulations, which remain effective for claims filed prior to March 27, 2017, provide:
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)-(c).
If an ALJ declines to give the treating source or treating physician's opinion controlling weight, he or she must explain the decision using the criteria set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527:
40 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
When applying these criteria, the ALJ is charged not only to provide "good reasons" but also with a "clear elaboration requirement," Bowie v. Comms'r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 400 (6th Cir. 2008), which is "imposed explicitly by the regulations . . . in part to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases." Wilson v. Comms'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 547, 544 (6th Cir. 2002). Although the ALJ is tasked with assessing whether a claimant has demonstrated a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act and, in so doing, evaluating the credibility of medical opinions, ALJs may not make medical judgments. Meece v. Barnhart, 192 Fed. Appx. 459, 495 (6th Cir. 2006) ("But judges, including administrative law judges of the Social Security Administration, must be careful not to succumb to the temptation to play doctor.").
Defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding that the ALJ's stated reasons for rejecting the treating psychiatrists' opinions were "conclusions rather than explanations" and that "the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff's activities and/or mental status examination findings are inherently incompatible with the limitations assessed by the treating psychiatrists is tantamount to a medical judgment." Doc. 15, p. 15-16. There is no dispute between the parties as to whether Drs. Bonder and McBride are treating sources and the ALJ referred to them as such. As treating sources, their opinions are deserving of controlling weight pursuant to 40 CFR § 1527(d)(2). This record further indicates the ALJ's acceptance of Plaintiff's diagnoses from treating sources, reflected in the ALJ's finding of two "severe impairments: an affective disorder and an anxiety disorder." Doc.10 p.12-23. Although the ALJ accepts the diagnoses, he rejects the physicians' conclusions about the severity of Plaintiff's impairments with regard to work. The ALJ did so without conducting the balancing of factors to determine what weight should be accorded the treating source opinions. The Sixth Circuit emphasizes:
Cole, 661 F.3d at 939, quoting Hensley v. Astrue, 579 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009) and Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004).
Defendant concedes that the ALJ did not assign a specific weight to the opinions of Drs. Bonder and McBride and further failed to complete the required analysis. However, Defendant argues that this Court should find the ALJ's reasoning sufficient without the mandated analysis because (1) the ALJ referenced portions of Plaintiff's treatment record when summarily concluding that the treating source opinions were not supported by the evidence, and (2) the ALJ gave great weight to the Ohio Division of Disability Determination psychologists' opinions "because State agency psychologists are considered to be experts in Social Security disability programs." Doc.10, p. 21. A violation of the good reasons rule may be deemed harmless error under the following circumstances:
Cole, 661 F.3d at 940, quoting Friend v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 Fed.Appx. 551 (6th Cir. 2010).
In the matter at bar, the Court cannot find the ALJ's violations of the good reasons rule to be harmless. It cannot be said that the treating sources' opinions are patently deficient because the ALJ found them sufficient as to Plaintiff's categories of diagnosis. In this instance, the ALJ did not adopt or make findings consistent with the treating physicians' assessment of Plaintiff's impairments. Nor can the Court say the goal of 40 CFR § 1527(d)(2) was met, because the ALJ's decision leaves the Court without a clear understanding of the ALJ's reason to discredit the treating physicians' assessment of Plaintiff's functional limitations. The ALJ's emphasis on the non-treating state psychologists' expertise in Social Security disability programs strongly suggests that the ALJ reversed the burden imposed by the treating source rule and automatically accorded the non-treating physicians persuasive weight due to their agency experience.
This Court has examined the record including those citations emphasized by Defendant and concludes that the Magistrate Judge's analysis of the ALJ's decision is correct. The ALJ's explanation is tainted by an implicit assumption that an individual who, while mostly compliant with treatment, is capable of appearing for a majority of her regularly scheduled appointments and engaging with her psychiatrist in a comparatively alert and oriented manner during those appointments, cannot have the limitations assessed by her treating psychiatrists. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's observation that the ALJ unreasonably equates Plaintiff's moderately successful, intermittent, and fleeting, interactions with trained medical personnel with the ability to interact with others "who are not trained mental health professionals, for an eight-hour workday." Doc. 15, p.18. This Court concludes, as the Magistrate Judge indicated, that the Ohio Division of Disability Determination psychologists' opinions do not provide an explanation supporting this underlying assumption.
The Sixth Circuit has a long history of rejecting conclusions that individuals who "can still perform simple functions, such as driving, grocery shopping, dish washing and floor sweeping" are therefore not suffering from limitations that prevent engaging in "substantial gainful activity," as such simple tasks are "intermittent and not continuous" and may be done in spite of otherwise disabling limitations. Walston v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1967). Accord Miller, 811 F.3d 838 ("Although the ALJ may properly consider Miller's household and social activities when `evaluating a claimant's assertions of pain or ailments,' the ALJ must establish that Miller could have performed such activities on a `sustained basis' when assessing Miller's mental impairments.") (emphasis sic, internal citations to Keeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 538 Fed.Appx. 515 (6th Cir. 2014), Walkers v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 1997), and Gayheart v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2013) omitted.). The Sixth Circuit does not find this type of anecdotal substitute for a clear analysis persuasive, especially where, as the Magistrate Judge notes here, the ALJ's characterization of the record is "questionable" at best. Doc. 15, p. 17, Cole, 661 F.3d at 939 ("As this Court has recently held, the ALJ's focus on the claimant's ability to do certain activities in discounting the treating source's opinion does not constitute `good reasons' for doing so when the claimant's testimony and other record evidence contradict the ALJ's finding.").
In this matter, the ALJ did not apply the requirements of the treating physician rule and has not provided a clear explanation of his failure to credit the limitations described by the treating sources. As such, the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Cole, 661 F.3d at 940. This Court's finding that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence is based on the ALJ's violation of the agency's procedural rules. It may be true, on remand, that the Commissioner reaches the same conclusion as to Plaintiff's limitations while complying with the treating physician rule and good reasons requirement. If this is the case, Plaintiff will then be able to understand the Commissioner's rationale and the procedure through which the decision was reached. "To hold otherwise . . . would afford the Commissioner the ability to violate the regulations with impunity and render the protections promised therein illusory." Cole, supra at 940, citing Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546.
The Commissioner's objections in this matter do not identify an error of law or fact in the Magistrate Judge's decision. Accordingly they are OVERRULED. The Magistrate Judge's decision is ADOPTED in full. The COMISSIONER's decision is REVERSED, and the matter REMANDED for further proceedings.
