DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY, Chief District Judge.

1. In August 2013, Plaintiff, on behalf of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), filed a complaint against Defendant alleging violations of the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., and the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11001, et seq. (Docket No. 1.) As alleged therein, Defendant's violations include the failure to properly establish, maintain, and report on operating parameters for pollution control equipment as required by regulations and Defendant's Title V permit. Plaintiff concurrently filed a proposed consent decree signed by the parties resolving the issues in the nascent litigation. (Docket No. 4.) As required by 28 C.F.R. § 50.7, the consent decree was then published in the Federal Register and made available for public comment for a period of 30 days. Having considered the comments submitted during that period, Plaintiff now moves this Court for approval and entry of the consent decree. (Docket No. 5.)

2. Approval of a proposed consent decree falls squarely within a court's discretion and should be considered in light of the strong policy of encouraging voluntary settlement of litigation. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 776 F.2d 410, 411 (2d Cir. 1985). In examining a proposed consent decree in the environmental context, a court must satisfy itself that the settlement is reasonable, fair, and consistent with the purposes of the statutes under which the case was brought. See United States v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 62 F.Supp.2d 713, 719 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990)).

3. The general requirements governing approval of consent decrees must also be satisfied. That is, the proposed consent decree must (1) arise from and resolve a dispute over which the court has subject matter jurisdiction, (2) fall within the scope of the case made by the pleadings, and (3) further the objective of the law upon which the complaint was based. See Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. City of New York, 30 F.Supp.2d 325, 330-31 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). "Acceptance of a settlement agreement is especially appropriate `where a consent decree has been negotiated by the Department of Justice on behalf of a federal administrative agency like EPA which enjoys substantial expertise in the environmental field.'" City of New York, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (quoting Cronin v. Browner, 898 F.Supp. 1052, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)). Nonetheless, although a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the parties to the decree, it must "assure itself that the terms of the decree are fair and adequate and are not unlawful, unreasonable, or against public policy." United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F.Supp. 1067, 1072 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). Here, although the Plaintiff's factual allocution is at times sparse, this Court is satisfied that the consent decree meets these requirements.

4. This Court finds that the settlement as reflected in the consent decree is reasonable, fair, and consistent with the purposes of these statutes. "Congress enacted the Clean Air Act to address the increasingly grave threat of air pollution to the environment, public health and the general welfare of the nation." State of Vt. v. Thomas, 850 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir. 1988); see 42 U.S.C. § 7401. In support of that goal, Section 112 of the CAA authorizes the promulgation of emission and work practice standards to control the emission of certain hazardous air pollutants. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7412. Title V of the same act establishes an operating permit program for certain sources of hazardous air pollutants, such as Defendant's manufacturing facility. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7661. The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act "embodies two fundamental objectives: public access to information concerning hazardous chemicals in the community and use of this information to formulate and administer local emergency response plans in case of a hazardous chemical release." Atlantic States Legal Fdtn. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F.Supp. 745, 751 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); see Williams v. Leybold Tech., Inc., 784 F.Supp. 765, 768 (N.D. Cal.1992).

5. First, the consent decree is reasonable and consistent with the objectives of both Acts. Defendant's obligations, such as the requirement of additional stack and performance testing, are aimed specifically at rectifying the noncompliance and transparency issues alleged in the complaint, thereby furthering the public health, welfare, and information accessability goals of the applicable statutes. Further, the civil penalty is significant enough to promote compliance by other regulated entities. Plaintiff has also considered the costs of seeking enforcement through litigation rather than by consent, as well as the risks to and delay of that enforcement that could result from the assertion of affirmative defenses during protracted litigation. See Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 90 ("the reasonableness of a proposed settlement must take into account foreseeable risks of loss"). a court should ordinarily look to the negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor, openness, and bargaining balance." See id. at 86. Here, the parties agree that this consent decree is the result of a good-faith, arms-length negotiation between parties represented by counsel experienced in environmental issues. The proposed decree was then published for a 30-day comment period to allow for public consideration and input. This Court is therefore satisfied that the consent decree is procedurally sound.

7. Third, this Court finds that the terms of the consent decree are substantively fair. The terms of the consent decree are substantively fair if they account for the comparative strength of the parties' cases; the likely complexity and cost of litigation; and the comparative fault and apportionment of liability in relation to a rational estimate of the harm caused. United States v. Fort James Operating Co., 313 F.Supp.2d 902, 908 (E.D.Wis. 2004) (citing Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 87). Review of the consent decree reveals that comparative fault has been considered, as well as the risks of litigating the claim and the relative costs and benefits of litigation versus settlement. Further, it is clear that Plaintiff has considered both those public comments in support of this resolution, including those submitted on behalf of the Clean Air Coalition, the Western New York Council on Occupational Safety and Health, and the Steelworkers Local 6992, as well as those criticizing the civil penalties contained therein as too lenient. Thus, this Court finds that the parties have fully considered the relevant issues, and further finds no reason to deviate from the general standard of affording deference to the expertise of the EPA in such matters. See Cannons Eng'g, 899 F.2d at 83.

8. For the reasons discussed above, this Court finds that the consent decree is reasonable, fair, and consistent with both the Clean Air Act and Emergency Planning and the Community Right to Know Act. The consent decree is therefore approved.

IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that the Motion for Entry of the Consent Decree (Docket No. 5) is GRANTED and the Consent Decree is APPROVED and ORDERED by this Court;

FURTHER, that a copy of the Consent Decree signed by this Court shall be filed along with this order;

FURTHER, that the Clerk of the Court shall close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Plaintiff United States of America, on behalf of the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), has filed a complaint in this action concurrently with this Consent Decree, alleging that Defendant E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company, violated the Clean Air Act ("the CAA"), 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. and Section 313 of Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, also known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 ("EPCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11023.

The Complaint against Defendant alleges that it operates a stationary source of air emissions subject to the Maximum Achievable Control Technology regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act, and that it failed to fully comply with the Clean Air Act and 40 C.F.R. Subparts MB and T.

The Complaint against Defendant also alleges that Defendant failed to submit complete and accurate emission statements in violation of Title V of the Clean Air Act;

In addition, the Complaint alleges that Defendant failed to submit accurate Toxic Chemical Inventory Form R reports for methyl methacrylate for the reporting years 2003 to 2005 and a timely Form R report for certain glycol ethers for the reporting year 2008 in violation of Section 313 of EPCRA and 40 C.F.R. Part 372.

Defendant does not admit any of the allegations, transactions or occurrences set forth in the Complaint or any liability to the United States arising out of the allegations, transactions or occurrences set forth in the Complaint.

The Parties recognize, and the Court by entering this Consent Decree finds, that this Consent Decree has been negotiated by the Parties in good faith and will avoid litigation between the Parties and that this Consent Decree is fair, reasonable, and in the public interest.

NOW, THEREFORE, with the consent of the Parties, IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED as follows:

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, and 1355, Section 113(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) and Section 325(c) (1) of EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(1), and over the Parties. Venue lies in this District pursuant to Section 113(b) of the Act, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and (c) and 1395(a), because the violations alleged in the Complaint are alleged to have occurred in, and Defendant conducts business in, this judicial district. For purposes of this Decree, or any action to enforce this Decree, Defendant consents to the Court's jurisdiction over this Decree and any such action and over Defendant and consents to venue in this judicial district.

2. For purposes of this Consent Decree, Defendant agrees that the Complaint states claims upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Section 113 of the CAA and Section 325(c)(1) of EPCRA.

II. APPLICABILITY

3. The obligations of this Consent Decree apply to and are binding upon the United States and upon Defendant and any successors, assigns, or other entities or persons otherwise bound by law.

4. No transfer of ownership or operation of the Facility, whether in compliance with the procedures of this Paragraph or otherwise, shall relieve Defendant of its obligation to ensure that the terms of the Decree are implemented. Until the Consent Decree has been terminated in accordance with Section XV of this Decree, at least 30 Days prior to any such transfer, Defendant shall provide a copy of this Consent Decree to the proposed transferee and shall simultaneously provide written notice of the prospective transfer, together with a copy of the proposed written agreement to EPA Region 2, the United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, and the United States Department of Justice, in accordance with Section XI of this Decree (Notices) (along with any assertion that such information is protected as Confidential Business Information under 40 C.F.R. Part 2). Any attempt to transfer ownership or operation of the Facility.without complying with this Paragraph constitutes a violation of this Decree.

5. Defendant shall provide a copy of this Consent Decree to all officers, employees, and agents whose duties might reasonably include compliance with any provision of this Decree, as well as to any contractor retained to perform work required under this Consent Decree. Defendant shall condition any such contract upon performance of the work in conformity with the terms of this Consent Decree.

6. In any action to enforce this Consent Decree, Defendant shall not raise as a defense the failure by any of its officers, directors, employees, agents, or contractors to take any actions necessary to comply with the provisions of this Consent Decree.

III. DEFINITIONS

7. Terms used in this Consent Decree that are defined in the CAA or EPCRA or in regulations promulgated pursuant to the CAA or EPCRA shall have the meanings assigned to them in the CAA or EPCRA or such regulations, unless otherwise provided in this Decree. Whenever the terms set forth below are used in this Consent Decree, the following definitions shall apply:

IV. CIVIL PENALTY

8. Within 30 Days after the Effective Date of this Consent Decree, Defendant shall pay the sum of $440,000 as a civil penalty, together with interest accruing from the date on which the Consent Decree is lodged with the Court, at the rate specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 as of the date of lodging.

9. Defendant shall pay the civil penalty due by FedWire Electronic Funds Transfer ("EFT") to the U.S. Department of Justice in accordance with written instructions to be provided to Defendant, following lodging of the Consent Decree, by the Financial Litigation Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of New York, 138 Delaware Avenue Buffalo, NY 14202, (716) 843-5700. At the time of payment, Defendant shall send a copy of the EFT authorization form and the EFT transaction record, together with a transmittal letter, which shall state that the payment is for the civil penalty owed pursuant to the Consent Decree in United States v. E.1. DuPont de Nemours and Company, and shall reference the civil action number and DOJ case number 90-5-2-1-09450, to the United States in accordance with Section XIV of this Decree (Notices); by email to acctsreceivable.CINWD@Oe a. gov: and by mail to:

10. Defendant shall not deduct any penalties paid under this Decree pursuant to this Section or Section VI (Stipulated Penalties) in calculating its federal income tax.

V. COMPLIANCE RE"UIREMENTS

11. After entry of this Consent Decree but no later than January 31, 2016:

VI. STIPULATED PENALTIES

12. Defendant shall be liable for stipulated penalties to the United States for violations of this Consent Decree as specified below. A violation includes failing to perform any obligation required by the terms of this Decree according to all applicable requirements of this Decree and within the specified time schedules established by or approved under this Decree.

13. Late Payment of Civil Penalty If Defendant fails to pay the civil penalty required to be paid under Section IV of this Decree (Civil Penalty) when due, Defendant shall pay a stipulated penalty of $1000.00 per Day for each Day that the payment is late.

14. Failure to Comply with Section V (Compliance Reauirements).

If Defendant fails to comply with the requirements of Section V of this Decree (Compliance Requirements) when due, Defendant shall pay the following stipulated penalties:

15. Stipulated penalties under this Section shall begin to accrue on the Day after performance is due or on the Day a violation occurs, whichever is applicable, and shall continue to accrue until performance is satisfactorily completed or until the violation ceases. Stipulated penalties shall accrue simultaneously for separate violations of this Consent Decree.

16. Defendant shall pay any stipulated penalty within 30 Days of receiving the United States' written demand.

17. The United States may in the unreviewable exercise of its discretion, reduce or waive stipulated penalties otherwise due it under this Consent Decree.

18. Stipulated penalties shall continue to accrue as provided in Paragraph 15, during any Dispute Resolution, but need not be paid until the following:

19. Defendant shall pay stipulated penalties owing to the United States in the manner set forth and with the confirmation notices required by Section XI, except that the transmittal letter shall state that the payment is for stipulated penalties and shall state for which violation(s) the penalties are being paid.

20. If Defendant fails to pay stipulated penalties according to the terms of this Consent Decree, Defendant shall be liable for interest on such penalties, as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1961, accruing as of the date payment became due. Nothing in this Paragraph shall be construed to limit the United States from seeking any remedy otherwise provided by law for Defendant's failure to pay any stipulated penalties, and nothing in this Paragraph shall be construed to limit any of Defendant's defenses, rights and remedies otherwise provided by law.

21. Subject to the provisions of Section IX of this Consent Decree (Effect of Settlement/Reservation of Rights), the stipulated penalties provided for in this Consent Decree shall be in addition to any other rights, remedies, or sanctions available to the United States for Defendant's violation of this Consent Decree or applicable law, and nothing in this Paragraph shall be construed to limit any of Defendant's defenses, rights and remedies otherwise provided by law. Where a violation of this Consent Decree is also a violation of the CAA and EPCRA, Defendant shall be allowed a credit, for any stipulated penalties paid, against any statutory penalties imposed for such violation.

VII. FORCE MAJEURE

22. "Force majeure," for purposes of this Consent Decree, is defined as any event arising from causes beyond the control of Defendant, of any entity controlled by Defendant, or of Defendant's contractors, that delays or prevents the performance of any obligation under this Consent Decree despite Defendant's best efforts to fulfill the obligation. The requirement that Defendant exercise "best efforts to fulfill the obligation" includes using best efforts to anticipate any potential force majeure event and best efforts to address the effects of any such event (a) as it is occurring and (b) after it has occurred to prevent or minimize any resulting delay to the greatest extent possible. "Force Majeure" does not include Defendant's financial inability to perform any obligation under this Consent Decree.

23. If any event occurs or has occurred that may delay the performance of any obligation under this Consent Decree, whether or not caused by a force majeure event, Defendant shall provide notice orally or by electronic or facsimile transmission to the Chief of the Air Compliance Branch, EPA Region 2, within 72 hours of when Defendant first knew that the event might cause a delay. Within seven days thereafter, Defendant shall provide in writing to EPA an explanation and description of the reasons for the delay; the anticipated duration of the delay; all actions taken or to be taken to prevent or minimize the delay; a schedule for implementation of any measures to be taken to prevent or mitigate the delay or the effect of the delay; Defendant's rationale for attributing such delay to a force majeure event if it intends to assert such a claim; and a statement as to whether, in the opinion of Defendant, such event may cause or contribute to an endangerment to public health, welfare or the environment. Defendant shall include with any notice all available documentation supporting the claim that the delay was attributable to a force majeure. Failure to comply with the above requirements shall preclude Defendant from asserting any claim of force majeure for that event for the period of time of such failure to comply, and for any additional delay caused by such failure. Defendant shall be deemed to know of any circumstance of which Defendant, any entity controlled by Defendant, or Defendant's contractors knew or should have known.

24. If EPA agrees that the delay or anticipated delay is attributable to a force majeure event, the time for performance of the obligations under this Consent Decree that are affected by the force majeure event will be extended by EPA for such time as is necessary to complete those obligations. An extension of the time for performance of the obligations affected by the force majeure event shall not, of itself, extend the time for performance of any other obligation. EPA will notify Defendant in writing of the length of the extension, if any, for performance of the obligations affected by the force majeure event.

25. If EPA does not agree that the delay or anticipated delay has been or will be caused by a force majeure event, EPA will notify Defendant in writing of its decision.

26. If Defendant elects to invoke the dispute resolution procedures set forth in Section VIII (Dispute Resolution), it shall do so no later than 30 days after receipt of EPA's written notice. In any such proceeding, Defendant shall have the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that the delay or anticipated delay has been or will be caused by a force majeure event, that the duration of the delay or the extension sought was or will be warranted under the circumstances, that best efforts were exercised to avoid and mitigate the effects of the delay, and that Defendant complied with the requirements of Paragraphs 22 and 23, above. If Defendant carries this burden, the delay at issue shall be deemed not to be a violation by Defendant of the affected obligation of this Consent Decree identified to EPA and the Court.

VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION

27. Unless otherwise expressly provided for in this Consent Decree, the dispute resolution procedures of this Section shall be the exclusive mechanism to resolve disputes arising under or with respect to this Consent Decree. Defendant's failure to seek resolution of a dispute under this Section shall preclude Defendant from raising any such issue as a defense to an action by the United States to enforce any obligation of Defendant arising under this Decree.

28. Informal Dispute Resolution. Any dispute subject to Dispute Resolution under this Consent Decree shall first be the subject of informal negotiations. The dispute shall be considered to have arisen when Defendant sends the United States a written Notice of Dispute. Such Notice of Dispute shall state clearly the matter in dispute. The period of informal negotiations shall not exceed 20 Days from the date the dispute arises, unless that period is modified by written agreement. If the Parties cannot resolve a dispute by informal negotiations, then the position advanced by the United States shall be considered binding unless, within 14 Days after the conclusion of the informal negotiation period, Defendant invokes formal dispute resolution procedures as set forth below.

29. Formal Dispute Resolution. Defendant shall invoke formal dispute resolution procedures, within the time period provided in the preceding Paragraph, by serving on the United States a written Statement of Position regarding the matter in dispute. The Statement of Position shall include, but need not be limited to, any factual data, analysis, or opinion supporting Defendant's position and any supporting documentation relied upon by Defendant.

30. The United States shall serve its Statement of Position within 45 Days of receipt of Defendant's Statement of Position. The United States' Statement of Position shall include, but need not be limited to, any factual data, analysis, or opinion supporting that position and any supporting documentation relied upon by the United States. The United States' Statement of Position shall be binding on Defendant, unless Defendant files a motion for judicial review of the dispute in accordance with the following Paragraph. The time period for when the United States' Statement of Position becomes binding on Defendant and the time period for when Defendant files a motion for judicial review, may be modified by written agreement.

31. Defendant may seek judicial review of the dispute by filing with the Court and serving on the United States, in accordance with Section XI of this Consent Decree (Notices), a motion requesting judicial resolution of the dispute. The motion must be filed within 14 Days of receipt of the United States' Statement of Position pursuant to the preceding Paragraph. The motion shall contain a written statement of Defendant's position on the matter in dispute, including any supporting factual data, analysis, opinion, or documentation, and shall set forth the relief requested and any schedule within which the dispute must be resolved for orderly implementation of the Consent Decree.

32. The United States shall respond to Defendant's motion within the time period allowed by the Local Rules of this Court. Defendant may file a reply memorandum, to the extent permitted by the Local Rules.

33. Standard of Review

34. The invocation of dispute resolution procedures under this Section shall not, by itself, extend, postpone, or affect in any way any obligation of Defendant under this Consent Decree, unless and until final resolution of the dispute so provides. Stipulated penalties with respect to the disputed matter shall continue to accrue from the first Day of noncompliance, but payment shall be stayed pending resolution of the dispute as provided in Paragraph 18. If Defendant does not prevail on the disputed issue, stipulated penalties shall be assessed and paid as provided in Section VT (Stipulated Penalties).

IX. EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT

35. This Consent Decree resolves the civil claims of the United States for the violations alleged in the Complaint filed in this action through the date of lodging.

36. The United States reserves all legal and equitable remedies available to enforce the provisions of this Consent Decree, except as expressly stated in Paragraph 35. This Consent Decree shall not be construed to limit the rights of the United States to obtain penalties or injunctive relief under the CAA or EPCRA or the implementing regulations, or under other federal laws, regulations, or permit conditions, except as expressly specified in Paragraph 35. The United States further reserves all legal and equitable remedies to address any imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment arising at, or posed by, Defendant's Facility, whether related to the violations addressed in this Consent Decree or otherwise.

37. In any subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding initiated by the United States for injunctive relief, civil penalties, or other appropriate relief relating to the Facility, Defendant shall not assert, and may not maintain, any defense or claim based upon the principles of waiver, res judicata, collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, claim preclusion, claim-splitting, or other defenses based upon any contention that the claims raised by the United States in the subsequent proceeding were or should have been brought in the instant case, except with respect to claims that have been specifically resolved pursuant to Paragraph 35 of this Section.

38. This Consent Decree is not a permit, or a modification of any permit, under any federal, State, or local laws or regulations. Defendant is responsible for achieving and maintaining complete compliance with all applicable federal, State, and local laws, regulations, and permits; and Defendant's compliance with this Consent Decree shall be no defense to any action commenced by the United States pursuant to any such laws, regulations, or permits, except as set forth herein. The United States does not, by its consent to the entry of this Consent Decree, warrant or aver in any manner that Defendant's compliance with any aspect of this Consent Decree will result in compliance with provisions of the CAA or EPCRA, or with any other provisions of federal, State, or local laws, regulations, or permits.

39. This Consent Decree does not limit or affect the rights of Defendant or of the United States against any third parties, not party to this Consent Decree, nor does it limit the rights of third parties, not party to this Consent Decree, against Defendant, except as otherwise provided by law.

40. This Consent Decree shall not be construed to create rights in, or grant any cause of action to, any third party not party to this Consent Decree.

X. COSTS

41. The Parties shall bear their own costs of this action, including attorneys' fees, except that the United States shall be entitled to collect the costs (including attorneys' fees) incurred in any action necessary to collect any portion of the civil penalty or any stipulated penalties due but not paid by Defendant.

XI. NOTICES

42. Unless otherwise specified herein, whenever notifications, submissions, or communications are required by this Consent Decree, they shall be made in writing and addressed as follows:

43. Any Party may, by written notice to the other Parties, change its designated notice recipient or notice address provided above.

44. Notices submitted pursuant to this Section shall be deemed submitted upon mailing, unless otherwise provided in this Consent Decree or by mutual agreement of the Parties in writing.

XII. EFFECTIVE DATE

45. The Effective Date of this Consent Decree shall be the date upon which this Consent Decree is entered by the Court or a motion to enter the Consent Decree is granted, whichever occurs first, as recorded on the Court's docket.

XIII. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION

46. The Court shall retain jurisdiction over this case until termination of this Consent Decree, for the purpose of resolving disputes arising under this Decree or entering orders modifying this Decree, pursuant to Sections VII and XIV, or effectuating or enforcing compliance with the terms of this Decree.

XIV. MODIFICATION

47. The terms of this Consent Decree, including any attached appendices, may be modified only by a subsequent written agreement signed by all the Parties. Where the modification constitutes a material change to this Decree, it shall be effective only upon approval by the Court.

XV. TERMINATION

48. After Defendant has completed the requirements of Section V (Compliance Requirements) of this Decree, and has paid the civil penalty and any accrued stipulated penalties as required by this Consent Decree, Defendant may serve upon the United States a Request for Termination, stating that Defendant has satisfied those requirements, together with all necessary supporting documentation.

49. Following receipt by the United States of Defendant's Request for Termination, the Parties shall confer informally concerning the Request and any disagreement that the Parties may have as to whether Defendant has satisfactorily complied with the requirements for termination of this Consent Decree. If the United States agrees that the Decree may be terminated, the Parties shall submit, for the Court's approval, a joint stipulation terminating the Decree.

50. If the United States does not agree that the Decree may be terminated, Defendant may invoke Dispute Resolution under Section VIII of this Decree. However, Defendant shall not seek Dispute Resolution of any dispute regarding termination, under Paragraph 29 of Section VIII, until 45 days after service of its Request for Termination.

XVI. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

51. This Consent Decree shall be lodged with the Court for a period of not less than 30 Days for public notice and comment in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 50.7. The United States reserves the right to withdraw or withhold its consent if the comments regarding the Consent Decree disclose facts or considerations indicating that the Consent Decree is inappropriate, improper, or inadequate. Defendant consents to entry of this Consent Decree without further notice and agrees not to withdraw from or oppose entry of this Consent Decree by the Court or to challenge any provision of the Decree, unless the United States has notified Defendant in writing that it no longer supports entry of the Decree.

XVII. SIGNATORIES/SERVICE

52. Each undersigned representative of Defendant and the Deputy Chief for the Environemental Enforcement Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Department of Justice certifies that he or she is fully authorized to enter into the terms and conditions of this Consent Decree and to execute and legally bind the Party he or she represents to this document.

53. This Consent Decree may be signed in counterparts, and its validity shall not be challenged on that basis. Defendant agrees to accept service of process by mail with respect to all matters arising under or relating to this Consent Decree and to waive the formal service requirements set forth in Rules 4 and 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any applicable Local Rules of this Court including, but not limited to, service of a summons.

XVIII. INTEGRATION

54. This Consent Decree constitutes the final, complete, and exclusive agreement and understanding among the Parties with respect to the settlement embodied in the Decree and supercedes all prior agreements and understandings, whether oral or written, concerning the settlement embodied herein. No other document, nor any representation, inducement, agreement, understanding, or promise, constitutes any part of this Decree or the settlement it represents, nor shall it be used in construing the terms of this Decree.

XIX. FINAL JUDGMENT

55. Upon approval and entry of this Consent Decree by the Court, this Consent Decree shall constitute a final judgment of the Court as to the United States and Defendant.