MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, District Judge.

Plaintiff Symonous-Greta Harris, proceeding pro se, commenced the above-captioned action on April 29, 2016, as ex relatione and authorized representative for Symonous Harris et al., against Defendants BNC Mortgage, Inc., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., U.S. Bank National Association ("U.S. Bank"), Aurora Loan Services LLC, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Structured Asset Securities Corporation et al., Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust and all other parties of interest identified as 1-50 John and Jane Does. (Compl., Docket Entry No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated various state and federal laws by initiating and pursuing a foreclosure action against Plaintiff's property after Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage debt. (Id. at 1-32.) Plaintiff seeks damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. (Id. at 32.) Defendants BNC Mortgage, Inc., Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. and Structured Asset Securities Corporation et al., (the "BNC Defendants") move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (BNC Defs. Mot. to Dismiss ("BNC Mot."), Docket Entry No. 16.) Defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., U.S. Bank and Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust (the "Wells Fargo Defendants"), also move to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Wells Fargo Defs. Mot. to Dismiss ("Wells Fargo Mot."), Docket Entry No. 17.) Plaintiff has not opposed the motions.1 As further explained below, the Court dismisses the Complaint based on claim preclusion.

I. Background

On June 23, 2006, Plaintiff executed a note with BNC Mortgage, Inc. (the "Note"), pertaining to property located at 18 Raleigh Place in Brooklyn, New York (the "Property"). (Compl., 1-2; Note, annexed to Pl. State Ct. Opp'ns to State Ct. Default J. Mot. ("Pl. State Ct. Opp'ns") as Ex. 1, Docket Entry No. 17-8.)2 In August of 2009, Defendant U.S. Bank, commenced a foreclosure action against Plaintiff in New York Supreme Court, Kings County, (the "State Court"), alleging that Plaintiff defaulted on the Note. (State Ct. Foreclosure Compl. ("State Ct. Compl."), Docket Entry No. 17-4.) In January of 2014, U.S. Bank moved for a default judgment. (Pl. State Ct. Opp'ns 4.)3 Plaintiff, through counsel, opposed the motion, arguing that U.S. Bank fraudulently obtained the Note and failed to submit evidence regarding how it came into legal possession of the Note. (Id. at 14-21.) The State Court denied U.S. Bank's motion for default judgment. (Id. at 4.)

In October of 2015, U.S. Bank again moved for a default judgment, this time attaching affidavits evidencing its valid legal possession of the Note. (State Ct. Default J. Mot. ("State Ct. Default Mot."), Docket Entry No. 17-7.) In December of 2015, Plaintiff opposed the motion through counsel, arguing that U.S. Bank failed to show how it came into possession of the Note and also arguing that U.S. Bank's supporting affidavits were fraudulent or otherwise unreliable. (Pl. State Ct. Opp'ns 2-13.) The State Court granted U.S. Bank's motion for a default judgement, finding that U.S. Bank "submitted proof of service of the summons and complaint, proof of the facts constituting the claim, and proof of the Harris default in appearing or answering." (State Ct. Default J. Order, Docket Entry No. 17-10.) The State Court explained that "[i]n opposition, . . . Harris failed to relieve the default . . . by failing to provide a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense." (Id.) The State Court entered its order on March 10, 2016, together with an Order of Reference that appointed a referee to determine the total amount due to U.S. Bank under the Note. (State Ct. Order of Reference, Docket Entry No. 17-11.) Subsequent to the filing of this action and the Defendants' motions, the State Court entered final judgment on January 19, 2017.4

Plaintiff alleges that she is bringing this action "because [in] the State of New York, Supreme Court, [Defendants] filed foreclosure proceedings in 2009," during which Defendants obtained a foreclosure judgment against the Property even though they did not hold a legally valid note on the Property. (Compl. 7-28.) Plaintiff asks that the Court grant her quiet title to the Property and order Defendants to "refund all monies [Plaintiff] paid" pursuant to the Note. (Id. at 28-29, 32.)

II. Discussion

a. Standard of review

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must construe the complaint liberally, "accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Concord Assoc's, L.P. v. Entm't Prop. Trust, 817 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)); see also Tsirelman v. Daines, 794 F.3d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1997)). A complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)); see also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. ex rel. St. Vincent Catholic Med. Ctrs. Ret. Plan v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt. Inc., 712 F.3d 705, 717-18 (2d Cir. 2013). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must be mindful that a plaintiff's pleadings should be held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105 (1976)); see Wiley v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that courts must liberally construe papers submitted by pro se litigants "to make the strongest arguments they suggest"); Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly, the court "remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally").

b. Claim Preclusion

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are precluded because Plaintiff litigated — or could have litigated — the claims in the State Court foreclosure action. (BNC Defs. Mem. in Supp. of BNC Mot. 6-8, Docket Entry No. 16-5; Wells Fargo Defs. Mem. in Supp. of Wells Fargo Mot. 12-17, Docket Entry No. 17-1.) The Court agrees.

"The federal courts generally have . . . consistently accorded preclusive effect to issues decided by state courts." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980). State court judgments may preclude a federal action under two related but distinct doctrines. Proctor v. LeClaire, 715 F.3d 401, 411 (2d Cir. 2013). "Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in th[e] [previous] action . . . ." Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1463 (2d Cir. 1996). "Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, [] applies not to claims or to causes of action as a whole but to issues." Id. at 414 (citing Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 1996). A court can take judicial notice of state court decisions on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rates Tech. Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2012) ("We may `take judicial notice of a document filed in another court . . . to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Worthy-Pugh v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 664 F. App'x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming a district court's decision granting a defendant's motion to dismiss where the district court found that Plaintiff's action was precluded by a prior state court foreclosure action); Graham v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 156 F.Supp.3d 491, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (dismissing federal complaint on a motion to dismiss where preclusion was found based on a state court judgment of foreclosure and sale); Swiatkowski v. Citibank, 745 F.Supp.2d 150, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (same).

"Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of the [s]tate from which the judgments emerged would do so. . . ." Allen, 449 U.S. at 96; see also Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 191 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[I]n order to determine the preclusive effect of a state-court decision, a federal court must look to the law of that state and should not give the state-court decision any greater preclusive effect than the courts of that state would give it. . . ."). Thus, the Court must apply New York law to determine whether Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.5

A defendant moving to dismiss an action on the basis of claim preclusion must show "(1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the same adverse parties or those in privity with them; and (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been raised, in the prior action." Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., 779 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation and alterations omitted); see also Duane Reade, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Under both New York law and federal law, the doctrine of . . . claim preclusion, provides that `[a] final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties . . . from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.'" (citation and alteration omitted)).

Here, the elements of claim preclusion are satisfied. First, the State Court entered a judgement of foreclosure and sale on the Property against Plaintiff, which is an adjudication on the merits. (State Ct. Default J. Order; State Ct. Order of Reference); see Norex Petrol. Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The law is well established that a default judgment is deemed a[] conclusive adjudication on the merits . . . ."); Dudla v. P.M. Veglio LLC, No. 13-CV-0333, 2016 WL 1068120, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2016) ("Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, . . . [a] default judgment functions as a final judgment on the merits." (citing Saud v. Bank of N.Y., 929 F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1991)). In addition, at least two unpublished opinions from the Second Circuit have held that a judgment of foreclosure and sale in a state court action constitutes an adjudication on the merits for the purposes of claim preclusion. See, e.g., Worthy-Pugh, 664 F. App'x at 22; De Masi v. Country Wide Home Loans, 481 F. App'x 644, 645 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming a district court's dismissal of an action on claim preclusion grounds where plaintiff's action was related to a prior state court foreclosure action because "[u]nder New York law, a final judgement of the merits of an action precludes . . . all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions" (citation omitted)); see also Fequiere v. Tribeca Lending, No. 14-CV-812, 2016 WL 1057000, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2016) (same); Graham, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 509 (same).

Second, this action involves parties who were either parties in the State Court action or were privies to those parties. The named parties in the State Court action were Defendants U.S. Bank, the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust and Plaintiff, all of whom are named parties in this action. (Compl. 1, State Ct. Foreclosure Compl.) In addition, based on Plaintiff's allegations, the other named Defendants were in privity with U.S. Bank in the State Court action due to their interests in and involvement with Plaintiff's Note. (See Compl.); see also Fequiere, 2016 WL 1057000, at *6 (finding that the defendants, who were not named in a state court foreclosure action, were in privity with the state-court plaintiff because of their alleged interests in the federal plaintiff's/state-court defendant's mortgage); Graham, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 509 (same); Swiatkowski, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 171 & n.11 (same); Yieser v. GMAC Mortg. Corp., 535 F.Supp.2d 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same).

Third, while Plaintiff's arguments to the State Court in support of her request for a quiet title for the Property are not as extensive as the arguments presented here, the gravamen of the arguments are the same — that Defendants had no right to foreclose on the Property because they did not hold a legally valid note. (Compare Pl. State Ct. Opp'ns 1-21 with Compl. 1-32.) Moreover, both this action and the State Court action are based on the same set of facts relating to the foreclosure of the Property. (See Compl.; State Court Default J. Order.) Therefore, Plaintiffs claims were or could have been raised in the State Court action. See De Masi, 481 F. App'x at 646 ("[T]he district court correctly determin[ed] that [the plaintiff] was precluded from relitigating her claims in federal court because the New York Supreme Court had previously entered final judgment in three cases arising out of the same set of operative facts, namely, the. . . foreclosure on [the plaintiff's] home."); Swiatkowski, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 172 (finding that a plaintiff's claims were or could have been brought in a state court foreclosure action where the plaintiff's claims were based on "the allegation that [the] defendants improperly obtained a [j]udgment of [f]oreclosure and [s]ale"); Yieser, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (finding that, "[b]ecause the plaintiffs could have presented the same claims they now assert . . . as defenses or counterclaims in the action for foreclosure, the doctrine of res judicata bars this litigation" (collecting cases)). Although Plaintiff was the defendant in the State Court action, she could have raised all of the claims she presents here as counterclaims or defenses in the State Court action. See Fequiere, 2016 WL 1057000, at *7 (finding that the plaintiff's claims alleging "that [the] defendants improperly obtained [a] [f]oreclosure [j]udgment" were or could have been brought in a state court foreclosure action against her property); Graham, 156 F. Supp. 3d at 509 (finding that a plaintiff's claims were or could have been brought in a state court foreclosure action because "New York courts have held that a defendant in a foreclosure action should assert claims [related to] the mortgage agreement as defenses against the plaintiff lender in the original foreclosure action" (collecting cases)).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims in this action are precluded by the State Court action.6

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint.7

SO ORDERED.