FREDERICK J. SCULLIN, Jr., District Judge.
Plaintiff William C. Queal, Jr. brought this action pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) ("Act"), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner"), denying his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), together with Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 10. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 10, 11.
Plaintiff filed an application for benefits on September 30, 2006, alleging disability beginning on October 1, 2004. See Administrative Record ("AR") at 20. Plaintiff's application was denied; and, after a hearing, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Marie Greener issued an unfavorable written decision on October 21, 2008. See id. at 47-56. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration ("Appeals Council") remanded; and, following a supplemental hearing, ALJ Greener issued a second unfavorable decision on October 26, 2009. See id. at 63-80. On September 21, 2011, the Appeals Council remanded again, directing that the case be assigned to a new ALJ. See id. at 172-75.
Plaintiff then had a hearing before ALJ Elizabeth W. Koennecke, who issued an unfavorable written decision on April 18, 2012. See AR at 20-41. In her written decision, the ALJ made the following findings "[a]fter careful consideration of all the evidence. . . ."
See id. (citations omitted).
The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on March 26, 2013, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. See AR at 10-13. Plaintiff then commenced this action on May 3, 2013, filing a supporting brief on October 30, 2013. See Dkt Nos. 1, 10. Defendant filed a response brief on December 16, 2013. See Dkt. No. 11.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff advances two main arguments. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously gave his treating physicians' opinions less than controlling weight and that, as a result, there was not substantial evidence to support the ALJ's findings with respect to whether his impairment met or medically equaled those listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, §12.04, and with respect to his residual functional capacity. Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's conclusion that his substance abuse was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability. See generally Dkt. No. 10, Pl.'s Br.
Absent legal error, a court will uphold the Commissioner's final determination if there is substantial evidence to support it. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence to mean "`more than a mere scintilla'" of evidence and "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quotation omitted). To be eligible for SSI, a claimant must show that he suffers from a disability within the meaning of the Act. The Act defines "disability" as an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to cause death or last for twelve consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). To determine if a claimant has sustained a disability within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process:
For this test, the burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps and on the Commissioner for the fifth step, if the analysis proceeds that far. See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
The Commissioner's regulations instruct that
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (emphasis added). When affording a treating physician's opinion less than controlling weight, the ALJ "will always give good reasons" for doing so. Id. To that end,
Brickhouse v. Astrue, 331 F. App'x 875, 877 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 143 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). In particular, treating physician opinions are "`not afforded controlling weight where . . . the treating physician issued opinions that are not consistent with other substantial evidence in the record, such as the opinions of other medical experts.'" Petrie v. Astrue, 412 F. App'x 401, 405 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam)). "The report of a consultative physician may constitute such substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1039).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by affording less than controlling weight to the opinions of Drs. Camillo, Michaels, Savino, and Kimball. However, the ALJ discussed the opinions of other medical experts whose opinions contradicted those of the treating physicians. See AR at 30-32. Additionally, with respect to Dr. Camillo's opinion, the ALJ noted that Dr. Camillo is Plaintiff's former treating psychiatrist. See AR at 33. The ALJ thoroughly discussed a number of case notes from Dr. Camillo's clinic that were inconsistent with his opinion, including a mental status examination. See id. The ALJ's written decision also considered other facts from the record that were inconsistent with Dr. Camillo's opinion, such as Plaintiff's self-reports of only "very episodic instances of isolation" together with his daily activities including going to a diner for coffee daily, going to the YMCA twice per week, and missing his appointments only infrequently. See id. The Court finds that the ALJ offered sufficient reasons for affording Dr. Camillo's opinion less than controlling weight.
With respect to Dr. Michaels' opinion, the ALJ noted that Dr. Michaels is Plaintiff's former psychiatrist and that the treating relationship lasted 28 days. See AR at 35. The ALJ further noted that Dr. Michaels' opinion was provided less than two weeks after Plaintiff's discharge from Clifton Springs Hospital & Clinic and before Plaintiff's longest period of sobriety, during which he displayed significant improvement in function. See id. Additionally, the ALJ discussed a number of progress notes from Dr. Michaels' clinic that were inconsistent with her opinion, including Plaintiff's awareness of coping skills and progress with decreasing worry and projection. See id. Finally, the ALJ considered evidence from Plaintiff's later medical records at Mercy Center and Community Clinic that tended to show that Plaintiff would "get out of his apartment on most days" in order to socialize, shop, attend church, volunteer, and attend medical appointments. See id. The Court finds that the ALJ offered sufficient reasons for affording Dr. Michaels' opinion less than controlling weight.
With respect to Dr. Savino's opinion, the ALJ identified Dr. Savino as Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist. See AR at 35. The ALJ then discussed the extent to which she found Dr. Savino's opinion to be inconsistent with the record. For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff received his highest Global Assessment of Function ("GAF") score to date at his initial interview at the Community Clinic. See id. at 36. Additionally, the ALJ noted that, although Dr. Savino opined that Plaintiff's functioning was limited by insomnia, Plaintiff's treatment for insomnia was essentially minimal. See id. Perhaps most importantly, the ALJ noted that Dr. Savino's assessment took place less than one month after Plaintiff suffered a major relapse of drug and alcohol use in December of 2011. See id. The Court finds that the ALJ offered sufficient reasons for affording Dr. Savino's opinion less than controlling weight.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to address Dr. Kimball's opinion as that of a treating source. The Court finds this argument to be without merit. The record shows that Dr. Kimball performed a consultative examination on Plaintiff on April 29, 2009, through the New York State Department of Temporary and Disability Assistance. See AR at 572. Dr. Kimball noted in his report that he had seen Plaintiff for an evaluation at Mercy Center. See id. at 573. However, the same report also stated that Plaintiff "sees Dr. Camill[o] and nurse, Joyce Combs, RN, is his counselor" when he attends outpatient services as Mercy Center. See id. at 575. Thus, it appears that Dr. Kimball saw Plaintiff once at the Mercy Center, was not his regular care provider there, and then later examined him while working for New York State in a different capacity. The Court finds that the ALJ did not err by declining to find a treatment relationship between Plaintiff and Dr. Kimball under those circumstances.
In summary, for the above-stated reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ properly applied the treating physician rule with respect to the opinions of Drs. Camillo, Michaels, Savino, and Kimball.
Under Listing 12.04, Affective Disorders, a claimant is presumptively disabled when he meets his burden of showing that he suffers from a "disturbance of mood, accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive syndrome." Listing 12.04. "The required level of severity . . . is met when the requirements in both [paragraphs] A and B are satisfied[:]"
In this case, Plaintiff argues that "[t]he comprehensive medical evidence has shown, and the ALJ does not dispute, that Plaintiff satisfies [paragraph] (A)" of Listing 12.04. See Dkt. No. 10, Pl.'s Br., at 20. He then argues that his impairments amount to marked limitations in all four of the paragraph B criteria, even absent his substance abuse. See id. at 21.
The ALJ made no express finding with respect to the paragraph A criteria. However, she did find that Plaintiff failed to meet the paragraph B criteria. See AR at 28. In particular, the ALJ found that, absent his substance abuse, Plaintiff "has mild restriction of activities of daily living; mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning; moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; and no episodes of decompensation." See id. In support of these findings, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff successfully obtained a driver's license, that he worked for several years as a direct care aide, requiring significant mental demands, and that he reported to multiple care providers that he was "able to perform a range of daily activities independently, including caring for his personal needs, cooking, doing general cleaning and doing his own laundry." See id. at 29.
Additionally, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's "problems in social functioning occurred in limited circumstances" when he abstained from substance abuse from August of 2009 through the end of November 2011.
Finally, the ALJ emphasized the fact that Plaintiff was able to live on his own and manage his own medications upon his discharge from the supportive apartment program at Transitional Living Services of Northern New York. See id. at 35. The Court finds that this evidence constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that Plaintiff did not meet the criteria listed in paragraph B of Listing 12.04. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
The Act precludes disability benefits where drug and alcohol abuse is a "contributing factor material to" the determination of disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C), 1382c(a)(3)(J). The relevant inquiry in this context is "whether we would still find you disabled if you stopped using drugs or alcohol." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(1), 416.935(b)(1). In other words, "[i]f we determine that your remaining limitations would not be disabling, we will find that your drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the determination of disability." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(b)(2)(i), 416.935(b)(2)(i). The claimant bears the burden to prove that his drug addiction or alcoholism was not material to the determination of disability. See Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff argues that his treating physicians and other medical sources assessed extreme and marked limitations even during period of sobriety. In her written decision, however, the ALJ found that Plaintiff "has not been a reliable historian or particularly truthful about the extent of his substance abuse, as noted by his medical professionals." See AR at 31. For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported in March 2012 that he had last used in 2009, when an inpatient hospital record from late 2011 showed a positive drug screen. See id. The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff had reported drinking 12 to 20 beers every day until December 3, 2011. See id. In so finding, the ALJ applied the correct two-step credibility analysis. See id. at 31; Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App'x 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010).
Additionally, the ALJ in her written decision found that "the record establishes a clear period of sustained sobriety" from the fall of 2009 through late 2010, with only minor relapses in 2011. See AR at 37. The ALJ based this finding upon records indicating that Plaintiff's mother, who previously had rejected him in part because of his substance abuse, had renewed their relationship. See AR at 31-32. According to the ALJ, "[t]his suggests that [Plaintiff's] mother believed that he had sustained some period of sobriety." See id. Having established a significant period of sobriety, the ALJ found that she was able to "clearly separate" Plaintiff's substance abuse from his other limitations. See id. at 32.
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff "has experienced a significant improvement in his mental function with prolonged abstinence from drug or alcohol use. . . ." See id. In particular, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to control his own medication beginning in January of 2010. See id. The written decision also noted "no significant decline in the claimant's functioning" during this time, with increasing GAF scores throughout 2011. See id. at 32-33. Finally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to live alone beginning in August of 2011. See id. at 33. According to the ALJ, this evidence showed "gradual improvement in mental function over the length of the period of sobriety." See id. at 36.
For these reasons, the Court finds that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's substance abuse was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.
Having reviewed the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
