MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JOI ELIZABETH PEAKE, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Cindy Gaffney ("Plaintiff") brought this action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended (42 U.S.C. § 405(g)), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for judgment, and the administrative record has been certified to the Court for review.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff protectively filed her application for DIB on July 27, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of June 18, 2010, later amended to July 15, 2012. (Tr. at 13, 150-51.)2 Her claim was denied initially (Tr. at 57-70, 89-97), and that determination was upheld on reconsideration (Tr. at 71-86, 99-106). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing de novo before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. at 107.) Plaintiff attended the subsequent hearing on August 19, 2014, along with her attorney and an impartial vocational expert. (Tr. at 13.)

The ALJ ultimately concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. at 23-24.) On April 27, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the decision, thereby making the ALJ's conclusion the Commissioner's final decision for purposes of judicial review. (Tr. at 1-6.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal law "authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of social security benefits." Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 2006). However, "the scope of [the] review of [such an administrative] decision . . . is extremely limited." Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1981). "The courts are not to try the case de novo." Oppenheim v. Finch, 495 F.2d 396, 397 (4th Cir. 1974). Instead, "a reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the ALJ [underlying the denial of benefits] if they are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard." Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal brackets omitted).

"Substantial evidence means `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). "It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance." Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence." Hunter, 993 F.2d at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In reviewing for substantial evidence, the court should not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the [ALJ]." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). "Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. "The issue before [the reviewing court], therefore, is not whether [the claimant] is disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).

In undertaking this limited review, the Court notes that in administrative proceedings, "[a] claimant for disability benefits bears the burden of proving a disability." Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1981). In this context, "disability" means the "`inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).3

"The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4)). "Under this process, the Commissioner asks, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the national economy." Id.

A finding adverse to the claimant at any of several points in this five-step sequence forecloses a disability designation and ends the inquiry. For example, "[t]he first step determines whether the claimant is engaged in `substantial gainful activity.' If the claimant is working, benefits are denied. The second step determines if the claimant is `severely' disabled. If not, benefits are denied." Bennett v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

On the other hand, if a claimant carries his or her burden at each of the first two steps, and establishes at step three that the impairment "equals or exceeds in severity one or more of the impairments listed in Appendix I of the regulations," then "the claimant is disabled." Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177. Alternatively, if a claimant clears steps one and two, but falters at step three, i.e., "[i]f a claimant's impairment is not sufficiently severe to equal or exceed a listed impairment, the ALJ must assess the claimant's residual function[al] capacity (`RFC')." Id. at 179.4 Step four then requires the ALJ to assess whether, based on that RFC, the claimant can "perform past relevant work"; if so, the claimant does not qualify as disabled. Id. at 179-80. However, if the claimant establishes an inability to return to prior work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, which "requires the Commissioner to prove that a significant number of jobs exist which the claimant could perform, despite [the claimant's] impairments." Hines, 453 F.3d at 563. In making this determination, the ALJ must decide "whether the claimant is able to perform other work considering both [the claimant's RFC] and [the claimant's] vocational capabilities (age, education, and past work experience) to adjust to a new job." Hall, 658 F.2d at 264-65. If, at this step, the Government cannot carry its "evidentiary burden of proving that [the claimant] remains able to work other jobs available in the community," the claimant qualifies as disabled. Hines, 453 F.3d at 567.

III. DISCUSSION

In the present case, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in "substantial gainful activity" since July 15, 2012, her amended alleged onset date. Plaintiff therefore met her burden at step one of the sequential evaluation process. At step two, the ALJ further determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:

(Tr. at 15.) The ALJ found at step three that none of these impairments, either individually or in combination, met or equaled any disability listing. (Tr. at 17-18.) Therefore, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's RFC and determined that she could perform light work with the following additional limitations:

(Tr. at 19.) Based on this determination and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined at step four of the analysis that Plaintiff remained capable of performing her past relevant work as an office worker. (Tr. at 22.) The ALJ also made an alternative finding at step five that, given Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the vocational expert as to these factors, she could perform other jobs available in the national economy. (Tr. at 22-23.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. at 23-24.)

Plaintiff now contends that the ALJ's RFC assessment both (1) failed to give a complete function-by-function analysis as to Plaintiff's mental RFC as required by Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015), and (2) failed to properly weigh the opinion evidence. Plaintiff further argues that with respect to steps four and five of the sequential analysis, the ALJ failed to resolve apparent conflicts between the vocational expert testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). After careful consideration, the Court finds that none of these contentions merit remand, as set out below.

A. Mental RFC Determination

1. Concentration, persistence, and pace

At step three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace. In Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit explained that where such limitations are reflected at step three, the ALJ should address those limitations in assessing the RFC or should explain why the limitations do not affect the claimant's ability to work. The Fourth Circuit specifically held that "an ALJ does not account for a claimant's limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work." Mascio, 780 F.3d at 638 (quotation omitted). This is because "the ability to perform simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task. Only the latter limitation would account for a claimant's limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace." Id. The Fourth Circuit further noted that

Id. (internal citation omitted). However, as previously noted in other cases in this District, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Mascio

Tolbert v. Colvin, 1:15CV437, 2016 WL 6956629, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 28, 2016) (finding that RFC limitations to "simple, routine, repetitive tasks with simple, short instructions, in a job that required making only simple, work-related decisions, involved few workplace changes, and required only frequent contact with supervisors, co-workers, or the public" sufficiently accounted for a Plaintiff's moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace in light of the ALJ's explanation throughout the administrative decision) (quoting Jones v. Colvin, No. 7:14CV00273, 2015 WL 5056784, at *10-12 (W.D. Va. Aug. 20, 2015)).

In the present case, as noted above, the ALJ found at step three of the sequential analysis that Plaintiff had "moderate difficulties" with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace. The ALJ then explained that, although Plaintiff "has reported difficulties with memory and concentration . . ., [her] daily activities show that she retains sufficient concentration to perform simple tasks, in that she can prepare meals, do laundry, and manage a checkbook." (Tr. at 18.)

In setting the RFC, the ALJ then limited Plaintiff to "simple, routine, and repetitive tasks" with "only occasional decision-making" and "only occasional changes in the work setting." (Tr. at 19.) In making this assessment, the ALJ again referred to Plaintiff's activities of daily living, noting that she "shops at the grocery store once or twice per week" and "also cares for her twelve-year-old adopted daughter." (Tr. at 20.) In addition, the ALJ noted that in the third-party function report, Plaintiff's husband stated that Plaintiff "is competent to handle financial matters, such as paying bills, counting change, managing a savings account, and using a checkbook." (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff's mental health treatment record, and noted that the treatment records reflect that "her psychological symptoms can be managed when she sees a psychiatrist on a regular basis for medication management." (Tr. at 20.) Finally, the ALJ placed "great weight" on the opinion of state agency psychological consultant Richard H. Cyr-McMillon, Ph.D., who also found that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace and step three, but nevertheless concluded that she could perform simple tasks and function adequately in a stable environment. (Tr. at 22.) As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Cyr-McMillon posited that Plaintiff "may have some difficulty adapting to changes in the workplace but can avoid hazards and should be able to adapt to changes associated with the performance of simple tasks and function adequately in a stable work assignment in a position that is not highly production oriented or socially demanding." (Tr. at 22, 82.) The ALJ then incorporated these various limitations in the RFC, by limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, and also limiting her to only occasional decision-making and only occasional changes in the work setting.

In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit explained that "`[r]emand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review.'" Mascio, 780 F.3d at 636 (citing Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)). However, in this case, as explained above, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's mental limitations at length and set out the reasons for the RFC determination, ultimately relying on Plaintiff's activities of daily living, mental health treatment records, and the opinion of Dr. Cyr-McMillon in setting Plaintiff's RFC with respect to her mental limitations. Thus, sufficient explanation is provided to allow for meaningful judicial review, and the ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence.

2. Social Functioning

Plaintiff also contends under Mascio that her moderate limitations in social functioning were not adequately reflected in the RFC. In this regard, at step three of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in social functioning. (Tr. at 18.) In making that determination, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified that "she avoids social invitations because she does not like crowds or social pressure to make new friends." (Tr. at 18.) However, the ALJ further found noted that "Dr. Cyr-McMillon, a psychological consultant, opined that [Plaintiff] retained sufficient social functioning to work in an environment that is not socially demanding." (Tr. at 18.)

In setting the RFC, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to only occasional interaction with the public on an occasional basis and only occasional interaction with coworkers, but found that Plaintiff could respond appropriately to supervision. (Tr. at 19.) In making this determination, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's "statements about significant difficulties with interpersonal relations is contradicted by her husband's third party function report, where he indicated that she does not have problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others. (Tr. at 20, 181-182.) That report specifically notes that Plaintiff gets along "well" with authority figures such as bosses. (Tr. at 182.)

In addition, in considering the opinion evidence, the ALJ discounted the opinion evidence from Ms. Murray, a clinical social worker, to the extent she rated Plaintiff as having marked limitation in her ability to interact appropriately with coworkers. (Tr. at 21, 757.) The ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Cyr-McMillon, who found that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in social functioning, but that she can "relate appropriately to supervisors" and follow simple instructions in a setting that is "task versus public oriented." (Tr. at 82.) The ALJ then set the RFC, finding that "[d]ue to her psychological symptoms, [Plaintiff] can only interact with the public on an occasional basis. She can occasionally interact with coworkers, but not work in tandem with them. She can respond appropriately to supervision. She can perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. She can tolerate only occasional decision-making. She can tolerate only occasional changes in the work setting." (Tr. at 19).5 Thus, the ALJ considered Plaintiff's social functioning at length and specifically including social limitations in the RFC, providing sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful judicial review, and supported by substantial evidence.

3. Activities of Daily Living

Plaintiff also contends under Mascio that her mild limitations in activities of daily living were not adequately reflected in the RFC. However, these contentions are equally unpersuasive.

Adams v. Colvin, No. 1:15CV00673, 2016 WL 4007608, at *7 (M.D.N.C. July 26, 2016). In this case, as in Adams, "[a]ssuming that Mascio applies even in the context of mild limitations in the broad areas of functioning (i.e., the lowest of four levels above `none'), the ALJ here sufficiently explained why Plaintiff's mild limitations in daily activities . . . did not translate into further restrictions in the RFC." Id. at *7.

With respect to Plaintiff's activities of daily living, at step three the ALJ found mild restrictions, based on Plaintiff's testimony that "she has difficulty performing manipulative tasks, such as sewing and peeling potatoes, but she attributed the limitation to her physical impairments." (Tr. at 18.) To the extent Plaintiff now contends that the RFC failed to account for this step three determination, the Court notes that Plaintiff has failed to point to any other mental RFC limitations that should have been included in connection with her mild limitations in activities of daily living. Moreover, in setting the RFC, the ALJ did address Plaintiff's mild limitations in activities of daily living. Specifically, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff shops at the grocery store and cares for her twelve-year-old adopted daughter (Tr. at 20), she takes care of her husband and daughter by cooking and doing laundry, she drives, and she handles financial matters. (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ also gave great weight to State agency consultant Dr. Cyr-McMillon's opinion that Plaintiff had mild restrictions in activities of daily living but could still understand and perform simple tasks and could "adapt to changes associated with the performance of simple tasks and function adequately in a stable work assignment." (Tr. at 22, 81.) Again, this discussion provides a sufficient explanation for the omission of any other limitations from the RFC related to activities of daily living.

B. Treating Physician Opinion

Plaintiff next disputes the ALJ's weighing of the opinion evidence. Plaintiff specifically challenges the ALJ's application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), better known as the "treating physician rule." The Fourth Circuit has held that for claims, like Plaintiff's, filed before March 24, 2017, ALJs must evaluate medical opinion evidence in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) and the "treating physician rule" embodied within the regulations. Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 873 F.3d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 2017). Under these regulations, "medical opinions" are "statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1)). While the regulations mandate that the ALJ evaluate each medical opinion presented to him, generally "more weight is given to the medical opinion of a source who has examined you than to the medical opinion of a medical source who has not examined you." Brown, 873 F.3d at 255 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)). The ALJ generally accords the greatest weight—controlling weight—to the well-supported opinion of a treating source as to the nature and severity of a claimant's impairment, based on the ability of treating sources to

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). However, if a treating source's opinion is not "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques or is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record," it is not entitled to controlling weight. Social Security Ruling 96-2p, Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Giving Controlling Weight to Treating Source Medical Opinions, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (July 2, 1996) ("SSR"); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Brown, 873 F.3d at 255; Craig, 76 F.3d at 590; Mastro, 270 F.3d at 178.6 Instead, the opinion must be evaluated and weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(c)(6), including (1) the length of the treatment relationship, (2) the frequency of examination, (3) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (4) the supportability of the opinion, (5) the consistency of the opinion with the record, (6) whether the source is a specialist, and (7) any other factors that may support or contradict the opinion. Moreover, even if an opinion by a treating physician is given controlling weight with respect to the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments, opinions by physicians regarding the ultimate issue of whether a plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the Act are never accorded controlling weight because the decision on that issue is reserved for the Commissioner alone. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d).

Where an ALJ declines to give controlling weight to a treating source opinion, he must "give good reasons in [his] . . . decision for the weight" assigned, taking the above factors into account. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). "This requires the ALJ to provide sufficient explanation for `meaningful review' by the courts." Thompson v. Colvin, No. 1:09CV278, 2014 WL 185218, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 2014) (quotations omitted).

In the present case, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician Dr. Feraru with regard to Plaintiff's physical limitations. As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Feraru provided the following opinion:

(Tr. at 21, 761.) The ALJ gave three reasons for assigning this opinion little weight. First, "Dr. Feraru failed to give the basis for the opinion." (Tr. at 21.) In this regard, Plaintiff testified that Dr. Feraru did not perform any type of functional evaluation (Tr. at 40), and there is nothing in Dr. Feraru's opinion reflecting the basis for the limitations set out there. Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Feraru's opinion was "not supported by [Dr. Feraru's] treatment notes." (Tr. at 21.) In this regard, the ALJ set out Dr. Feraru's treatment notes throughout the opinion. The ALJ first noted that Plaintiff visited Dr. Feraru on June 18, 2012, just prior to the alleged onset date, for an evaluation of the pain in her lower back and left hip, and "reported that Prednisone had improved her condition and that her pain was better after using a Dosepak." (Tr. at 15.) This treatment record specifically reflects that "the Prednisone helped her a lot" and that her low back pain was better with "some discomfort" remaining. (Tr. at 265.) Her motor function, sensation, reflexes, and gait were all normal, with a negative straight leg raise test. (Tr. at 267.) This June 2012 record also includes a report of Plaintiff's 2010 lumbar MRI, which reflected facet joint arthropathy and degenerative disc disease but no definite nerve root impingement. (Tr. at 15, 266, 609.) The ALJ also described a treatment record from May 2014, near the time of Dr. Feraru's opinion, when Plaintiff visited Dr. Feraru for an evaluation of her neck pain and to review the results of a recent MRI. (Tr. at 16, 561-64.) As noted by the ALJ, "Dr. Feraru noted [Plaintiff's] neck and right-arm pain had improved with prednisone. The MRI showed disc bulges at multiple levels of the cervical spine, but no root compression. Of the physical examination, Dr. Feraru noted that [Plaintiff's] strength in all five motor groups was a 5/5." (Tr. at 16, 561-64, 603.) The treatment records reflect that Plaintiff's neck pain had increased over a few days in April 2014 (Tr. at 574), but had improved by the next visit a month later in May 2014 and she "overall feels better," with normal strength, reflexes, sensation, and gait. (Tr. at 561-64.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff visited Dr. Feraru in January 2013, noting that Plaintiff's headaches were infrequent. (Tr. at 16.) At that visit, Plaintiff was following up regarding her back pain, and was "doing better with meds," with normal strength, sensation, reflexes and gait. (Tr. at 512-15.) The ALJ then set out the following evaluation of Dr. Ferarus's treatment records:

(Tr. at 20.)7 Third, in giving Dr. Feraru's opinion little weight, the ALJ found that the opinion is not supported by "other objective medical evidence." (Tr. at 21.) That medical evidence is included in the above summary, including the MRI results reflecting facet joint arthropathy and degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine but no definite nerve root impingement, (Tr. at 15, 266, 609), and disc bulges in the cervical spine, but no root compression (Tr. at 16, 561-64, 603). In addition, Plaintiff's annual physical examination at Bethany Medical Center in April 2014, only a few days before the date of Dr. Feraru's opinion, reflects that Plaintiff "feels well with minor complaints." (Tr. at 643.) At that annual physical, the review of musculoskeletal system reflects that "Back Pain, Joint Pain, . . . Muscle Weakness and Myalgia" were "Not Present," and that physical "examination of the lumbrosacral spine reveals — no tenderness to palpation, no pain, no swelling, edema or erythema of surrounding tissue and normal lumbosacral spine movements." (Tr. at 644-45.) Similarly, Plaintiff's neck had a "full range of motion" and was "non-tender." (Tr. at 645.) She had normal muscle strength, normal bulk, contour and tone, and normal gait and station. (Tr. at 645.) These findings are similar to the prior annual physical examination in January 2013 (Tr. at 686-87), as well as the later records from July 2014 (Tr. at 766-68). Thus, the ALJ provided sufficient explanation for the weight given to Dr. Feraru's opinion, supported by substantial evidence in the record.8

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ's weighing of some of the other opinion evidence, although none of the other opinions are from treating physicians under the treating physician rule. First, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision to give "partial weight" to the opinion of the consultative examiner Dr. Troxler. As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Troxler opined that Plaintiff "could perform simple tasks at a reduced rate of efficiency, that she would have difficulty interacting appropriately with others at work, and that she would have difficulty tolerating the stress of full-time employment." (Tr. at 16.) As to that opinion, the ALJ gave the opinion only partial weight. First, the ALJ noted that it was "based on a one-time examination." (Tr. at 21.) In that regard, it is undisputed that Dr. Troxler saw Plaintiff only once, and Dr. Troxler's report does not reflect that she reviewed Plaintiff's records or had access to any other information to provide a broader view. Second, the ALJ found that Dr. Troxler's opinion was "not fully consistent with the claimant's ongoing treatment notes." (Tr. at 21.) The ALJ noted, for example, that treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff's "psychological symptoms can be managed when she sees a psychiatrist on a regular basis for medication management." (Tr. at 20, 253.) The ALJ also noted that according to Plaintiff's husband, Plaintiff "does not have problems getting along with family, friends, neighbors, or others." (Tr. at 20.)

Similarly, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision to give little weight to a May 11, 2010 opinion from a Licensed Psychological Associate, Suzanne Ramsey, who opined that Plaintiff "can barely use her hands; she cannot sit for long or stand for long; she is reactive and gets upset easily. Her irritability and frustration is often played out with others and her people skills are sketchy." (Tr. at 21, 525.) The ALJ gave this opinion little weight first because it was "not supported by clinical findings." (Tr. at 21.) In that regard, there are no supporting records from Ms. Ramsay and no clinical findings made to support the assertions. Second, the ALJ also found that the assessment of Plaintiff's physical limitations was entitled to little weight because it was "outside of the scope of treatment for a mental health therapist." (Tr. at 21.) In this regard, it is undisputed that Ms. Ramsey was a mental health therapist, and she gives no basis for her evaluation of Plaintiff's physical condition and no expertise for opining with respect to Plaintiff's physical limitations.

Finally, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision to give partial weight to an assessment by Ms. Murray, a clinical social worker, in August 2014. (Tr. at 21, 756-58.) Ms. Murry opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations is some areas of functioning, and marked limitations in her ability to interact appropriately with co-workers. The ALJ gave partial weight to the opinion with regard to the moderate limitations because the opinion was "somewhat consistent with the treatment record," and the ALJ took those moderate limitations into account in setting the RFC as discussed above with regard to the mental RFC. However, the ALJ discounted Ms. Murray's opinion that Plaintiff had marked limitations in her ability to interact appropriately with coworkers. The ALJ noted first that this opinion was not consistent with the objective treatment notes. Notably, nothing in Plaintiff's therapy notes with Ms. Murray reflect an inability to get along with co-workers, and instead those treatment notes reflect that Plaintiff was focused on particular concerns regarding her daughter's behavior and her mother's health. In addition, the ALJ found that Ms. Murray's assessment was "based on [Plaintiff's] report of past work situations rather than her own independent judgment." (Tr. at 21.) In this regard, Ms. Murray's form specifically asked her to identify the factors that supported her assessment. With respect to social functioning, including the marked limitation in interacting with co-workers, Ms. Murray stated that her assessment was based on "Cindy's report of past work situations. I assume these issues remain if she was working now." (Tr. at 757.) Thus, Ms. Murray herself stated that the only basis for her assessment was Plaintiff's "report of past work situations" that Ms. Murray "assumed" would remain, and the ALJ discounted her opinion on that basis.

Thus, as to all of the opinion evidence, the ALJ explained the weight being given and the reasons for assigning more or less weight. Those determinations are supported by substantial evidence in the record, cited and relied upon by the ALJ. To the extent that Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to re-weigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion than the ALJ, it is not the function of this Court to re-weigh the evidence or reconsider the ALJ's determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence. As noted above, "[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ." Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. Thus, the issue before the Court is not whether a different fact-finder could have drawn a different conclusion, or even "whether [the claimant] is disabled," but rather, "whether the ALJ's finding that [the claimant] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Craig, 76 F.3d at 589. Here, the ALJ reviewed the evidence, explained her decision, and supported that explanation with substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis for remand.

C. DOT Conflict

Finally, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination at step four and step five. Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ failed to properly identify Plaintiff's prior work at step four of the sequential analysis. On this issue, Plaintiff notes that Plaintiff's past work was a composite job of forklift driver and office helper, and the ALJ concluded only that she could do her past work of office helper. However, even if this was error at step four, the ALJ made an alternative step five finding, concluding that even if Plaintiff could not return to her past work, there were other jobs in the national economy that she could perform. Thus, any error at step four was rendered harmless by the alternative finding at step five.

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determination at step five, based on alleged conflicts between the vocational expert's testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. In Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit clarified the steps an ALJ must take to identify and resolve apparent conflicts between a vocational expert's testimony and the DOT. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that, if an expert's testimony apparently conflicts with the DOT, the expert's testimony can only provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision if the ALJ received an explanation from the expert explaining the conflict and determined both that the explanation was reasonable and that it provided a basis for relying on the expert's testimony rather than the DOT. Pearson, 810 F.3d at 209-10; see also Rholetter v. Colvin, 639 F. App'x 935, 938 (4th Cir. 2016).

In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that the vocational testimony on which the ALJ relied at step five of the sequential analysis conflicted with the DOT. In particular, Plaintiff challenges the vocational expert's testimony that the jobs he identified could accommodate alternating between sitting and standing. However, the vocational expert addressed this issue and said:

(Tr. at 53.) Given this testimony, the ALJ then specifically addressed the issue in her decision by noting the potential conflict particularly as to the sit/stand option, and finding that

(Tr. at 23.) Thus, the issue was identified and the ALJ received testimony from the Vocational Expert explaining the potential conflict. The ALJ then explicitly determined both that the explanation was reasonable and that it provided a basis for relying on the expert's testimony rather than the DOT. Plaintiff now argues that, because the expert did not testify that he relied on his "education, training, professional knowledge, and experience," but rather his "professional association as a resource," the ALJ's reliance on his explanation was unsupported. However, in the context presented, the ALJ's understanding of that testimony is reasonable.9 The apparent conflict was thus addressed and resolved to the extent required by Pearson, and the Vocational Expert's testimony provides substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion.

Plaintiff further contends that two of the step five jobs, namely parts cleaner and mail sorter, include apparent conflicts with no explanation. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the job of parts cleaner requires constant handling, directly contradicting the limitation to frequent handling included in the RFC. (Pl.'s Br. [Doc. #10] at 18). Defendant acknowledges this error, but argues that it is harmless in light of the additional jobs identified by the vocational expert. (Def.'s Br. [Doc. #13] at 19.) Plaintiff also contends that the reasoning level of three required for a mail sorter exceeds her mental RFC limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks.10 (Pl.'s Br. at 18-19.) However, as with the prior contentions, any such error is harmless, because even if the challenged jobs of parts cleaner and mail sorter are disregarded, the ALJ still found other jobs that exist in the national economy (specifically, 140,000 positions as a retail marker), that Plaintiff would be able to perform, based on the remaining representative position and the testimony of the vocational expert.11

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision finding no disability be AFFIRMED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment Reversing the Commissioner [Doc. #9] be DENIED, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. #12] be GRANTED, and that this action be DISMISSED with prejudice.