ERVIN, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from an order dismissing their declaratory judgment action for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. After careful consideration of Plaintiffs' challenges to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's order should be affirmed.
The present case arises from a dispute over the extent to which a charter school may apply for funds from the capital outlay fund of the county in which the charter school is located. Plaintiffs are charter schools, charter school students, and the parents of charter school students. Defendants are the State of North Carolina, various North Carolina counties in which charter schools are located, and the boards of education that have been established in those counties.
In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that "they receive disparate and discriminatory treatment in North Carolina by and through a discriminatory funding practice permitted and enforced by the Defendants" and that they were "being denied the opportunity to receive from counties or local
Based upon these allegations, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that: (1) "the charter school funding statutes are facially unconstitutional or unconstitutional to the extent they are applied to prohibit" Defendants from "extending to the Plaintiffs the opportunity to be uniformly considered for expenditures from the capital outlay fund" or that (2) the charter school funding statutes, "consistent with the North Carolina Constitution and other statutory provisions," either "permit" or "must permit" Plaintiffs to have the "opportunity to be uniformly considered for expenditures from the capital outlay fund by the County Defendants."
All Defendants sought dismissal of Plaintiffs' amended complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6). After hearing argument concerning Defendants' dismissal motion, the trial court entered an order dismissing Plaintiffs' amended complaint on 4 June 2010. Plaintiffs noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's order.
The standard of review utilized in reviewing orders granting dismissal motions made pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6), is well established:
Goodman v. Holmes & McLaurin Attorneys at Law, 192 N.C. App. 467, 473, 665 S.E.2d 526, 531 (2008) (quoting Bowman v. Alan Vester Ford Lincoln Mercury, 151 N.C. App. 603, 606, 566 S.E.2d 818, 821 (2002), and State ex rel. Cooper v. Ridgeway Brands Mfg., LLC, 184 N.C. App. 613, 618, 646 S.E.2d 790, 795 (2007) (internal quotation omitted), aff'd in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 362 N.C. 431, 666 S.E.2d 107 (2008), and citing Stephenson v. Town of Garner, 136 N.C. App. 444, 447, 524 S.E.2d 608, 611, disc. review denied, 352 N.C. 156, 544 S.E.2d 243 (2000)). We will now utilize this standard of review to evaluate Plaintiffs' challenges to the trial court's order.
The initial issue that we must address is whether a charter school has a legal right to apply for funding from the capital outlay fund maintained by the board of education in the county where the charter school is located. Based upon our analysis of the relevant statutory provisions, we conclude that charter schools are not entitled to request such funding.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29A "authorize[s] a system of charter schools to provide opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain schools that operate independently of existing schools[.]" Although charter schools are undoubtedly public schools, they are exempt from the obligation to comply with many of the statutory provisions that govern the operation of traditional public schools, according to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29E, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
The structure of public school budgeting and financial accounting is outlined in the "School Budget and Fiscal Control Act," which appears in Chapter 115C, Article 31, of the North Carolina General Statutes. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-426, which is entitled "Uniform Budget Format," specifies the required funding categories and provides, in pertinent part, that
Like other public schools, charter schools must comply with the procedural requirements specified in the statutory provisions governing the budget format. Francine Delany New School for Children, Inc. v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 150 N.C. App. 338, 346, 563 S.E.2d 92, 97 (2002), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 670, 577 S.E.2d 117 (2003) (stating that "[t]he Legislature clearly intended for charter schools to be treated as public schools subject to the uniform budget format."). However, the provisions of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-426, which are procedural in nature, do not address the substantive right of charter schools to seek funding from one or more of the categories enumerated in the budget format statutes. Instead, the resolution of that issue is governed by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29H, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
Thus, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29H expressly provides that charter schools are entitled to funds from just two of the three primary sources of local funding for schools set out in the uniform budget format—the local current expense appropriation and the local school administrative unit allotment. "In Francine Delany New Sch. for Children, Inc. v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 150 N.C. App. 338[, 346,] 563 S.E.2d 92[, 98] (2002), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 670, 577 S.E.2d 117 (2003), this Court held that the phrase `local current expense appropriation' in the Charter School Funding Statute, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29H(b), is synonymous with the phrase `local current expense fund' in the School Budget and Fiscal Control Act, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-426(e). Thus, the Charter Schools are entitled to an amount equal to the per pupil amount of all money contained in the local current expense fund." Sugar Creek Charter School, Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 188 N.C. App. 454, 460, 655 S.E.2d 850, 854, disc. review denied, 362 N.C. 481, 667 S.E.2d 460 (2008) (Sugar Creek I).
"It is well settled that statutes dealing with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia, `as together constituting one law.'" Williams v. Alexander County Bd. of Educ., 128 N.C. App. 599, 603, 495 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1998) (quoting Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 180-81, 261 S.E.2d 849, 854 (1980)). As we noted above, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-426 identifies three primary sources for the support of public schools: the local current expense fund, the State Public School Fund, and the capital outlay fund. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29H specifically provides that charter schools are entitled to receive funding from just two of these three funds. "`In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, the presumption is that it acted with full knowledge of prior and existing laws.' Further, `[o]ne of the long-standing rules of [statutory] interpretation and construction in this state is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.' Applying such principle here, because the language of [N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29H] specifically references only [the local current expense fund,] that language cannot be construed as a reference to another [fund, the capital outlay fund] not specifically mentioned, especially when the drafters were presumed to have been aware of that other [fund]." Bowles Automotive v. Div. of Motor Vehicles, ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 690 S.E.2d 728, 737 (quoting Williams v. Alexander County, 128 N.C.App. at 603, 495 S.E.2d at 408, and Mangum v. Raleigh Bd. of Adjust., 196 N.C. App. 249, 255, 674 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2009), and citing Hunt v. Reinsurance Facility, 302 N.C. 274, 290, 275 S.E.2d 399, 407 (1981)), disc. review denied, 364 N.C. 324, 700 S.E.2d 746 (2010). Thus, by specifically stating that charter schools are entitled to funding from the State allotment and the local current expense fund, the General Assembly intended to preclude charter schools from having access to county capital outlay funds. As a result, we conclude that, since "a county has no power to appropriate funds unless authorized to do so by the General Assembly," Hughey v. Cloninger, 297 N.C. 86, 88, 253 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1979), and since there is no statutory provision authorizing charter schools to receive monies from county capital outlay funds, the relevant statutory provisions do not allow charter schools access to county capital outlay funds.
In addition, other statutory provisions governing the operation of charter schools support our conclusion that the General Assembly intended for charter schools to be responsible for providing any needed physical facilities using their own resources. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29B(13) requires an application for authorization to establish a charter school to include " [i]nformation regarding the facilities to be used by the
Our conclusion that charter schools are not entitled to seek assistance from the relevant county's capital outlay fund is also consistent with other differences between the statutory provisions governing the manner in which traditional public schools and charter schools obtain needed facilities. For example, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-517 allows local boards of education to "acquire suitable sites for schoolhouses or other school facilities" and states that "condemnation proceedings to acquire same may be instituted by such board under the provisions of Chapter 40A of the General Statutes." A number of statutory provisions address in detail the construction and maintenance of buildings utilized by traditional public schools. For example, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-521 provides, among other things, that:
In addition, the construction of traditional public schools is subject to the extensive set of statutory requirements applicable to public contracts set out in N.C. Gen.Stat. § Chapter 143, Article 8. On the other hand, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-238.29E(e), which addresses the capital needs of charter schools, provides that:
As a result, an examination of the relevant statutory provisions indicates that:
We conclude that these differences between the statutory provisions governing the operation of traditional public schools and charter schools, although not conclusive, are consistent with our determination that charter schools are not intended to operate in the same manner as traditional public schools, a fact that reinforces our conclusion that charter schools are not entitled to have access to a county's capital outlay fund.
On at least one prior occasion, this Court made a determination consistent with the one that we have found to be appropriate in this case. In Sugar Creek I, the plaintiffs sought access to local funds that were not held in the local current expense fund. In response to that request, this Court opined that charter schools were only entitled to receive local funding from the local current expense fund, stating that:
Sugar Creek I, 188 N.C.App. at 461-62, 655 S.E.2d at 855-56 (emphasis added). Thus, in Sugar Creek I, this Court examined the statutes addressing public school funding, including the provisions of N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 115C-426 and 115C-238.29H; reasoned that, in addition to the local current expense fund, a school system had a capital outlay fund and might also have certain other funds; and explicitly stated that, among the funds made available to a local school board by its board of county commissioners, "the Charter Schools are only entitled to a pro rata share of all money in the local current expense fund." As a result, if we were to hold that, in addition to having access to the local current expense fund, charter schools are entitled to funding from the local capital outlay fund, such a holding would conflict with our reasoning in Sugar Creek I.
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the pertinent statutory provisions clearly preclude charter schools from seeking access to the capital outlay funds maintained in the counties in which they operate. Although there are certainly similarities between the ends sought to be served by both traditional public schools and charter schools, the statutory provisions applicable to each type of educational institution differ widely and clearly indicate that the capital needs of traditional public schools and charter schools should be met in different ways. As a result, we conclude that Plaintiffs' request that we interpret the relevant statutory provisions to provide charter schools with access to local capital outlay funds lacks merit.
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to access to the relevant county's capital outlay fund in light of the "express provisions of the North Carolina Constitution." Plaintiffs' argument hinges primarily on N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1) (2011), which provides that:
This constitutional provision is codified in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-1, which states, in part, that "[a] general and uniform system of free public schools shall be provided throughout the State, wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students, in accordance with the provisions of Article IX of the Constitution of North Carolina." According to Plaintiffs, N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1) requires that charter schools have access to the same funding sources as traditional public schools, including the capital outlay fund. We are not persuaded by Plaintiffs' argument.
The Supreme Court has clearly construed the education-related provisions of the North Carolina Constitution, including N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1), as follows:
Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997). At no point in their amended complaint have Plaintiffs asserted that the State, or any of its subdivisions, has failed to provide them with the constitutionally-mandated access to a sound basic education. Instead, Plaintiffs contend that N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1) both mandates that the General Assembly, the State, and the various counties in North Carolina provide for a uniform system of public schools affording all children in grades K— 12 access to a sound basic education and also forbids the General Assembly from establishing any other educational programs or schools. In essence, Plaintiffs argue that:
We do not believe that the constitutional provision upon which Plaintiffs rely is subject to such an interpretation.
At bottom, Plaintiffs' argument rests on the contention that "the North Carolina Constitution indicates that there is a single class of public schools[.]" Given that, in their
"The standards of constitutional interpretation are well established. It is elementary that the Constitution is a limitation, not grant, of power." Britt v. N.C. State Board of Education, 86 N.C. App. 282, 286, 357 S.E.2d 432, 434 (citing Mitchell v. Financing Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968)), disc. review denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987). "All power which is not expressly limited by the people in our State Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the people through their representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that Constitution." State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448-49, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989) (citations omitted).
Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 337, 410 S.E.2d 887, 891 (1991) (quoting Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. at 343, 410 S.E.2d at 896 (Mitchell, J., dissenting)).
In addition, Plaintiffs argue that the reference in N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1) to a "general and uniform" system of public schools affords them access to counties' capital outlay funds. In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs reason that: (1) charter schools, which are indisputably public schools, are necessarily part of the constitutionally-mandated "general and uniform system of free public schools" and that, (2) given their status as a component of the uniform system of public schools, they are entitled to funding identical to that available to other schools in the uniform public school system. As a result, Plaintiffs devoted a considerable portion of their brief to an attempt to demonstrate that charter schools are encompassed within the "general and uniform system of free public schools." Defendants, on the other hand, just as vigorously deny that charter schools are part of the uniform public school system. We need not resolve this issue, however, given that such a determination is not necessary in order for us to properly decide the issues raised by Plaintiffs' appeal.
Although charter schools are public schools, they differ from traditional public schools, as we have already noted, in some significant respects. Charter schools (1) have greater freedom to devise their own educational programs, (2) are entitled to a share of the local current expense fund just like traditional public schools, (3) have the responsibility for providing facilities within which to conduct their operations using their own resources, and (4) are not subject to the same building design rules as those applicable to traditional schools. Thus, charter schools and traditional schools are similar in some respects and different in others.
A charter school might be considered legally to be either (1) a component of the uniform system of public schools, created in addition to those schools required to provide access to a sound basic education and subject to different statutory guidelines and funding options than traditional public schools, or (2) as an optional educational program created outside of and in addition to the uniform system of public schools. As discussed above, we conclude that N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(1) does not forbid the State from establishing additional schools or educational programs to supplement those traditionally utilized to effectuate the constitutional mandate to provide access to a sound basic education. In view of the differences between charter schools and traditional public schools, we see no basis for constitutional concern arising from the use of differing funding mechanisms to support different types of public schools that are subject to different statutory provisions. Thus, since the funding mechanisms that the General Assembly has authorized for both traditional public schools and charter schools are constitutional regardless of whether charter schools are or are not components of the uniform public school system, we see no reason to decide whether charter schools are or are not parts of the general and uniform public school system.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that depriving them of access to counties' capital outlay funds violates the provisions of N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 3, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
As its language suggests, N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 3 addresses the distinction between general laws, which are applicable throughout the State, and local laws, which are only applicable in specified localities. See, e.g., Adams v. Dept. of N.E.R. and Everett v. Dept. of N.E.R., 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E.2d 402 (1978) (discussing the distinction between general laws and local acts). We do not believe that there is any "general law" issue in this case, since the statutory provisions governing elementary and secondary education are applied uniformly throughout North Carolina. In addition, nothing in N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 3 in any way limits the General Assembly's authority to create and provide funding mechanisms for optional schools that differ from those applicable to traditional public schools. As a result, Plaintiffs' argument in reliance on N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 3 lacks merit.
Finally, we conclude that Plaintiffs' remaining constitutional arguments lack merit as well. Plaintiffs assert that the North Carolina "Constitution authorizes the State and counties to provide funding to public charter schools for capital needs."
In addition, Plaintiffs cite N.C. Const. art. IX, § 2(2), which provides that local school boards "may use local revenues to add to or supplement any public school or post-secondary school program." Although this generalized provision authorizes the use of local funds for education-related purposes, it does not address the criteria that the General Assembly must utilize in making funding decisions or preclude the General Assembly
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court did not err by concluding that Plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and granting Defendants' dismissal motion. At bottom, the issue that we have been asked to resolve in this case is one that must be decided by legislative action instead of a judicial decision. As a result, the trial court's order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges ELMORE and THIGPEN concur.
1. Alternative learning programs or alternative schools, see N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C-105.47A;
2. Adult education programs, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-231;
3. Summer schools, see N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C233;
3. Extended services programs, see § 115C238.31;
4. Cooperative innovative high school programs, see § 115C-238.50;
5. The North Carolina School for the Deaf, Eastern North Carolina School for the Deaf, Governor Morehead School for the Blind, Early Intervention Services—Preschool, and Governor Morehead Preschool programs, all of which provide educational programs for specific targeted populations; and
6. A "Virtual High School" employing computer-based education, see N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 115C-81, and 238.50;
The curriculum, funding, and other features of these programs differ from those utilized in or available to traditional public schools. In the event that we were to find that Plaintiffs' constitutional argument had merit, the statutes governing the operation of all of these educational institutions, facilities and programs would be subject to a constitutional challenge as well.
